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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR 
2007 Manuscript Awards 
I am pleased to announce the following winners of the an-
nual AHJ Manuscript Competition for Volume 34 (2007) which 
awards $500 for the article judged best by the editorial board 
and $250 for each of two others for excellence: 
WINNER: Charles (Bill) W. Wootton and Barbara E. Kemmerer, 
"The Emergence of Mechanical Accounting in the 
U.S., 1880-1930" 
RUNNERS-UP: John (Dick) R. Edwards and Stephen P. Walker, 
"Accountants in the British Census" 
Jean L. Heck and Robert E. Jensen, "An Analy-
sis of the Evolution of Research Contributions 
by The Accounting Review, 1925-2005" 
Congratulations for these fine pieces of work. 
New Editors (2009-2011) 
The Academy of Accounting Historians has selected Richard 
Fleischman and Christopher Napier to be joint editors of AHJ 
for the next three-year term, commencing January 1, 2009. 
Professor Fleischman will coordinate the review of submitted 
papers that appear to be oriented toward the Western Hemi-
sphere, either by virtue of topical area or authorship. Professor 
Napier will process papers emanating from the remainder of 
the world. Editor Fleischman would like to express thanks to 
Christopher for agreeing to share editorial duties. 
Dr. Fleischman would also like to thank Cheryl McWatters who 
is retiring after many years of meritorious service to AHJ as In-
terfaces editor. Since Cheryl is irreplaceable, the new coeditors, 
not wishing to see the highly successful feature perish, will at-
tempt to muddle along jointly in the shoes Cheryl now vacates. 
vi 
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Masayoshi Noguchi
TOKYO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
and
John Richard Edwards
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND 
OLIGARCHY: THE CASE OF THE ICAEW
Abstract: This paper examines the difficulty of achieving representa-
tive and effective governance of a professional body. The collective 
studied for this purpose is the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (formed 1880) which, throughout its existence, 
has possessed the largest membership among British accounting as-
sociations. Drawing on the political theory of organization, we will 
explain why, despite a series of measures taken to make the constitu-
tion of its Council more representative between formation date and 
1970, the failure of the 1970 scheme for integrating the entire U.K. 
accountancy profession remained attributable to the “detachment of 
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker, 2001, 
p. 277]. We also trace the failure of attempts to restore the Council’s 
authority over a period approaching four decades since that “disaster” 
occurred [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637]. 
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary associations in common with organizational enti-
ties in general have at the apex of their administrative structure 
a body charged with the responsibility of leadership. In the case 
of professional associations, such leadership has as a central 
motivation the pursuit of the professional project on behalf of 
its members. However, Macdonald [1995, pp. 57-58, 204-205] ex-
plains how the membership of a professional body can constrain 
the capacity of its leadership to mobilize economic, social, po-
Acknowledgments: We express our gratitude and appreciation to Stephen 
P. Walker, Trevor Boyns, Roy Chandler, and Malcolm Anderson for constructive 
comments made at draft stages of this paper. This study has also benefited from 
helpful comments made by participants at the 2004 World Congress of Account-
ing Historians in St. Louis and Oxford, the 2004 Annual Conference of the As-
sociation of Accounting Historians at Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan, and 
from the inputs of two anonymous referees. Financial support from the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation 
(small grant ref: 4949) is gratefully acknowledged.
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litical, and organizational resources in pursuit of a professional 
project. Using the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) for this case study, we find no shortage of 
examples of this happening in the last ten years or so. For ex-
ample, the Council’s 2001 proposal to restructure the ICAEW’s 
traditional district society system was overtly challenged and 
contended in a poll [Accountancy, August 2001, p. 12]. Council’s 
plans in1996 and 1999 to introduce electives (optional papers) 
into the ICAEW’s final examinations met strong opposition and 
were rejected by the membership [Accountancy, February 1996, 
p. 11; July 1999, p. 6]. Indeed, members have been proactive as 
well as reactive in challenging the authority of Council. Initia-
tives taken in 1996 and 1998, designed to achieve direct election 
of the ICAEW president by the membership rather than by the 
Council, although defeated in a poll, have been judged to effect a 
diminution of its credibility [Accountancy, February 1996, p. 12; 
July 1998, p. 20]. 
Momentous events that further highlight the persistent lack 
of authority on the part of the Council are the series of failed 
merger initiatives, including a number in the recent past, where 
the aspirations of the ICAEW’s leadership were thwarted by the 
membership. The fragmented organizational structure of the 
U.K. accountancy profession can be traced to the diverse nature 
of the work undertaken by British accountants in the second 
half of the 19th century [Edwards and Walker, 2007]. Merger 
initiatives have been intended to reduce the plethora of societies 
which, for example, totaled at least 17 in the early 1930s [Stacey, 
1954, p. 138] and, as a result, produce the advantages associated 
with a more unified accountancy profession [Shackleton and 
Walker, 2001, p. 166; Council Minutes Book Y, p. 148]. There 
have of course been important instances of successful mergers 
which include amalgamation of the five societies formed in Eng-
lish cities (Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Sheffield) during 
the 1870s to create the ICAEW in 1880; combination of the three 
city-based (Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Glasgow) societies formed 
in Scotland in the 19th century to create the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) in 1951; and the merger of 
the London Association of Accountants and the Corporation of 
Accountants in Scotland to form, in 1939, what is today known 
as the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants [Edwards, 
2003]. The only other major reorganization of the British ac-
counting profession occurred in 1957 when the second largest 
accountancy body in Britain, the Society of Incorporated Ac-
countants and Auditors, was dissolved with its members joining 
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one or other of the then three chartered bodies. 
There has been no further merger involving any of the 
senior professional bodies in Britain for half a century, during 
which time many initiatives have in fact been mounted only 
to have then foundered. The first of these marked an event 
which serves as the focal point for this study – the “disaster” 
[Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637] that occurred when the 
ICAEW’s membership rejected its leadership’s plan to merge 
all six senior accountancy bodies in 1970. Subsequent aborted 
merger plans include the ICAS with the ICAEW in 1989, the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
with the ICAEW in 1990 and 2005, and the Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants with the ICAEW in 1996 and 2004. 
The reasons for failure are seen to be broadly common, “internal 
wrangling and fiercely guarded brand values” [Perry, 2004].1 
Every time a proposed merger fails, division between the 
ICAEW Council and its membership is highlighted [Wild, 2005], 
the authority of Council is problematized, and more representa-
tive arrangements in the Council’s composition are demanded. 
For example, a letter published in Accountancy [July 1996, p. 
130] stated that:
Elected but out of touch…Not only is there no means 
by which the elected Council members do receive the 
views of their constituents, but their behavior in recent 
years has shown them to be seriously out of touch with 
members’ wishes. The issue of merger, for example, has 
shown time and time again that the Council members 
did not know, or chose to ignore, the view of their con-
stituents.
The purposes of this study are to explain why the ICAEW 
Council came to be “detached” from the interests of the mem-
bership, lost its authority with the membership, and subse-
quently failed to re-establish it. To achieve these objectives, the 
remainder of this paper is constructed in the following manner. 
First, we locate our study within the relevant prior accounting 
history literature. Next, we review germane features of the politi-
cal theory of organization to establish an analytical framework 
for examining the intra-organizational dynamics between dif-
ferent groups of members within the ICAEW. We then consider 
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations succeeded in making 
provision for a democratically run organization and identify 
1 See also, “Membership ‘Time Bomb’ Drives ICAEW Merger Plan” [2004] and 
“Members Split on ICAEW-CIMA-CIPFA Merger” [2004].
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and distinguish types of criticisms directed in practice at the 
representative character of the leadership by members and the 
professional press. In so doing, and by reference to the analyti-
cal framework, we trace and analyze the reform of the arrange-
ments made for the election of ICAEW councilors during the 
period prior to 1970, and consider their effectiveness. We then 
examine the reasons for the collapse of the scheme for integrat-
ing the entire British accountancy profession, drawing attention 
to and presenting evidence to demonstrate the “detachment of 
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker, 
2001, p. 277]. Finally, we examine and analyze the failure of nu-
merous attempts to restore the Council’s authority over a period 
approaching four decades since that calamity occurred.
The main primary sources consulted for the purpose of 
this study are located at the Guildhall Library, London, and the 
ICAEW’s office in Milton Keynes. 
INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS IN  
ACCOUNTING HISTORY
There exists a substantial critical literature on the profes-
sionalization of accountancy which is marked by studies of 
closure strategies2 pursued by professional accountancy bodies. 
Many of the works of this genre focus on external relationships – 
inter-organizational, inter-occupational, and, particularly, state-
profession – in the endeavor to offer a “coherent explanation 
of why some occupations [or segments] successfully become 
accepted as professionalized whilst others do not” [Cooper and 
Robson, 1990, p. 374]. There is also a developing literature that 
spotlights the significance of intra-organizational relationships 
within an accountancy body, focusing, in the main, on dichoto-
mies between the leadership and the rank-and-file. 
Extending work on closure strategies, one strand of the 
studies of internal relationships examines the interface between 
the accounting profession and the state. Chua and Poullaos 
[1993] include an examination of the need to address the con-
cerns of practitioners and non-practitioners when Victorian ac-
countants were attempting to secure state recognition by royal 
charter between 1885 and 1906. Carnegie et al. [2003] employ 
the prosopo grahical method of inquiry to explain why key 
members of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, 
2 Murphy [1984, p. 548] defines closure as “the process of mobilizing power in 
order to enhance or defend a group’s share of rewards or resources.” 
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transferred their allegiance to the Australasian Corporation of 
Public Accountants in order to better pursue acquisition of a 
charter for those in public practice. Richardson’s [1989, p. 415] 
study of the regulation of accountancy “illustrates the relation-
ship between the internal social order of the profession and its 
involvement in corporatist structures in one particular jurisdic-
tion,” that of Ontario, Canada. He draws on Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony to examine the way in which consent was manu-
factured and dissent managed during creation of the Public Ac-
countants Council. Shackleton’s [1995, p. 40] study of Scottish 
chartered accountants up to World War I reveals “significant 
schisms” within the membership of the dominant Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh that problematized relationships 
with the state over the period 1853-1916. Noguchi and Edwards’ 
[2004a] study of the ICAEW leadership’s determination to ensure 
that its 1944 submission to the Cohen Committee on Company 
Law Amendment was consistent with state priorities resulted in 
rejection of unwelcome proposals put forward by district societ-
ies and refusal of requests to make independent submissions. 
Noguchi and Edwards [2004b] reveal disagreement between 
practicing and industrial members concerning how to tackle the 
pressing issue of inflation accounting between 1948 and 1966, 
and demonstrate how the Council of the ICAEW resolved this 
internal conflict within the constraints imposed by the need to 
be seen to behave in the “public interest.”
A second type of intra-organizational investigation focuses 
on the interaction between the leadership and the membership 
of an accountancy body over contentious issues such as merger 
with other professional associations. Often, a key concern of the 
members is the loss of product branding which is deemed to be 
an important part of members’ identity in the marketplace and, 
therefore, “infused with value” [Richardson and Jones, 2007, 
pp. 135-136]. Richardson and Jones show the process through 
which the 2004 proposed merger between the Canadian Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants and CMA Canada failed, “largely 
because of the reaction of members of each association to ei-
ther the potential loss of their designation [in order to join the 
merged body] or the dilution of their ‘brand’ equity [by granting 
the continuing designation to new members through the merger 
rather than through traditional entry processes].” In the U.S., 
the AICPA’s global credential initiative was put to a vote, in 
January 2002, which “revealed a startling disconnect between 
the elite of the profession and the members in whose name they 
claimed to work” [Fogarty et al., 2006, p.16; see also, Shafer 
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and Gendron, 2005]. Within the British context, Shackleton and 
Walker’s [2001, p. 235] study of the period 1957-1970 explains 
how Henry Benson’s early (1966) acknowledgment of the fact 
that the merger “proposals would initially involve dilution and, 
therefore, a reduction in status as a starting point” proved too 
bitter a pill for ICAEW members to swallow. 
Following the second line of investigation, this study 
conducts a theoretically informed analysis of conflict of inter-
est between different groups of the membership arising from 
the constitutional arrangements made for the election of the 
ICAEW’s Council. In the next section, we review relevant aspects 
of the political theory of organization to establish the analytical 
framework for this study.
POLITICAL THEORY OF ORGANIZATION
Building on Max Weber’s thesis on bureaucracy, Michels 
[1962, p. 365] formulated a political theory called “the iron 
law of oligarchy” in his book Political Parties, first published in 
1911. “Whoever says organization, says oligarchy,” he argued, 
on the grounds that all forms of organization, as the inevitable 
outcome of their growth, eventually develop into an oligarchic 
polity despite the continued existence of formal democratic 
practices. Jenkins [1977, p. 569] called this facet of Michels’ iron 
law the “organizational transformation” thesis. Scott [2003, p. 
343] agrees that “most unions, most professional associations 
and other types of voluntary associations, and most political 
parties exhibit oligarchical leadership structures.” 
Emergence of Oligarchy: Following Cassinelli [1953], Jenkins 
[1977, p. 571] defines oligarchy as “the ability of a minority in an 
organization, generally the formal leadership, to make decisions 
free of controls exercised by the remainder of the organization, 
generally the membership,” and further explains: “For a volun-
tary organization officially committed to pursuing the interests 
of members…oligarchy means that the policies of the organiza-
tion reflect the preferences of elites rather than the views and 
interests of its members.”3
Oligarchy emerges because leaders of the organization wish 
to maintain their place on the ruling body and “because the po-
sitions provide them with economic rewards and social status” 
3 Leach [2005, p. 316] stated that “oligarchy is best understood as a particular 
distribution of illegitimate power that has become entrenched over time.”
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[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. Once leaders are appointed, they use 
their position to maintain, or if possible enhance, their power or 
attendant prestige by controlling the flow of information within 
the organization and mobilizing their political and organi-
zational resources, with the result that the rank-and-file of the 
organization are deprived of opportunities to exercise its own 
power to challenge the leadership [Lipset et al., 1956]. Accord-
ing to Jenkins [1977, p. 569]:
As the organization experiences membership increase, 
the ability of members to participate directly in the 
making of policy is curtailed. The members may retain 
formal control through the election of officers. How-
ever, growth also entails installation of centralized 
means of communication and formalized procedures. 
Both of these factors insulate officers from controls by 
members despite the check of periodic elections. Of-
ficers can use centralized communications to control 
the agenda of issues and can block challenges through 
formal procedures and administrative co-optation.
Importantly, the leaders have the power to co-opt junior 
officials who share their values and orientation, with the result 
that the oligarchy becomes self-perpetuating.
Subsequent Development of Political Theory: Empirical and 
theoretical studies that followed the Weber-Michels model of 
organization elaborated it along three main lines – an explica-
tion of the sources, dynamics, and consequences of the “iron 
law”; an empirical testing of the model; and “an examination of 
contingent circumstances in which the iron law does not take 
hold or when it is reversed” [Osterman, 2006, p. 622]. The third 
line is particularly significant because it amends the model’s 
universality by arguing that the advent of oligarchy is not inevi-
table, as Michels claimed, but contingent on a particular set of 
conditions.
The case for the contingent nature of oligarchy was per-
suasively presented by Zald and Ash [1966, pp. 328, 340], who 
criticized the Weber-Michels model as ignoring environmental 
factors surrounding organizations and insisted that “the Weber-
Michels model can be subsumed under a more general ap-
proach…which specifies the condition under which alternative 
transformation processes take place.” They examined various 
conditional terms, both internal and external (including interac-
tion with other organizations), and concluded that there is no 
evidence confirming the inevitable advent of oligarchy.
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The argument of Zald and Ash [1966] encouraged subse-
quent empirical studies of the contingent nature of oligarchy. 
Jenkins [1977, p. 570], drawing on the results of Edelstein and 
Warner [1976] and Rothschild-Whitt [1976], argued that the 
advent of oligarchy depends upon such factors as absence of 
influential factions, weak procedural guarantees in competitive 
elections, and differences in ideological commitments between 
elite and general members. Other studies identify the following 
additional conditions that influence whether oligarchy emerges 
– characteristics and social status of the organization’s members 
[Lipset et al., 1956; Clemens, 1993], decision-making structure, 
characteristics of the leadership, and age of the organization 
[Staggenborg, 1988; Minkoff, 1999].
Germane to this study, the question of how organizations 
can reverse or break away from an oligarchic situation has also 
been actively researched [Osterman, 2006, p. 625]. Voss and 
Sherman [2000, p. 304] examined the revitalization process of 
the American labor movement that had suffered “the entrenched 
leadership and conservative transformation associated with 
Michels’s iron law of oligarchy,” while Isaac and Christiansen 
[2002] depicted the process of how workplace labor militancy 
was revitalized by civil rights movement insurgencies and 
organi zation. The most widely recognized phenomenon caused 
by oligarchy is loss of commitment and energy on the part of the 
membership, which Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334] called “becalm-
ing.” Piven and Cloward [1977] described how membership’s en-
ergy is lost when an organization for a poor peoples’ movement 
becomes bureaucratized, while Voss and Sherman [2000] re-
vealed that the decline of the labor union movement was caused 
by the loss of membership commitment. In the context of the 
labor union movement, Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 304-305, 
309] identified three pre-conditions for overcoming oligarchic 
symptoms and restoring organizational vitality:
First, some local unions experienced an internal po-
litical crisis that fostered the entry of new leadership, 
either through international union intervention or 
 local elections. Second, these new leaders had activist 
experience in other social movements, which led them 
to interpret labor’s decline as a mandate to organize 
and gave them the skills and vision to implement new 
or ganizing programs using disruptive tactics. Finally, 
inter national unions with leaders committed to organiz-
ing in new ways facilitated the entry of these activists 
into locals and provided locals with the resources and 
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legitimacy to make change that facilitated the process 
of organizational transformation. 
Voss and Sherman further suggest potential for their findings 
to be applicable to other organizations by stating that the fac-
tors identified “provide a useful template with which to examine 
other institutionalized organizations that innovate in a radical 
direction or fail to do so.”4 Among the factors Voss and Sherman 
identified, political crisis within the organization5 and an influx 
of new leaders to wield influence, are of importance to this 
study. 
We can therefore conclude that the political theory of or-
ganization is a promising basis for analyzing the problematic 
leadership of the ICAEW because the theory postulates that all 
leaderships have the potential to become oligarchic as they 
grow; the theory is applicable to voluntary associations such as 
professional bodies; the theory suggests that the leadership’s de-
termination to maintain control causes them to pursue policies 
that are in their interests rather than those of the general mem-
bership; and growth in size and the development of organiza-
tional structures limit the members’ power to influence/control 
the leadership. But the theory also acknowledges the fact that 
oligarchy is not inevitable; it depends on internal conditions and 
can be overcome in appropriate environmental circumstances.
CONSTRUCTING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED COUNCIL
The organizational structure of the ICAEW consists of the 
Council and a variety of sub-systems which include district so-
cieties and numerous Council-appointed committees. The Royal 
Charter (1880) gave Council responsibility for the management 
and superintendence of the Institute’s affairs and, as “the policy-
making body,” it has reigned over the ICAEW throughout its his-
tory. Given the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to consider 
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations match the theoretical 
characteristics of a democratically created organization.
According to Merton [1966, pp. 1057-1058], “The democrat-
ic organization provides for an inclusive electorate of members 
4 Voss and Sherman [2000, p. 345] added that “the elements of crisis, new 
leaders with novel interpretations, and centralized pressure are likely to be key.”
5 Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 327, 343] identified disastrous strikes and mis-
management of the local union as examples of political crises and concluded: 
“These crises were important primarily because they resulted in a change in lead-
ership” and that “radical changes necessitate new leadership.” 
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and for regularly scheduled elections.” Merton adds: “The demo-
cratic organization must provide for initiatives of policy to come 
from elected representatives and to be evaluated by the member-
ship through recurrent elections of representatives.” Thus, 
In one form or another, a democracy must provide for 
a legislative body: a Congress, a Parliament, or a House 
of Delegates…It is, therefore, all the more important 
that a voluntary association’s legislative body, which 
usually represents the near-ultimate authority of the as-
sociation, be representative of the diverse interests and 
values of the entire membership. 
The ICAEW’s Royal Charter provided that the power of the 
Council should be subject to the control and regulation of spe-
cial and annual general meetings (AGMs). The original by-laws 
provided for the Council to consist of 45 members of whom the 
nine longest serving were required to retire each year and were 
eligible for re-election. Filling a vacancy on the Council required 
formal approval at an AGM. Provision was made for additional 
candidates to be nominated in writing by ten members. In the 
event of a vacancy occurring between AGMs, the Council was 
empowered to appoint a replacement who would retire and be 
eligible for re-election on the same date as the person replaced. 
At meetings of the ICAEW, members had equal voting rights 
and, therefore, were able to make their voices heard and views 
reflected in the organization’s affairs, either directly through the 
approval of major decisions taken by the Council (e.g., propos-
als to reform the by-laws) or indirectly through the elections of 
councilors. 
CRITICISM OF LEADERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
The previous section reveals that the policy formulation 
and decision-making criteria for a democratically run organiza-
tion were formally satisfied in the case of the ICAEW, and one 
might therefore expect the legislative body, the Council, to be 
“representative of the diverse interests and values of the entire 
membership” [Merton, 1966, p. 1058]. In practice, the Council 
was, from very early on, judged by both the membership and the 
accounting press to consist instead of self-perpetuating elites. 
There were four inter-related elements in the criticism of how 
the ICAEW’s leadership was constituted in practice – over-repre-
sentation of leading firms, unbalanced geographical representa-
tion, biased re-election arrangements, and non-representation of 
business members.
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Over-Representation of Leading Firms: The ICAEW’s first Council 
included five cases of two members coming from a single ac-
counting firm.6 Apart from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co., these 
were all London partnerships. The author of the ICAEW’s official 
history, himself a former president, records that criticism of this 
feature of the Council’s composition was aired early on [Howitt, 
1966, p. 28]:
It was advanced that the affairs of the Institute were be-
ing handled by too small and privileged a circle, and at 
the second Annual General Meeting in 1883 a motion 
was proposed to prevent any firm of accountants from 
being represented by more than one member on the 
Council…The question remained a contentious one.
The Council’s response was that this arrangement had been 
given “the most grave consideration…at the foundation of the 
Institute” [Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 13] but allowed to stand. 
Indeed, it had been created because of the desire to present a 
strong public profile. According to councilor C.F. Kemp, cit-
ing the example of representations made to the government 
concerning the Bankruptcy Bill 1883, “it was necessary to bring 
the greatest possible influence they could obtain to bear, and…
without the recognised names which they possessed they [the 
ICAEW] would not be in the position which they now occupied” 
[Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 11]. However, to prevent any fur-
ther extension of the representation of leading firms, it became 
an “unwritten rule” that “not more than two partners in the 
same firm should serve on the Council at the same time” [Coun-
cil Minute Book Y, p. 4; File 1490].7
Geographical Representation: The ICAEW was originally formed 
from the amalgamation of five societies, of which four primar-
ily catered for public accountants working in the cities where 
they were formed – Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Shef-
6 E. Guthrie and C.H. Wade from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co.; R.P. Harding 
and F. Whinney from Harding, Whinney & Co.; A.C. Harper and E.N. Harper from 
E. Norton Harper & Sons; W. Turquand and J. Young from Turquand, Youngs & 
Co.; and W.W. Deloitte and J.G. Griffiths from Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co.
7 This rule was abandoned in 1966 because “it could prohibit members who 
could give valuable service to the Institute as members of the Council from being 
appointed to the Council” [Council Minute Book Y, p. 42]. From that date, Council 
adopted a “rule of guidance” that “not more than three members in direct part-
nership relationship may serve concurrently as members of the Council” [Council 
Minute Book Z, p. 92].
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field. The inaugural 45 Council seats were, with two exceptions,8 
allocated between the founding associations [Howitt, 1966, 
p. 24]9 and, therefore, were inevitably heavily biased in favor 
of those geographical areas. The geographical distribution of 
Council membership was questioned at the very first AGM held 
on June 7, 1882, when A. Murray suggested that “Such towns as 
Newcastle and Bristol should be represented” [Accountant, June 
10, 1882, p. 10]. G.B. Monkhouse, Newcastle upon Tyne, and 
E.G. Clarke, Bristol, were appointed to the Council later that 
year, and the 1883 AGM was informed that Council had been 
“strengthened” by the election of these “eminent accountants 
from districts hitherto unrepresented” [Accountant, May 5, 1883, 
p. 13]. 
The ICAEW’s leadership did not immediately embrace en-
thusiastically the notion of geographical equality, however, with 
the General Purposes Committee (GPC) deciding in July 1888 
that “it is not desirable to go into statistics of membership with a 
view to redistribution of the members of the Council among the 
various districts in proportion to the members of the Institute 
residing in those districts” [Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Within a decade, 
we detect a softening of the GPC’s stance when recommending 
in October 1897 that south Wales be represented for the first 
time on the Council through the appointment of R.G. Cawker 
[Ms.28416/2, pp. 10, 15]. Council again remained unmoved, but 
gradually responded to pressure for provincial representation so 
that, by 1901, a revised quota system had been instituted. Of the 
45 available places, 12 were allocated to the four existing socie-
ties (Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and Northern) and 
a further eight to major cities. The remaining 25 places were 
reserved for London members.
The opening move to improve further provincial represen-
tation occurred at the 1901 AGM when W.R. Hamilton of Not-
tingham complained of “the over-representation of London” and 
requested the Council to take steps designed to achieve repre-
sentation on the Council “in some measure corresponding to the 
[geographical] distribution of accountants” [Accountant, May 4, 
1901, pp. 534-535]. This plea met with a stonewalling response 
8 Through effective political manoeuvring [Walker, 2004, chapter 11], Edwin 
Guthrie and Charles Henry Wade, who belonged to none of the five merging in-
stitutions, were not only admitted as founder members but were also allocated 
seats on the Council. 
9 Of 45 Council seats, 20 were allocated to the Institute of Accountants, 14 to 
the Society of Accountants, three to the Manchester Institute (in addition to Wade 
and Guthrie), and three each to the Liverpool Society and the Sheffield Institute.
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from Ernest Cooper, president 1899-1901, who insisted that “all 
they [the Council] desired was the best possible process of get-
ting the best possible men on the Council” [Accountant, May 4, 
1901, p. 536], further explaining that the role of the quota sys-
tem was to help maintain “a fair proportion between the country 
members and the London members.” If, instead, the matter was 
left to the general body of members, Cooper believed that the 
inevitable result would be “to elect far more London men than 
at present, because the great body would be in London” [Ac-
countant, May 4, 1901, pp. 536-537].10
Continued and persistent complaints from provincial 
members eventually produced positive results, with the grant of 
Council representation often appearing to follow as a reward for 
forming a local society.11 A wider degree of provincial members’ 
representation on Council was therefore achieved, with the se-
lection of members being made by the Council based on nomi-
nations from provincial societies. However, wider representation 
for the provinces did not necessarily mean increased representa-
tion. By 1950, 13 provincial societies had been created, and the 
number of Council members assigned to them was 21, only one 
seat more than the 1901 allocation. The majority (24) of Council 
seats continued to be assigned to London members.
Re-election Arrangements: There were a number of features of 
the re-election arrangements which were thought to have per-
petuated control by elites on the Council and to have made it 
difficult to counter its biased composition both in terms of geog-
raphy and the favoritism accorded the leading firms.
Those retiring by rotation were routinely re-elected, causing 
a contributor to The Accountant to complain that “the Council is 
not representative as it should be by the Bye-laws of the Charter. 
For the last nineteen years (I think without a single exception) 
the Council have re-elected themselves!” [Accountant, June 9, 
1900, p. 533]. Criticisms were also directed, persistently and 
vehemently, at the practice of the Council filling vacancies that 
arose between annual meetings, an action which, it was felt, de-
10 The dissatisfaction among Nottingham members was settled in 1907, 
when T.G. Mellors of Mellors, Basden & Mellors, Nottingham was appointed to 
the Council. The Accountant [December 14, 1907, p. 726] reported that “The ap-
pointment is an excellent one in every way; but perhaps especially so because it 
removes a grievance under which Nottingham has been suffering for some years 
past.”
11 Nottingham (1907), South Wales (1913), Leicester (1930), South Eastern 
Society (1939), East Anglian Society (1939)
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prived the membership from having its say at the next AGM: “If 
a councillor dies or retires a Mr. Brown or a Mr. Jones is given 
the situation, and the members who annually retire by rotation 
are re-elected nem. con” [Accountant, June 9, 1900, p. 533].12 
The issue was raised at the 1901 AGM when Hamilton referred 
“to the very old grievance of the filling-up of vacancies occurring 
in the Council during the year by the Council, instead of leaving 
those vacancies to be filled up by the members” [Accountant, 
May 4, 1901, p. 534]. Proposals that casual vacancies should 
be left unfilled until the next AGM, made at Council meetings 
by such luminaries as Frederick Whinney in 1882 and George 
Walter Knox in 1885, met with no success [Ms.28411/1, pp. 167, 
402; see also, Ms.28411/2, p. 300; Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Indeed, on 
October 14, 1896, Council explicitly resolved “not to make any 
departure from the existing practice” of filling casual vacancies 
[Ms.28411/4, p. 115]. 
It could well be argued that the members literally had the 
solution in their own hands, but that they failed to exercise it. 
A supplementary report of the GPC, dated February 26, 1919, 
stated that “there has been no notice nominating candidates in 
opposition to retiring members of the Council for the last 32 
years” [Ms.28435/16]. Nor has our examination of the available 
archival data revealed a single instance of retirement by rotation 
leading to a change in Council membership. The Accountant 
[May 5, 1894, p. 408] makes the reasonable point that it was 
“a very invidious task for the ordinary members to object to 
persons who had once been elected.” But members’ inaction 
enabled the Council to respond to criticism as follows: “On one 
occasion a vote was taken, so that the rules of procedure did not 
prevent the introduction of anybody;13 or at any rate the testing 
of the feeling of the members in regard to any person who might 
be put forward” [Accountant, May 5, 1894, p. 408; see also, May 
9, 1896, p. 396].14
The issue of Council control over new appointments also 
had a more general dimension. When a member of a provincial 
12 See also, Accountant, May 13, 1893, p. 453; May 5, 1894, p. 408; May 12, 
1894, p. 423; May 12, 1894, pp. 424-425; December 21, 1895, p. 1031; May 9, 1896, 
p. 396; June 23, 1900, p. 573; March 18, 1901, p. 327.
13 This justification was somewhat disingenuous given that the vote took place 
only because of Council’s failure, due to an oversight, to fill a vacancy created by 
a member’s sudden resignation.
14 The case referred to was probably the only instance we have found of an 
election taking place, resulting in the appointment to Council of F.H. Collison, 
London, in May 1887 [Accountant, May 2, 1887, p. 271].
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society retired, the society had the right to put forward nomina-
tions for his replacement, but the Council reserved the power to 
choose between the nominees. The position was even worse in 
London where the appointment remained entirely in the hands 
of the London Council members. The autocratic nature of this 
prerogative is further underlined by the fact that the London 
members of the Council maintained, from 1899 onwards, “wait-
ing lists” of prospective councilors “in order to ensure continuity 
in the work of the Council and the maintenance of its traditions” 
[Ms.28435/16, emphasis added]. 
It was mainly to address this latter situation that, in July 
1920, a group of younger London members pressed for the 
creation of “a Society of Chartered Accountants for London on 
lines similar to the existing Provincial Societies…to act together 
in a corporate capacity upon questions which arise from time to 
time affecting the interests of the profession” [Accountant, July 
17, 1920, p. 58; see also, Loft, 1990, p. 39]. To appear to respond 
positively to the London members’ concerns, the Council estab-
lished instead the London Members’ Committee. This arrange-
ment failed to satisfy the London members’ principal aspiration 
which was to achieve “the privilege,” in common with provincial 
societies, of “nominating men to fill vacancies on the Council 
as and when such vacancies should arise for London men” [Ac-
countant, January 29, 1921, pp. 121-122]. The London Members’ 
Committee was, in the estimation of The Accountant [January 
29, 1921, pp. 121-122; see also, London Members’ Committee 
Minutes Book A, p. 4], designed only to facilitate social inter-
course among London members. 
It was to be a further 21 years (1942) before the anomaly 
was addressed and, even then, the London Members’ Committee 
(by this time called the London & District Society) was autho-
rized to make nominations to Council for filling a vacancy only 
after consultation with the London members of the Council.
The surviving records of recommendations made by London 
councilors and the nominations subsequently transmitted to 
the Council by the committee of the London & District Society 
prove fairly conclusively that the views of London councilors 
dominated the appointment process [London Members’ Com-
mittee Minutes Books B, p. 188; C, pp. 7, 108, 177, 200, 245, 
263; London & District Society Minutes Books D, pp. 74, 155, 
158; E, p. 3]. 
A final objectionable feature of re-election arrangements 
was the subject of a leading article in The Accountant [May 21, 
1904, p. 669; see also, Accountant, July 9, 1904, p. 41]: “Council 
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…hold office…by a sort of ‘apostolic succession’ from the origi-
nal Fathers of the Institute, and in no real sense have the general 
body of members had a voice in either their nomination or elec-
tion.” Apostolic succession meant that councilors, on death or 
resignation, would be replaced by another partner in the same 
firm, and this sometimes would literally involve a son succeed-
ing his father in that role. For example, in 1897, when Council 
rejected the request for south Wales representation, it instead 
appointed E. Edmonds in place of W. Edmonds of Portsmouth. 
Personal correspondence, dated November 29, 1925 from J. B. 
Woodthorpe to Sir William Henry Peat, a London councilor, 
concerning the death of John William Woodthorpe, also demon-
strates this version of apostolic succession: “I believe there are 
several precedents of a son succeeding his father on the Council, 
and, if this should happen in the present case, I should esteem 
it was a very great honour” [Ms.28435/16]. More often there 
would be no family connection, with a prominent example from 
this genre occurring when Samuel Lowell Price was succeeded 
by his founder partner Edwin Waterhouse in 1887. Overall, we 
can therefore conclude that in 1942 and beyond, the Council 
retained, substantively, the character of a self-elected body. 
A final feature of the non-representative composition of the 
Council concerns the complete exclusion throughout the first 60 
or so years of the ICAEW’s history of any representation whatso-
ever of business members. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Business Members: At the 1919 AGM, Mark Webster Jenkinson, 
a London practitioner, argued that “there is a very strong feeling 
among the members, particularly among the younger members, 
that some more progressive policy on the part of the Institute 
itself is necessary” [Accountant, May 10, 1919, pp. 398-399].15 
As the result of his work as controller of factory audit and costs 
at the Ministry of Munitions during World War I, Jenkinson 
had reached the conclusion that cost accounting was an area 
of growing importance, that chartered accountants knew less 
than they should about it and that, if they failed to “deliver the 
goods,” a new profession would spring up to fill the vacuum 
[Accountant, January 18, 1919, p. 46]. Jenkinson’s wide-ranging 
15 The Accountant [January 25, 1919, p. 54] reported on Jenkinson’s proposals 
as follows: “there can…be very little doubt that they will meet with very wide-
spread support among the members of the Institute, and particularly the younger 
members, especially when put forward by so undoubtable a champion of the 
younger generation’s rights as Mr. Webster Jenkinson.”
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proposals for reform included a system of proportional repre-
sentation to ensure fair treatment of each geographical district 
and, significantly, in light of his deep-seated concern about the 
appropriate future direction of the Institute, three councilors 
drawn from the non-practicing membership [Accountant, Janu-
ary 25, 1919, p. 54; Ms.28448]. 
Frederick John Young, president 1917-1919, responded by 
creating a committee to consider the subject consisting of ten 
members of the Council, nine representatives from each of the 
provincial societies, and two other London members of the In-
stitute [Accountant, May 10, 1919, p. 398]. A confidential letter, 
dated April 3, 1919, from R.H. March, a Cardiff councilor, to 
George Colville, secretary of the ICAEW, reveals that the Spe-
cial Committee was formed principally to pacify dissatisfaction 
among members [Ms.28448]:
the Council should not oppose any wishes which might 
be put forward by the general body of members for the 
consideration of this subject, and should be willing to 
listen to any suggestions which may be put forward for 
the welfare of the profession…if a little tact is shown 
now it may have the effect of preventing any show of 
 irritation or temper at the Annual Meeting. 
Given these sentiments and Council’s domination of the inves-
tigating committee, it is unsurprising that its report made no 
provision for non-practitioner representation on the Council. It 
did put forward certain recommendations, one of which might 
have proved significant in addressing Jenkinson’s concerns [Ac-
countant, February 7, 1920, p. 152; Ms.28448]:
(E) That the present procedure of the Council under 
which the Provincial Societies are consulted with re-
gard to the filling of casual vacancies of the Council un-
der Bye-law 10 be continued when such vacancy arises, 
and that as far as may be the representation of the Pro-
vincial Societies on the Council should be proportionate 
to the total membership in England and Wales. 
The Council endorsed the other recommendations without 
qualification, but specifically emphasized that “The present pro-
cedure as defined by the Committee under ‘E’ will be continued 
by the Council” [Accountant, February 7, 1920, p. 152, emphasis 
added; Ms.28448]. 
The issue of business members’ representation resurfaced 
as the numbers employed in industry and commerce became 
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more substantial. Table 1 reveals that around the time of Jenkin-
son’s intervention on behalf of business members, just 5% (191 
of 3,797) of the traceable membership worked in business. The 
position then changed dramatically. The number of business 
members roughly trebled in both the 1920s and 1930s and ac-
counted for 17.2% (1,612 of 9,349) of the traceable membership 
in England and Wales in 1939.
TABLE 1
Categorized Membership of the ICAEW in  
England and Wales in Selected Years
Members 31/08/1920 01/09/1929 31/10/1939 09/11/1946 01/12/1956
Public accountants 3,606 5,755 7,737 6,840 9,161
Business accountants 191 518 1,612 2,493 4,337
Total traceable 3,797 6,273 9,349 9,333 13,498
Not traceable16 995 1,444 2,838 2,854 3,409
Retired - - - - 415
Total 4,792 7,717 12,187 12,187 17,322
Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957.16
E.M. Taylor who, like Jenkinson, had stressed the growing 
importance of cost accounting in the aftermath of World War I 
[Accountant, June 19, 1920, p. 712], presented to the 1941 AGM 
the following resolution designed to address the absence of 
representation of the rising number of business members [Ms. 
28432/19, emphasis added]:
In the interests of the whole membership of the Insti-
tute, it is desirable that the Council shall include not 
less than five Associates, whether practising members or 
not, and that the members of the Council be invited to 
lay before the next Annual General Meeting of the Insti-
tute proposals to give effect to this policy. 
The Council instead introduced reforms that failed to ad-
dress directly the matter at issue. C.J.G. Palmour, president 
1938-1944, informed the 1942 AGM that non-practicing mem-
bers could “best serve the interests of those by whom they are 
16 Members for whom the listings contain, at best, private addresses are in-
cluded in the “Not traceable” category. The numbers of “Retired” members are not 
separately identified between 1920 and 1946 and, accordingly, are also included 
in “Not traceable” category. The proportion of “Not traceable,” when compared 
with the other categories, is stable at around 21.7%. Thus, the trend revealed by 
the statistics is considered to be a reasonably reliable indication of the increase in 
number of business members.
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employed and the country generally in taking an active part 
in those [technical] spheres rather than in attempting to apply 
their minds to matters affecting the administration of the affairs 
of practising accountants” [Accountant, May 30, 1942, p. 303]. 
The outcome was the formation of the path-breaking Taxation 
and Financial Relations Committee [Zeff, 1972, p. 8] to investi-
gate technical matters and, through its mixed membership, “es-
tablish an active and effective liaison between the practising and 
non-practising sides of the profession” [Ms.28432/19].
The Council’s success in again sidelining the representation 
issue, as occurred with the formation of the London Members’ 
Committee in 1920, was short-lived this time. The Council’s at-
titude towards the representation of business members was at 
last softening, possibly because of the rapidly rising proportion 
of business members, and perhaps in recognition of business 
members’ valuable contributions to the work of the Taxation 
and Financial Relations Committee. Between 1943 and 1948, the 
London and Manchester district societies successfully nominat-
ed four business members for positions on the Council. The situ-
ation was extended and formalized at the 1950 AGM when the 
president, Russell Kettle of Deloittes, announced the creation of 
a pool of up to five Council seats17 exclusively available to non-
practicing members. But he also reaffirmed “the principle” that 
“having regard to the objects for which the Royal Charter was 
granted, membership of the Council should as a general rule be 
confined to practising members” [Accountant, May 13, 1950, pp. 
541-542].
Continued pressure for a greater voice for business mem-
bers bore further fruit through the formation of a GPC Sub-
Committee (Non-Practising Members) in 1951 and the Consulta-
tive Committee of Members in Commerce and Industry in 1957 
to consider matters relating to the interests of business mem-
bers [GPC Minutes Book J, p. 180] and to convey “broad and 
exclusively non-practising opinion held by persons of eminence 
in industry and commerce” [GPC Minutes Book M, p. 175]. In 
the view of business members such as J. Clayton, however, the 
formation of such a committee was not the most effective means 
for improving the representation of the interest of business 
members. He argued [File 5-8-14] that: 
what was needed was proper integration of the two 
[practising and non-practising] sides of the profession 
18 As a consequence, the quota allocated to provincial societies was reduced 
from 21 to 19 and London from 24 to 21.
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and this could only be done by opening the Council 
to more non-practising members. Industrial opinion 
would then be properly assimilated at all levels and in 
all Committees. 
The Consultative Committee of Members in Commerce and 
Industry resolved in October 1962 that the GPC should be asked 
to support an increase in the size of the Council from 45 to 
60, with 15 seats to be allocated to members in commerce and 
industry [GPC Minutes Book R, p. 137]. Also, to help achieve 
“the right balance of sound judgment and experience on the one 
hand and special skills necessary to conduct the wide range of 
its work on the other” [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136], GPC 
recommended the introduction of a system of co-option of up to 
six additional members as “a reserve to be filled at the absolute 
discretion of the Council” [GPC Minutes Book S, p. 60]. These 
proposals were approved by a special general meeting of the 
ICAEW membership held on September 23, 1965 [Council Min-
utes Book W, p. 154]. As a result of seat re-allocations, the bal-
ance between practitioners in London and the provinces favored 
the latter for the first time in the history of the ICAEW, 24 seats 
compared with 21.
The above four inter-related criticisms, sustained over 
the period 1880-1970 and directed at the Council’s lack of fair 
representation of the membership, raise serious doubts over 
whether the democratic leadership arrangements contained 
in the ICAEW’s internal regulations were effective in practice. 
Certainly, many members thought the Council was not represen-
tative of the diverse interests of the membership, but were their 
criticisms justified? The next sub-section addresses this issue in 
three ways; namely, by examining the geographical allocation of 
council seats in relation to membership levels, the distribution 
of council seats in relation to the size and location of accounting 
firms, and the division of seats between accountants working in 
public practice and in business.
Analysis of Distribution of Council Seats: Over the period 1880-
1970, 308 individuals, including the founder councilors, were 
appointed to the Council [Ms.28411/1-14; Council Minutes 
Books O-AB], of whom 29 were members in industry and ten, 
including two further business accountants, were recruited 
when the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was 
absorbed into the three chartered institutes in 1957. The remain-
ing 269 were practicing members. 
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Numerical information concerning the membership of each 
of the main district societies and the number of Council seats 
allocated to the geographical areas that they covered at five dif-
ferent dates between 1907 and 1956 is given in Table 2. It reveals 
that London members were consistently over-represented on the 
Council, based on their share of total U.K. membership in com-
parison with most provincial societies at most dates. The over-
representation was greatest in 1907, but still material in 1956 
when each of the other identified geographical areas continued 
to be under-represented. As noted above, the number of seats 
allocated to the provincial districts exceeded those for London 
for the first time in 1965, with the result that London’s share fell 
from 52.5% to 46.7%. Even then, London members remained 
heavily over-represented as their contribution towards the total 
U.K. membership had declined to 37.5% by 1972 [Council Min-
utes Book AF, p. 231].18
To study allegations that Council membership was domi-
nated by a limited number of large, long-standing London firms, 
we have identified those which either had a member on the first 
Council of the ICAEW or were formed 15 years or more prior 
to 1880 [Boys, 1994, pp. 17-18, 56-58; see also, Parker, 1980, 
pp. 36, 39-42; Matthews et al., 1998, pp. 283-322]. This exercise 
produced a list of 30 London “founder” firms. The numbers of 
Council seats occupied by partners in these firms and quali-
fied accountants employed at these firms at five dates between 
1920 and 1956 are given in Table 3.19 Corresponding figures also 
appear in Table 3 for “other London firms” and “non-London 
firms” in England and Wales. We have applied the chi-square 
test to examine the statistical significance, if any, of the differ-
ence in levels of Council representation at each of the five dates 
between London founder firms and the other two groups. At the 
first two study dates (1920 and 1929), the results were signifi-
cant at the 5% level, given there is only one degree of freedom. 
For 1939, the test proved significant at the 10% level. For 1946 
and 1956, the results were significant at neither the 5% nor 10% 
18 The officially recorded justification for London’s preferment in terms of 
Council seats was the distance between many provincial areas and London where 
the meetings of the Council and its committees were held [Council Minutes Book 
O, p. 227; File 1487].
19 From the Companies Act 1862 to the Companies Act 1967, there existed a 
provision prohibiting, in principle, partnerships of more than 20 members. The 
number of qualified accountants employed in accountancy firms, rather than the 
number of partners, is therefore considered to be a better indication of the size of 
the accountancy firm.
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levels. Given these significance levels, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, before World War II, London founder firms were 
continuously over-represented on Council though this effect was 
diminishing, but that this was no longer the case after the war.20
TABLE 3 
ICAEW Membership and Council Seats by Type of Firm
London founder 
firms
Other London 
firms
Non-London 
firms
Total
1920 no.  % no. % no. % no.
Council seats 16 35.6% 10 22.2% 19 42.2% 45 100%
ICAEW members 148 20.6% 210 29.2% 362 50.3% 720 100%
1929
Council seats 15 33.3% 11 24.4% 19 42.2% 45 100%
ICAEW members 334 18.4% 540 29.8% 937 51.7% 1,811 100%
1939
Council seats 16 35.6% 8 17.8% 21 46.7% 45 100%
ICAEW members 601 23.8% 723 28.6% 1,203 47.6% 2,527 100%
1946
Council seats 16 35.6% 8 17.8% 21 46.7% 45 100%
ICAEW members 406 27.8% 338 23.1% 717 49.1% 1,461 100%
1956
Council seats 15 37.5% 6 15.0% 19 47.5% 40 100%
ICAEW members 681 32.4% 445 21.2% 976 46.4% 2,102 100%
Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957
To examine further the extent to which councilors were 
recruited by “a sort of ‘apostolic succession’” [Accountant, May 
21, 1904, p. 669], 60 long-standing provincial firms were identi-
fied through the same procedure used to detect the 30 London 
founder firms. From the combined list of 90 founder firms, we 
were able to calculate that 157 (58.4%) of the 269 councilors in 
public practice over the period 1880-1970 stemmed from those 
origins. Even if we exclude the original 45 members, we find that 
112 (50.0%) of the 224 members subsequently appointed to the 
Council had the founder-firm root. Despite the rule established 
in 1883, restricting to a maximum of two the number of partners 
in the same firm and working from the same principal place 
of business serving on the Council at the same time [Council 
 Minutes Book Y, p. 4; File 1490], 64 of 112 (57.1%), councilors 
20 One reason for this change was that, during World War II, the London 
founder-firm membership fell by only 32.5%, whereas that of other firms fell by 
45.2%. Hence the imbalance of the pre-war era was resolved, not by a proportion-
ate reduction in the number of Council seats for London founder firms, but a 
larger fall in membership among other firms.
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were recruited from just 19 large London firms.21 Moreover, 36 
of the 112 members (32.1%) and 30 of the 64 London councilors 
(46.9%) were there as the result of “apostolic succession,” i.e., a 
partner from the same firm was appointed to replace a councilor 
who had resigned.
Turning to business members’ representation, we have seen 
that they had no representation whatsoever on the Council until 
1943, and that they received their first quota allocation of five 
out of 45 seats or 11.1% in 1950. We have also seen that business 
members accounted for 17.2% of traceable membership as early 
as 1939, and we are able to interpolate from Table 1 a business 
membership of about 30% between 1946 and 1956. Later, in 
1964, according to an estimate made by a GPC sub-committee, 
“10,000 or more members of the Institute…are engaged in com-
merce and industry” [GPC Minute Book R, pp. 135-136] at a 
time when the total U.K. membership was 23,285 [Membership 
List, 1964]. Therefore, even when the quota was increased to 15 
out of 60 in 1965, business members were still seriously under-
represented on the Council.
The evidence presented in this section reveals that, consis-
tent with criticisms directed at the composition of the Council 
by the ICAEW’s members and the press, its non-representative 
character persisted throughout the period 1880-1970, despite a 
series of initiatives designed to improve the situation.
A Self-Perpetuating Oligarchy – the Historical Dimension: In this 
section so far, we have studied changes made by the ICAEW in 
response to continuous and vehement criticism of the self-elect-
ed characteristic of the Council and the under-representation of 
a variety of sectional interests. We have also seen that two world 
wars provided important opportunities to review critically the 
oligarchic nature of the Council. World War I made influential 
chartered accountants aware of the growing importance of busi-
ness accounting within the portfolio of work that constituted 
contemporary professional practice and encouraged progres-
sive practitioners, such as Mark Webster Jenkinson, to sup-
port claims from business members for representation on the 
Council. World War II, against the background of a substantial 
21 These included Price, Waterhouse & Co. (9 councilors); Cooper Brothers & 
Co. (7); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (6); Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co. (6); 
Turquand, Youngs & Co. (5); Whinney, Smith & Whinney (4); Kemp, Chatteris, 
Nichols, Sendell & Co. (4); Binder, Hamlyn & Co. (4); Barton, Mayhew & Co. (4); 
James & Edwards (3); Josolyne, Miles, Page & Co. (2); Harmood Banner & Co. (2); 
and Cash, Stone & Co. (2). 
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increase in business membership within the ICAEW, encour-
aged people such as E.M. Taylor again to highlight the issue of 
business members’ representation.22 These findings support the 
argument that “democratization tends to follow war” [Mitchell, 
1999, p. 771].
We have seen that a number of changes were made that 
caused the Council to become more representative of the mem-
bership in 1970 than at foundation date. Despite such changes, 
however, we must conclude that the fundamental nature of the 
Council, as a self-elected oligarchy, remained substantially intact, 
with the mechanisms employed to defend that characteristic 
including (1) the quota system used to allocate Council seats to 
London and provincial societies; (2) the re-election of retiring 
members; (3) the Council’s power to fill a vacancy arising be-
tween AGMs; (4) the Council’s power to choose between nomina-
tions put forward by the provincial societies; (5) the Council’s 
control over the consultation process with the London & District 
Society; (6) the creation of “pools” of non-practicing members 
with Council retaining the power to choose between nominations 
put forward; and (7) the co-option of additional “suitable” mem-
bers at the absolute discretion of the Council. These mechanisms 
comprise overwhelming evidence of “weak procedural guaran-
tees in competitive elections” highlighted as important features 
of an oligarchic leadership by Jenkins [1977, p. 570]. 
The Council of the ICAEW also exploited its command over 
organizational resources [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p. 
569] in other ways to maintain its traditional character and to 
silence, sideline, or pacify dissatisfaction among members over 
their interest representation on Council. Tactics employed in-
cluded the formation of various advisory and consultative com-
mittees such as the Special Committee (1919), the London Mem-
bers’ Committee (1920), the Taxation and Financial Relations 
Committee (1942), the GPC Sub-Committee (Non-Practising 
Members) (1951), and the Consultative Committee of Members 
in Commerce and Industry (1957). These placating measures 
each played a role to help to moderate members’ dissatisfaction 
with the Council.
22 Taylor, at the 1941 AGM, stated that “I have come to the conclusion that re-
forms must take place in the structure of the Council…There are many problems 
facing us to-day…when the war is over and hundreds, possibly thousands, of our 
members come back to civil life, and possibly 1,500 article clerks with little, if any, 
professional experience come to take up business life... a broader representation 
on the Council is going to be beneficial to the Institute as a whole” [Accountant, 
May 17, 1941, pp. 376-377].
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/9
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200826
The oligarchic character of the Council of the ICAEW ex-
isted from the outset and was most intensively attacked immedi-
ately following organizational formation in 1880. Michels [1962, 
p. 167] observes that “With the institution of leadership there 
simultaneously begins…the transformation into a closed circle.” 
Osterman [2006, p. 623], on this same issue, comments that:
The question of timing…becomes the practical one of 
the length of time it takes to create a self-sustaining 
 bureaucratic apparatus and internal political system. 
Put this way, it is apparent that there is no universal an-
swer to the timing question. It depends on the charac-
teristics of the organization in question, such as size of 
membership, geographic scope, history, and so forth. 
The historical dimension is highly significant for this case 
study. We have seen that the ICAEW was formed from the merg-
er of five existing institutions. Among these, the elite body was 
the Institute of Accountants which dominated the merger nego-
tiations [Walker, 2004] and also the composition of the ICAEW’s 
initial Council [Edwards et al., 2005]. The Institute of Account-
ants had, in 1876, been accused by its members of arbitrary and 
selective procedures for appointing councilors which, as in the 
case of Kemp’s justification for an ICAEW Council consisting of 
the “great and the good” in 1883, was explained by the need for 
a strong public profile [Walker, 2004, p. 142]. This latter theme 
was given particular emphasis by Ernest Cooper who, we have 
seen, also staunchly defended the composition of the ICAEW’s 
Council when president in 1901. As a highly active member of 
the Institute of Accountants in the 1870s, Cooper advocated re-
forms directed towards achieving improved recognition for the 
profession [cited in Walker, 2004, p. 291]:
Can it be doubted that if the Institute after the Scotch 
System was introduced here had been actively engaged 
during the past seven years in ascertaining who are 
the respectable Accountants and inducing them to join 
the Institute that the profession would have assumed 
a much higher position in relation to the contemplated 
Bankruptcy reform? 
For Cooper, to increase the number of “respectable” accountants 
within the small membership of the elite Institute of Account-
ants and to have “the best possible men” on the Council of the 
ICAEW were probably consistent objectives in the sense that 
both enhanced the influence of the organization in making rep-
resentation to the government over the content of legislation re-
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lating to the accountants’ business. We might therefore conclude 
[see also, Walker, 2004, p. 139] that the Council of the Institute 
of Accountants in London institutionalized its character as a 
self-perpetuating elite during the 1870s, an historical character-
istic inherited by the ICAEW. 
The most important difference between the real case of the 
Council of the ICAEW and oligarchy typically envisaged in the 
political theory of organization is in motive. In theory, oligarchy 
emerges because the positions occupied by leaders of the organi-
zation “provide them with economic rewards and social status” 
[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. However, in the process whereby the 
ICAEW Council initially formed and subsequently maintained 
an oligarchic characteristic, evidence of the councilors enjoying 
direct personal gains from their positions remains unidentified, 
although, as Smallpeice [1944, p. 46] recognized, achieving the 
position of councilor itself represented “a high honour for prac-
tising members and is much prized…as a mark of esteem and 
a reward for outstanding service in the profession.” Aside from 
personal motives, the dominant concern when constructing the 
composition of the Council was to maintain and enhance, as 
indicated by Kemp’s 1883 comment, the political influence of 
the ICAEW in making representations to the government over, 
for example, the content of legislation relating to its business. 
From its experience when acquiring the Royal Charter in 1880, 
the Council of the ICAEW appears to have assumed that the in-
fluence of councilors from the London founding firms would be 
of crucial importance for the purpose of maintaining its political 
standing.
Reflecting its oligarchic character, the biased composition 
of Council proved highly significant in a negative sense at the 
time of the 1970 scheme for integrating the six senior profes-
sional accountancy bodies in Britain. It was members who were 
either not represented or under-represented on the Council that 
featured prominently in rejecting the leadership’s plans. The po-
litical crisis is next examined.
THE 1970 INTEGRATION SCHEME
The 1970 merger plan had been approved by five of the 
six senior professional bodies involved when, “virtually at the 
last moment, a campaign was launched by two members of 
the English Institute” [Tricker, 1983, p. 40]. H.T. Nicholson and 
B.W. Sutherland criticized the integration scheme as involving 
“an unacceptable dilution of the high professional standards 
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of the Institute” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73]. It is widely 
acknowledged that, principally as the result of latent opposition 
mobilized by their intervention, the integration scheme was re-
jected by 16,845 votes against 13,700 with 64.1% of the ICAEW’s 
membership taking part in the poll. 
For Nicholson and Sutherland, the scheme had been pro-
jected by “‘men in a hurry’, who refused to recognize that sound 
development could only come by a process of steady evolution, 
and were obsessed with the idea of creating the biggest body 
of accountants in the world” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73]. 
As far as business members were concerned, integration would 
result in “people [becoming] called chartered accountants 
who have never worked in a professional office” [Accountancy, 
September 1970, p. 635; see also, File 1477: 17 (34)]. For pro-
vincial practitioners, integration was considered to produce “an 
unacceptable dilution” of status [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 
73; see also, Accountancy, September 1970, pp. 635, 637]. And 
for younger members who had recently suffered the trauma of 
qualifying examinations, integration was seen as a retrograde 
step that would lessen the value of the chartered credential [Ac-
countancy, June 1966, p. 443].
The outcome was described in the ICAEW’s mouthpiece, 
Accountancy [September 1970, p. 637], as “a disaster for the ac-
countancy profession as a whole, and for the Institute especial-
ly,” while The Accountant [August 20, 1970, pp. 229-230] made 
the following assessment of events:
it might have been tempting to accuse a few individuals, 
whose opposition has been particularly determined and 
perhaps more articulate than most, of having wrecked 
the scheme; but it seems plain that these gentlemen 
have done nothing more than to provide, at the most, 
a focus for the considerable measure of dissatisfaction 
and dissent which already existed. 
Within the confines of Moorgate Place, similar sentiments 
were expressed in a less gracious manner by the then-president 
of the ICAEW, C. Croxton-Smith [Council Minutes Book AC, p. 
383]:
Over the past ten years…some 20,000 new members 
had been admitted. Many of these were in small indus-
trial companies and felt that they derived little benefit 
from membership other than the qualification which 
they wished to retain at a minimum cost. The integra-
tion scheme had produced an unholy alliance between 
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these members and some small practitioners whose mo-
tives for rejection of the proposals were quite different. 
The people leading opposition to the scheme, Nicholson and 
Sutherland, partly attributed failure of the integration initiative 
to the fact [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 636] that:
the Council [of the ICAEW] is not really in touch with 
the body of the members. They are all very busy men, 
and we are certainly not attacking them personally. It 
is more a fault of the system. There should be far fewer 
papers to read, and more chances to talk to the ‘con-
stituents’…If they are not careful they lose touch with 
grass-roots opinion, and this is what happened in this 
case. 
An in-depth study of the integration episode conducted by 
Shackleton and Walker [2001, pp. 277-278] locates the “detach-
ment of office bearers [the Council] from their constituents [the 
members]” as “perhaps the most notable feature of the unifi-
cation attempt of the 1960s.” They continue [Shackleton and 
Walker, 2001, pp. 277, 280; see also, Willmott, 1986, p. 571]: “As 
was starkly revealed in August 1970, it is ultimately the member-
ships of the professional bodies who have the power to accept or 
reject constitutional change,” and conclude: “The price of a dis-
dainful and non-consultative approach towards the membership 
was revealed when the result of the ICAEW ballot was declared.” 
Evidence of “Detachment” and “Disdain”: The under-represen-
tation of business members and provincial practitioners on the 
Council was not, therefore, simply a matter of principle; the 
biased composition had implications for how the ruling body 
behaved. It meant that they failed to comprehend the conflict 
between the priorities of business, provincial, and also younger 
members compared with those of the leadership dominated by 
the big London firms. But it went even further than that and, 
in this sub-section, building on Shackleton and Walker’s [2001] 
findings, we present specific evidence of a lack of respect on 
the part of the Council for legitimate concerns expressed by the 
membership. 
Statements of Auditing: A series of Statements of Auditing was 
launched by the ICAEW in 1958 to help auditors fulfill their 
obligation under the Companies Act 1948 to express an opinion 
on whether a company’s published accounts “give a true and 
fair view” [T&R Committee Minutes Book B, p. 259]. The series 
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was soon the subject of severe criticism from regional district 
societies. For example, the Statement dealing with the auditor’s 
duty in relation to stock-in-trade (1961) was opposed by five 
provincial societies (Manchester, Northern, Nottingham, South 
Eastern, and South Wales) on the grounds that it was “in some 
respects in advance of current practice and might prejudice the 
position of auditors in law by appearing to render attendance 
at stock taking mandatory” [T&R Committee Minutes Book C, 
p. 164]. The Manchester Society was particularly worried about 
the workload of the small practitioner [Council Minutes Book 
T, p. 235], while the London & District Society drew attention 
to the apprehension expressed by a “substantial minority” of its 
membership to an official document that amounted to a “volun-
tary extension of the auditor’s responsibility” [London & District 
Society Minutes Book D, p. 98]. 
The Chairman of the ICAEW’s Parliamentary and Law Com-
mittee, H.A. Benson of Cooper Brothers, nevertheless informed 
the January 1962 meeting of Council [Council Minutes Book T, 
p. 212] that:
it was in the interests of the profession that the docu-
ment [on stock] should be issued as soon as possible 
particularly having regard to the [Ninth] International 
Congress [of Accountants] to be held in New York in 
September 1962 when it was important that the Insti-
tute should be able to demonstrate that it is a leader in 
auditing standards. 
It appears that political considerations arising from the U.S. 
case of McKesson & Robbins (1939)23 were driving the leader-
ship’s actions. The Council attempted to make “attendance to 
observe stocktaking” an effective obligation for small as well as 
large public practices partly, at least, to enable the ICAEW to be 
seen as leading the development of U.K. auditing standards at 
the upcoming event.24
23 When accepting the audit of McKesson & Robbins Ltd. in 1924, Price, Wa-
terhouse & Co. agreed not to make a physical examination of inventories. One 
consequence was an audit failure to detect $10,100,000 of fictitious stock and the 
introduction of U.S. regulations requiring this to be done [Baxter, 1999, pp. 157, 
162; Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 259].
24 Another example of a disregard for views expressed by provincial practi-
tioners occurred in 1966 when “a majority of the regions” opposed the issue of a 
statement on “auditing procedures in connection with the verification of invest-
ments” [Various Sub-Committees Minutes Book D, p. 102].
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Fellowship Rules: The ICAEW’s Royal Charter divided member-
ship into two categories, fellows and associates, with senior 
fellowship status confined to those who had been continuously 
in practice as public accountants for five years. With business 
members often leaving public practice soon after qualification, it 
was therefore unusual for them to achieve fellowship status. As 
early as 1922, several issues of The Accountant [March 11, 1922, 
p. 331; March 18, 1922, p. 384; April 15, 1922, p. 507] published 
letters from business members requesting an extension of the 
fellowship arrangements. 
We have seen that, as the number of business members in-
creased significantly (Table 1), pressure for representation on the 
Council grew. The same was the case with the fellowship issue, 
with H.F. Bowser and J. Sandford Smith tackling the secretary 
of the ICAEW, R.W. Bankes, on the issue in 1944. Because of the 
two-tier scheme of credentials, in Bowser’s estimation, “the view 
is fairly generally held that Associate Members of the Institute in 
England are a kind of inferior brand of Chartered Accountant” 
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Sandford Smith also focused on the 
implications of the fellowship rules within the public domain 
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]:
While all accountants know that 5 years in practice is 
the only qualification at present called for to obtain the 
fellowship, the business world generally is not aware of 
this fact and attaches a notable degree of importance to 
the difference between an A.C.A. and a F.C.A. 
The request for access to fellowship status was referred to 
the Charter and Bye-laws Sub-Committee in 1946, where it was 
resisted by such luminaries as Sir Harold Howitt of Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co. [Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Council’s nega-
tive decision drew a critical response from business members, 
eliciting a promise to review the matter and solicit the views of 
district societies [Accountant, May 1, 1948, p. 345]. Despite the 
discovery that seven district societies either favored or had no 
objection to reform, compared with five against, the GPC report-
ed that “there is no real demand for fellowship from the general 
body of associates not in practice” and that “fellowship should 
continue to mark responsibility of the accountant in practice” 
[File 0436]. The Council in January 1950 confirmed the GPC’s 
conclusion that “it is undesirable that a new bye-law be intro-
duced to provide for the election to fellowship of members not 
in practice” [Council Minutes Book O, p. 47]. 
Dispute over the extension of fellowship status to business 
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members rumbled on and was not settled until the proposal that 
“associates [automatically] become fellows on the first day of 
January which follows the completion of ten years’ membership 
of the Institute” [Council Minutes Book S, pp. 2-3] was carried 
at the 1959 AGM and confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of 
14,231 in favor compared with 3,825 against. 
The detached and disdainful attitude of the Council towards 
the wider membership is further reflected in a report prepared 
by a GPC sub-committee (1964) at around the time that the 
move for integration was about to surface. It contained the fol-
lowing somewhat arrogant assertion in relation to governance 
[GPC Minutes Book S, p. 58]:
Whilst constitutionally members of the Council are 
elected by the membership as a whole, the Council can-
not absolve itself from the responsibility for ensuring 
that only men of right calibre and who between them 
cover the wide range of knowledge which is needed on 
standing committees [of the Council] are selected.
The report added [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136]:
whilst it is right that due regard be paid to services ren-
dered to a district society, the emphasis when consider-
ing the election of new members [of the Council] must 
be designed to secure the services of the best men in 
the profession compatible with the current needs of the 
Council. 
ELECTORAL REFORMS POST 1970
Rejection of the integration scheme spectacularly revealed 
the willingness and ability of the rank-and-file to challenge the 
authority of the Council. Moreover, it provided “a dramatic 
shock to traditional ideas about [the ICAEW’s form of] gover-
nance” [Tricker, 1983, pp. 40-41], and, as an immediate response 
to the “disaster” [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637], the 
Council appointed a Committee chaired by Douglas Morpeth of 
Touche Ross with broad terms of reference, “to consider the ob-
jectives of the Institute and the policies it should pursue” [Coun-
cil Minutes Book AC, p. 275]. The accounting press welcomed 
the appointment of a young committee with “an average age 
of 44” [Accountant, October 15, 1970, p. 502] which comprised 
“members from all sides of the profession, including those in 
practices both large and small, those employed in a range of 
capacities by industrial companies of various sizes, and those in 
education” [Accountancy, November 1970, p. 756].
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The Morpeth Committee reiterated concerns that appoint-
ments to the Council were not made on a “fully democratic ba-
sis” [Accountant, February 24, 1972, p. 237]. Recommendations 
for district society-based elections by postal ballot were judged 
to have three advantages – elections would be democratic; there 
would be a greater likelihood of members knowing the candi-
dates; and it might also stimulate the interest of members in 
their local society’s activities. Accountancy [June 1971, p. 293] 
welcomed the proposals on the grounds that “Many members 
look upon the Council as some form of self-perpetuating oligar-
chy” whereas “a postal ballot will appear more democratic to the 
average member.”
The Council presented the proposals to a special meeting 
on September 27, 1972, where they were approved with 6,792 
(97.5%) votes in favor and just 173 against [Accountant, October 
5, 1972, p. 416]. Accountancy [April 1983, p. 25] later assessed 
the underlying philosophy of the reforms in a broadly favorable 
manner:
a system of regular Council elections by District Soci-
ety areas was introduced [in 1972], giving members a 
decisive role in the selection and control of Council…
In particular, the Council considers it both ‘entirely 
proper and in accordance with modern practice’ that a 
democratically-elected Council should have the power 
to manage the Institute’s affairs. 
We can conclude that the Morpeth Committee’s central rec-
ommendations, direct election at district society level by postal 
ballot was an important break from the past system for electing 
councilors.
Subsequent Developments: At the time of the 1972 reforms, The 
Accountant [July 6, 1972, p. 3] conjectured that the new arrange-
ments might “place upon the membership a heavier burden than 
some have hitherto shown themselves prepared to bear…apathy 
and inanition, unless checked, could rapidly prevent the new 
measures from accomplishing anything better.” These concerns 
proved well-founded with annual elections conducted under the 
new scheme between 1973 and 199425 attracting turnouts rang-
ing from 15.2% to 24.1% [File 1490]. In Tricker’s [1983, p. 30] es-
25 In 1995, further important amendments to the system of election were 
made as the term of election was shortened from six to four years; the number of 
elected members enlarged from 60 to 70; and the introduction of “assured” seats, 
with one seat per constituency reserved for a business member [File 1489].
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timation, “the Institute is remote from the immediate concerns 
of most members and its governance is a matter of singularly 
little importance to them.” This loss of commitment and energy 
on the part of the membership, a typical symptom of oligarchic 
leadership, is called “becalming” by Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334] 
and described as follows by Michels [1962, pp. 60-61]:
The indifference which in normal times the mass is ac-
customed to display in ordinary political life becomes, 
in certain cases of particular importance, an obstacle 
to the extension of the party influence. The crowd may 
abandon the leaders at the very moment when these 
are preparing for energetic action…Accustomed to be 
ruled, the rank and file need a considerable work of 
preparation before they can be set in motion. 
As a consequence of the oligarchic leadership structure that 
dated from the creation of the ICAEW, the membership seems 
to have eventually lost interest in the election of councilors,26 
but when major strategic decisions need to be made, as in 
1970, they are galvanized into action. For example, plans for 
the introduction of radical, new current cost accounting-based 
financial reporting models were the subject of revolts, led by D. 
Keymer and M. Haslam, that produced turnouts of 46% (28,696) 
of the membership to reject Exposure Draft 18 in 1977 and 
41.4% (30,557) to vote on calls for the “immediate withdrawal” 
of Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16 two years later 
[Tweedie and Whittington, 1984, pp. 135-136, 147-148]. Merger 
initiatives involving CIPFA in 1990 and 2005 also generated sub-
stantial turnouts, 36% and 44% respectively. Indeed, the issues 
that motivated members into action included not only those di-
rectly affecting their immediate interests, but also those that did 
26 In this connection, Leach [2005, p. 331] suggests that “It could be that the 
majority was happy to leave the work of governance to a minority, as long as that 
minority remained accountable and did not jeopardize the majority’s interests. 
But as often happens with long-term incumbency, this abdication of responsibility, 
however consensual it might be, can easily lead to a situation of dependence where 
people do not feel entitled or qualified to intervene – even when they suspect 
their interests are being threatened – because they have not been involved in the 
process.” If the minority then indeed makes illegitimate decisions exceeding the 
range consigned by, and threatening the interests of, the majority, the situation 
clearly illustrates a case in which directional flow of causation between oligarchic 
leadership and members’ loss of commitment is reversed. However, in the case 
of the ICAEW during the period from 1880 to 1970, the reversed directional 
flow of causation is inapplicable because the oligarchic character of the Council 
 existed from the outset in 1880, and a series of members’ requests for reform then 
followed at least up until 1965.
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not, such as the Council’s plan to introduce options into the final 
examination. Moreover, the membership even proved capable 
of instigating a radical scheme designed to achieve democratic 
election of the ICAEW’s president, an initiative pursued for the 
purpose of avoiding maldistribution of power and “to make sure 
one section of the membership [Council] does not exercise tyr-
anny” [Accountancy, July 1996, p. 11].
When the new electoral system was introduced in 1972, Ac-
countancy [August 1972, p. 4] drew attention to the difficulty of 
recruiting suitable candidates from under-represented sectors 
and specifically suggested that “it will be no easier for senior 
employees of larger companies to serve on the Council under 
the new system than under the old.” It was anticipated that at 
least some of these concerns could be effectively addressed by 
substantially increasing the Council’s powers to co-opt, from 6 
to 20 members, but achievement of a proper balance between 
job interests in fact proved elusive. The number of elected busi-
ness members initially increased from 15 (25.0% of a total of 60 
elected councilors) in 1972 to 18 (30.0%) in 1981, but then fell to 
10 (16.7%) by 1994. Compared with their total U.K. membership 
(37.8% in 1983, 40.2% in 1990, and 57.3% in 2001), business 
members remained heavily under-represented on a Council still 
dominated by practitioners.27 This continued imbalance did 
nothing to resolve concerns about the availability to the Council 
of the full range of specialist knowledge impinging upon the 
activities of the ICAEW’s membership. Another cause of anxiety 
was the lack of continuity in the expertise available to the Coun-
cil, with 137 new members elected as the result of vacancies 
arising during the period from 1973 to 1994. To address these 
issues, the Council made good use of its extended power to co-
opt, with such members rising from three (4.8% of a total of 80 
councilors) in 1972 to the full complement of 20 (25%) ten years 
later [Council Minutes Books AA-AV; File 1490]. This enabled 
the Council to bring in business members and academics to 
supply specialist knowledge not otherwise available to it, as well 
as past-presidents and former chairs of Council committees to 
supply “executive talents” [Tricker, 1983, p. 27], experience, and 
continuity in the governance of Institute affairs. 
Nevertheless, continuing concern with the lack of interest 
and involvement of the members in the elections of councilors 
and, therefore, the lack of Council’s own legitimacy, led to a 
27 File 0433; File 7-8-5; Accountancy, August 1990, p. 162; http://www.icaew.
co.uk/institute/statistics/document.asp.
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 series of committees being appointed (Worsley 1983-1985, Green 
1990-1991, Woodley 1993, Gerrard 1996) whose reports resulted 
in a plethora of administrative changes to the composition of the 
Council (e.g.; increase in elected membership to 70, extension 
of powers of co-option to include large-firm partners, younger 
members, and chairs of Boards and Faculties) and the system 
of governance (e.g.; creation of the office of chief executive, the 
Executive Committee, and the office of secretary-general).
The Council also strove to reach out to different segments of 
the membership and, thereby, directly stimulate interest in In-
stitute affairs by establishing “Boards,” “Faculties,” and “Focus 
Groups” [Accountancy, November 1985, p. 181; June 2000, p. 
10]. These initiatives succeeded as judged by the numbers join-
ing [Accountancy, January 1991, p. 15; July 2000, p. 24; August 
2000, p. 24], but failed to connect the members’ interests with 
the election of councilors which continued to be based on the 
geographical areas represented by the district societies without 
giving any electorate status to these job-interest groups. 
We can therefore see that, in the period following the politi-
cal crisis of 1970, the Council made serious efforts to overcome 
symptoms of oligarchic leadership and revitalize the member-
ship [Voss and Sharman, 2000, pp. 304-305]. In the Council’s 
own words, since 1970, it has searched for “the methods by 
which we could ensure that Council is representative of the 
membership; the steps to be taken to involve members fully in 
policy development; the [better] relationship of district societies 
with Moorgate Place; and the way in which we look after the 
interests of our members” [Accountancy, June 1991, p. 8]. How-
ever, the fact that members still remained disconnected in 1991, 
and there is no evidence that the situation has since improved, is 
indicated in the following comment made in that year [Account-
ancy, December 1991, p. 20]:
a growing number of members have been asking wheth-
er the services the Institute provides represent value for 
money. From their point of view, the increasing finan-
cial burden of maintaining the chartered accountancy 
title, at a time when resources are under pressure, 
involves a substantial outflow of those resources for 
which they say that they see little in return in terms of 
protecting and representing their interests. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Between 1880 and 1970, the Council of the ICAEW respond-
ed to membership requests for better representation by making 
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changes to the constitution of the Council. These changes failed 
to alter the fundamental nature of the Council as a self-elective 
oligarchy substantially biased in favor of large London founder 
firms. This historically contingent but deep-seated characteristic 
of the Council was protected mainly through (1) continuous 
re-election of retiring members; (2) Council’s control over the 
 process of filling vacancies; and (3) arrangements for the Coun-
cil to co-opt “suitable” members. The Council also silenced, 
sidelined, or pacified dissatisfaction among members concern-
ing lack of representation on the Council by creating various 
ad visory and consultative committees. Consistent with the lit-
erature of political theory [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p. 
569], these are the tactics that the leadership of an organization 
typically wields to maintain its oligarchic character. However, 
the Council wished to maintain its traditional character, not 
principally for the purpose of direct personal gain as normally 
envisaged by the political theory of organization, but mainly to 
maintain political influence [Richardson, 1989; Walker, 2004, 
p.142] when making representations to the government over 
the content of legislation relating to the practicing accountants’ 
business.
This historical study has revealed that the oligarchic char-
acter of Council, as theoretically prescribed, caused the leader-
ship to become complacent, possibly disdainful, and certainly 
detached from the interests of the membership, as demonstrated 
when issuing Statements of Auditing and, for many years, re-
sisting changes to the fellowship rules. These kinds of actions, 
combined with the continuing dissatisfaction with lack of 
representation on the Council, resulted in the disregarded sec-
tions – business members, provincial practitioners, and younger 
members – being mainly responsible for rejecting the integration 
scheme in 1970. 
Between 1970 and1972, the electoral system of Council was 
reformed, with an internal review acknowledging the fact that 
under the new arrangements, there could “be no restriction on 
the way the electorate nominates or votes and no attempt by the 
Council to ‘rig’ elections by insisting on a specified type of can-
didate or preventing certain candidates from standing. It was for 
the electorate itself to determine such matters” [File 1490].
The reforms introduced district society-based elections by 
postal ballot and have been hailed as “An attempt…to involve 
members in the governance process, to emphasize the geo-
graphical constituencies and to highlight the representation of 
members on Council” [Tricker, 1983, p. 41]. In practice, the new 
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system failed to arouse members from their “becalmed” attitude 
[Zald and Ash, 1966] towards ICAEW affairs. Nor have numer-
ous subsequent initiatives proved successful in increasing the 
general level of membership involvement in Council elections. 
When, however, the leadership has attempted to take the ICAEW 
in some radical new direction, the level of interest becomes 
relatively substantial and opposition to the Council’s plans often 
unambiguous.
In brief, actions taken by the rank-and-file have persistently 
shown that Council’s authority remains seriously diminished. 
Although the Council installed a more democratic system for 
electing new leaders, it failed to stimulate the members’ interest 
so that they might connect better with the leadership. While we 
do not claim that the 1970 debacle irretrievably damaged the au-
thority of the leadership, it is certainly the case that the “disas-
ter” fundamentally problematized the governance arrangements 
and heralded the start of a period of continuous reform that has 
not borne fruit.
Within the U.K., the ICAEW is not alone in grappling with 
problems of governance. A recent academic study [Friedman 
and Phillips, 2004] of models of control within professional as-
sociations reports the conclusions of a seminar held at Birkbeck 
College, University of London (November 28, 2000), entitled 
“Governance for Professional Associations in the 21st Century.” 
The seminar, arranged by the Professional Association Research 
Network (PARN), was attended by representatives of 35 profes-
sional bodies, including the ICAEW.28 These delegates shared 
a concern that their governance structures were inadequate to 
meet the demands placed on them. In particular, they identified 
“composition of councils and electoral process” as a major issue 
leading to difficulties in conducting policy formulation and in 
arriving at strategic decisions [Friedman and Phillips, 2004, pp. 
194-195]. Friedman and Phillips [2004, p. 188] conclude that 
“Even the associations of professionals from which many top 
business executives are drawn, such as accountancy and law, 
have suffered from crisis and failures in governance.” 
The PARN seminar is significant in highlighting the prob-
lem of leadership legitimacy faced by professional bodies today. 
When considering how best to reform the constitution of the 
28 The seminar led to the PARN undertaking a research project co-sponsored 
by the ICAEW. The research findings were presented at a seminar, entitled “Gover-
nance: the management of change and the management of risk,” held at Woburn 
House, Tavistock Square, London, on January 8, 2003.
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Council, the ICAEW had in fact researched and sometimes 
imitated election arrangements put in place by the governing 
bodies of other professional associations. Such bodies included 
not only other accountancy associations but also other profes-
sional organizations such as the Law Society, Royal College of 
Surgeons, Royal Institute of British Architects, and the Char-
tered Surveyors’ Institution [Ms.28432/19; Ms.28448]. Through 
the PARN, or alternative forums, the ICAEW might gain further 
insights into the measures taken by other bodies to deal with 
the legitimacy issue. To promote the mutual learning process, 
further research into other organizations might help clarify the 
nature of the issue of governance of professional associations by, 
for example, comparison with the case of the ICAEW.29
For the present, this study enables us to predict that the 
ICAEW’s quest for a scheme to address better the need for rep-
resentative and effective governance of a professional body will 
continue into the future and, until that problem is resolved, the 
crisis of authority that the Council has repeatedly experienced in 
its recent history is likely to recur.
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ACCOUNTING CLERK IN 1846: A 
HIDDEN VOICE IN A MICRO-HISTORY 
OF MODERN PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate use of archival 
material to access a hidden voice in accounting history and provide 
social context in the form of a biographical micro-history of public ac-
countancy. The archival material is a letter written in 1846 by a Scot-
tish teenage public accountancy clerk. An analysis of the letter gives 
insight to the employment and social life of the clerk in mid-19th 
century Scotland and also identifies a notorious character in Scot-
tish public accountancy. The paper reveals the importance of social 
connections, religion, communication, and transport to middle-class 
Victorian Scots and, more generally, reminds accounting historians of 
the value of hidden voices and micro-histories.
INTRODUCTION
This paper has several unusual features as a study of ac-
counting history. It reports a biographical story associated with 
two genres identified by contemporary historians – hidden 
voices of ordinary rather than élite individuals in history [e.g., 
Weick, 2000; Xinran, 2002; Trevino and Francaviglia, 2007] and 
micro-histories that examine the past on a small and focused 
scale [e.g., Ginzburg, 1980; Bodanis, 2000; Kurlansky, 2004; 
Spence, 2007].
The rationale underlying the hidden voices genre is making 
visible the existence, contribution, and value of men and women 
who lack the historical characteristics of significant social influ-
ence and status.1 Hidden voices reflect the lives of the majority 
1 The hidden voices genre is alternatively classified by historians as history 
from below or the people’s history [Jordanova, 2000, p. 214]. For a discussion of 
the notion of history as a voice, see Berkhofer [1995].
Acknowledgments: I am very grateful to the Niven family for permission to 
access its archive of personal papers and memorabilia. I also thank the paper’s 
reviewers for their comments, particularly for the suggestion to use the paper to 
illustrate the idea of a hidden voice in a micro-history of accounting. 
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of a population, and the genre rejects research focused on élite 
members of that population [Brecher, 1997]. Non-accounting 
studies, for example, typically deal with subjects such as women, 
the working class, and under-developed communities. In con-
trast in accounting history, biographical studies mainly relate to 
élite individuals, what Sy and Tinker [2005, p. 49] describe as “a 
revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ of Accounting.”2 
Despite this bias, there are recent accounting history studies 
explicitly associated with hidden voices – e.g., Walker [1998], in 
relation to domestic household accounting, and Walker [2003, 
p. 609], with respect to female bookkeepers as “hidden invest-
ments” in commerce.3 There are also recent biographical studies 
that provide a mix of great men and hidden voices in relation 
to the founders of modern public accountancy associations 
(Lee, 2006a) and early chartered accountancy immigrants (Lee, 
2006b).
Micro-histories ignore the broad sweep of general his-
tories and concentrate instead on specific events or fragments 
of history. They constitute focused investigations of apparently 
unimportant historical subjects and are argued to appeal to the 
general public, be closer to reality, convey personal experience 
directly, and provide a route to generalization in history  [Sziártó, 
2002]. In accounting history, with the exception of biographies 
[Flesher and Flesher, 2003], there are few micro-histories as ac-
counting researchers appear to prefer macro observations of the 
past. Recent examples of micro-histories in accounting arguably 
include Lee [1994], Carmona and Gutierrez [2005], and Zeff 
[2007].
In the case of the current paper, the hidden voice and sub-
ject of the micro-history is at the beginning of a professional 
career before his professional influence had yet to take place. 
He is Alexander Thomas Niven (ATN) (1830-1918), a 16-year-old 
public accountancy apprentice clerk from the small market town 
of Balfron in Stirlingshire. In 1846, he was working in Edin-
burgh, the capital city of Scotland, and eight years later in 1854, 
he became the youngest founding member of the first modern 
professional association of public accountants, the Society of 
2 Tyson and Oldroyd [2007, p. 187] dispute the Sy and Tinker critique on the 
basis of evidence from a review of three accounting history journals between 2001 
and 2005.
3 Carnegie et al. [2000, p. 371] is a hidden voice study in which the research is 
explicitly described as “a response to Walker’s plea for less emphasis on ‘luminary 
accountants whose fame and fortune merit inclusion in works of biographical 
reference’” [see also, Walker, 2000, p. 318].
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Accountants in Edinburgh (SAE). 
A further unusual feature of the paper is its archival de-
pendence on a single primary source that is used deliberately as 
a gateway to explore other archival and secondary sources. Typi-
cally in accounting history, a biographical study is informed by 
a complex mixture and layering of archival sources. In this case, 
however, the hidden voice of ATN is found in a personal letter 
he wrote in 1846 to his father, the Reverend Alexander Niven 
(1798-1872), Master of Arts (University of St. Andrews 1817) 
and Church of Scotland minister of Balfron Parish Church from 
1825. Alexander Niven, in turn, was the son of the Reverend 
Alexander Niven (1760-1833), Doctor of Divinity (University 
of Glasgow), minister of Dunkeld Parish Church in Perthshire 
from 1793, and chaplain to John Murray (1755-1830), the fourth 
Duke of Atholl. ATN’s mother was Eliza Brown (1810-1879) who, 
at the time of his letter, was temporarily resident with her family 
in Glasgow.
The principal purpose of this paper is to report a hidden 
voice at an important juncture in the history of modern public 
accountancy. At the time of writing his letter, ATN was a junior 
and insignificant employee in a community of 96 public account-
ancy practitioners. Many of the latter were, eight years later, to 
form the SAE and trigger a wider professional project that con-
tinues today on a global basis. The letter provides insights to the 
life of a junior accountancy clerk in mid-19th century Scotland 
and therefore informs its reader about a specific historical time 
of importance to modern public accountancy and accountants. 
It also provides its reader with knowledge of the social context 
in which Scottish public accountants were beginning the asso-
ciational phase of their professional project. 
Letter writing was an everyday activity and significant 
means of communication for the Victorian middle class, the 
19th century equivalent of e-mail and text messaging. In 1846, 
individual members of the Niven family associated with ATN’s 
letter were residing in three Scottish locations – Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, and Balfron in Stirlingshire. Including its address and 
greetings, the letter comprises 777 words and is written in black 
ink using a quill pen. It is part of a small archive acquired by the 
author from the Niven family in the U.S. during two research 
projects on founder and immigrant chartered accountants.4 
4 A full bibliography relating to these projects is given in Lee [2006a, p. 392, 
2006b, p. 153]. ATN’s eldest son, John Ballantine Niven, immigrated to the U.S. in 
1898, and his descendents continue to reside on Long Island near New York City.
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Because of the particular focus of these projects, the letter has 
been used previously only to confirm that ATN was a public 
accountancy apprentice in Edinburgh in 1846 [Lee, 2002, p. 
82; Lee, 2006a, p. 286]. By contrast, in this paper, the letter is 
the focus for revealing a social context to the career of ATN at 
a specific point of time and for expanding previous accounting 
studies. As such, it particularly reflects the personal experiences 
and realities of ATN and provides specific historical pointers to a 
more general history of modern public accountancy in the 19th 
century.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is first to place 
ATN’s letter in the context of previous studies of which it is a 
part, then to reproduce it, and, finally, to identify and comment 
on its content. Before proceeding further, however, it is useful to 
emphasize the importance of letter writing in the 19th century 
by citing from a well-known, micro-historical study that uses 
family letters to report on the effects on ordinary people of a 
large-scale immigration from the U.K. to North America and, by 
implication, reveals previously hidden voices of “invisible immi-
grants” [Erickson, 1972, p. 1]:
Manuscripts of emigrant letters constitute a unique his-
torical source material. The act of emigration led many 
ordinary working people to record their actions and at-
titudes. From such letters we can gain some knowledge 
of the inner social history of the nineteenth century, of 
the motives and ways of looking at their world of people 
who did not lead armies or governments or business 
firms.... 
The letter by ATN to his father falls within the hidden voice 
research design described by Erickson. In 1846, ATN was an in-
ternal migrant from a small market town in the west of Scotland 
to the nation’s capital on its east coast. Edinburgh in mid-19th 
century was a major British and European center for traditional 
professions such as divinity, law, and medicine. Internal migra-
tion of this type by middle-class children from rural areas of 
Scotland was a small but growing feature of the early Edinburgh 
public accountancy community [Walker, 1988, pp. 108-113]. 
ATN was at the start of his career in public accountancy in 1846, 
when public accountants were regarded as a subset of the more 
prestigious legal profession [Walker, 1988, p. 13]. He had two 
uncles, Robert William Niven and John Dick Maxwell Niven, 
who trained as lawyers in Edinburgh [Lee, 2006a, p. 283]. Rob-
ert qualified as a Writer to the Signet (1819), but died in 1832. 
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John was living in Edinburgh in 1846, but had abandoned his 
legal career due to blindness. ATN was therefore following a 
family route to a professional career in commerce.
Edinburgh was very different from the market town of Bal-
fron where ATN was raised. For example, it had a population 
of more than 225,000 compared to less than 2,000 for Balfron 
in 1851. The letter written by ATN is therefore important in its 
potential to reveal aspects of the inner social history associated 
with a middle-class, Scottish teenager in 1846. It is dissimilar 
in nature from letters of the great and the good typically used 
by social historians – e.g., the letter written a century before by 
the Edinburgh philosopher David Hume (1711-1777) to the lord 
provost of Edinburgh in answer to critics of a publication by 
Hume in 1745 [Mossner and Price, 1967].
CONTEXT
ATN’s biography is part of a larger biographical history 
of 136 Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen public accountants 
who founded professional institutions in 1853, 1854, and 1867, 
respectively [Lee, 2006a, pp. 282-289]. The biography of ATN’s 
 eldest son, John Ballantine Niven (JBN) (1878-1954) (SAE 1893), 
a co-founder of the public accountancy firm Touche, Niven & 
Company in the U.S. in 1900, now part of Deloitte Touche, and 
1924 president of the American Institute of Accountants, now 
the American Institute of CPAs, is part of a biographical history 
of 177 Scottish public accounting immigrants to the U.S. prior 
to 1914 [Lee, 2006b, pp. 108-112]. In addition, there is a detailed 
analysis of the careers and influence of ATN and JBN [Lee, 
2002]. Some social history is given as background and context 
in these biographical publications. However, this paper uses the 
detailed contents of ATN’s letter to reveal more about his family, 
life-style, career, and profession. In doing so, it emphasizes the 
importance of apparently trivial archival materials in accounting 
history research and the need to give the hidden voices of ordi-
nary people an opportunity to speak from below in the literature 
of accounting history.
THE LETTER
The letter written by ATN to his father is dated December 
24, 1846, and was discovered by the author in 1998 in a collec-
tion of family papers stored by descendents of ATN’s son JBN at 
the latter’s home in Mill Neck on Long Island near New York. 
The property is situated immediately adjacent to the former 
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family home of President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919). The 
full transcript of the letter reads as follows:
Edinburgh, 1 George Street
December 24th 1846
My dear Papa,
Your kind letter I got yesterday along with one from 
Glasgow which enclosed another note from you to 
Mama for my perusal. I was perfectly surprised to find 
the Phaeton did not go into Glasgow till Saturday. After 
all you see you might just have done as I wished you to 
do, and not left here till the Friday night. I am now very 
vexed you have been the worse of your trip though, but 
I trust you will soon be perfectly recovered. 
I will attend to all your instructions with respect to 
the almanacs etc. In Mama’s letter she says something 
about extract of malt. Do you wish me to send a jar to 
Montrose Street along with them? I have made up my 
mind to give Marianne Cairns some little thing just now 
also, for I wish her to see that I feel their kindness to 
me a little. I am thinking some Saturday in the begin-
ning of the year to take a 4th class drive to Glasgow in 
the morning if it won’t put them about at all, and if 
they could give me a bed, stay till the Monday. If not, 
return on the Saturday evening. But I don’t wish you 
to mention this because in the first place I may not do 
so at all, and in the second if I do, it will be a nice thing 
to surprise Mama by popping in to breakfast some fine 
morning. I was sorry to find Aunty and Frederick poor 
Manny had been ill, but I am glad they are well again. 
I am very glad indeed that Mr Peddie’s report of your 
humble servant pleased them all in Glasgow, but oh I 
am thankful that it has been an almighty Father that 
has been on my right hand and on my left for the last 
year. The more good accounts I hear of myself it makes 
me the more so, for I feel convinced that without Him I 
could have done nothing. You may perhaps my dearest 
Father be surprised to hear such a statement from me. 
I perhaps never said so much about my own feelings 
to any one before, but I think it right to tell, that these 
feelings in regard to God’s Providence, I never had till I 
got my first quarter’s salary. Vanity was and is still too 
much I fear my besetting sin. I ought to say rather self 
conceit – but that day I felt it was not my own clever-
ness nor anything I can do that made Mr Peddie think 
I should get £5 instead of £3.15/- and ever since then I 
have felt more and more that ‘without me you can do 
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nothing.’ I must now draw near a close, though I am 
already too late for this evening’s Post. I forgot to bring 
up the Pict. Times tonight too, so you won’t get it till 
Saturday. I won’t be able to get Mama written to till the 
beginning of the week either. You may say when you 
write. Miss Low would get a parcel from Mrs Murray 
which she sent up to me to take charge of when I am 
going west, but as I was not, she was to send it herself. 
I think Dr Minto will come round a bit now; there has 
been a regular quarrel between him and Archy at last 
and he, the latter, is unseated from the foot of the table 
(!). The Plaid is a delightful thing. I got out a Ticket 
for the lectures from Mr Peddie. Many thanks for your 
leave to take a few lessons on dancing. I go to the 
Cresct. tomorrow you know; on Tuesday to the Mess-
ers and on New Year evening to the Millers. These are 
the invitations I have on hand at present but there will 
likely be more next week. 
Now dear Papa I must stop. Love to all, large and small.
Your ever affectionate son 
Alexander Niven 
PS 
I wish you could devise any possible excuse for leaving 
the Tron Church. I go there Sabbath after Sabbath, and 
I must tell you distinctly I come out vexed and uncom-
fortable, because I never get any good, and I feel quite 
vexed almost, when Sunday returns for I feel convinced 
that every time I enter the church I am just about to 
waste two hours of the Holy Sabbath. Please to think 
this seriously over and let me know what you think I 
ought to do. I could write many things more but I must 
stop. 
ATN 
10 of Thursday pm 
ATN’s letter is a window on the social fabric of his life as 
a teenage public accountancy clerk in mid-19th century Edin-
burgh. Why the letter survived for 161 years is unknown. It is 
one of a small number written by ATN that are known to exist. 
The others are personal letters to his son around the time in 
1905 when JBN married in the U.S. and ATN could not attend. 
The reason for the 1846 letter’s survival may be either histori-
cal accident or a content that was significant to members of the 
Niven family in the 19th century. For example, it appears to 
signal an important transition in ATN’s Christian faith and also 
mentions a notorious figure in Scottish public accountancy. 
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More generally, it informs its reader about ATN’s family, friends, 
and employment, as well as social conditions of the times. Most 
specifically, and despite its relative short length and apparent 
everyday subject matter, it provides the accounting historian 
with insights into public accountancy in Victorian Scotland at 
an employment level not usually examined by researchers. This 
is not a study of ATN as an influential practitioner in early Scot-
tish public accountancy. Instead, it is a micro-history of a young 
teenage migrant at the beginning of his professional career.
The following analyses relate to the addresses and family 
members associated with ATN in 1846, the importance of reli-
gion in his life and to most middle-class Scots of the time, his 
acquaintances other than members of the Niven family (i.e, his 
social network), his employer the infamous Donald Smith Ped-
die, the nature of indentured service in public accountancy in 
mid-19th century Scotland, and examples of everyday social life 
in 1846 Edinburgh. 
ADDRESSES AND FAMILY MEMBERS
The letter was written by ATN from a prominent Edinburgh 
address, number 1 George Street. This was a large Georgian 
townhouse in the rapidly developing New Town of Edinburgh 
[McKinstry, 2000, pp. 1-18]. The New Town was constructed 
from a prize-winning design of 1767 by 23-year-old architect 
James Craig (1744-1795) and represented the residential solu-
tion to a considerable health and safety hazard in the Old Town 
of the city. Building in the New Town began around 1776 at its 
east end in an area named St. Andrews Square. This first devel-
opment phase included the beginnings of George Street, a main 
thoroughfare that runs west from the Square. Number 1 was the 
first building on the north side of George Street.
Number 1 George Street in 1846 was the business address 
of an Edinburgh public accountant, Donald Smith Peddie (1809-
1883), and his nephew, John Dick Peddie (1824-1891), who was 
a well-known architect and member of the Royal Society of 
Architects (1869) and who became member of Parliament for 
Kilmarnock Burghs (1880-1885). D.S. Peddie practiced as a pub-
lic accountant and property manager [Lee, 2006a, pp. 299-302]. 
His George Street address was also the registered office of the 
Colonial Life Assurance Company, formed in 1846 to provide life 
insurance services in the U.K. and India. A member of the board 
of directors of the Colonial was Archibald Horne (1797-1862), 
a leading Edinburgh public accountant and landowner, and the 
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actuary and auditor were, respectively, public accountants Wil-
liam Thomas Thomson (1813-1883) and Charles Pearson (1803-
1884). Next door, at number 3 George Street, Thomson was the 
manager (chief executive officer) of the Standard Life Assurance 
Company, then Scotland’s premiere insurance company.
Other accountants publicly recorded in George Street in 
1846 include Gilbert Laurie Finlay (1790-1872) at numbers 22 
and 130, David Murray (1787-1877) and his son William Murray 
at number 39, John Green at number 50, John Spence Ogilvy 
(1805-1876) at number 53, William Moncrieff (1811-1895) and 
George Murray (1809-1884) at number 59, James Sym at num-
ber 68, Archibald Horne and James Jobson Dickson (1811-1891) 
at number 74, Alexander Ferguson at number 125, and Henry 
George Watson (1796-1879), James Brown (1786-1864), and 
Charles Pearson at number 128.5 With the exception of Fergu-
son, Green, William Murray, and Sym, each of these account-
ants was involved to some extent in the foundation of the SAE 
in 1853 and 1854.6
ATN’s letter provides clues to the nature of his employment 
in 1846. As previously mentioned, he was an indentured appren-
tice of Peddie. The apprenticeship started in 1844 and finished 
in 1849. Why ATN was apprenticed to Peddie is unknown. How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that it was due to a combination 
of ministerial connection (i.e., the fathers of both Peddie and 
ATN were ministers) and family relations through the Dick fam-
ily of Edinburgh and Perthshire (ATN’s grandmother was a Dick 
as was Peddie’s sister-in-law) [Lee, 2006a, pp. 282, 300]. Such 
familial associations were commonplace and important in the 
early public accountancy community in Edinburgh and, indeed, 
more widely in the Scottish professions [Walker, 1988, pp. 83-
89].
ATN’s apprenticeship would have been an unglamorous af-
fair. Sir John Mann [1954, pp. 300-301], a prominent Glasgow 
chartered accountancy practitioner of the mid-20th century 
recalls his chartered accountant father John Mann’s (1827-1910) 
description of the Glasgow offices of his apprenticeship at ap-
5 Biographies of Brown, Dickson, Finlay, Horne, Moncreiff, David Murray, 
George Murray, Ogilvy, Pearson, and Watson can be found in Lee [2006a, pp.88-
96, 119-120, 133-136, 167-170, 263-269, 275-277, 277-279, 290-291, 296-299, 343-
345, respectively]. 
6 Ferguson and Green are not listed as Edinburgh accountants by Richard 
Brown [1905]. However, he lists Murray and Sym as practicing in the city from 
1843 to 1855 and 1844 to 1850, respectively.
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proximately the same time as that of ATN: 7
Small, homely, rather dingy ‘counting houses’ as they 
were then called – equipped with high sloping desks 
and high backless stools. The ‘private’ rooms were 
well furnished but all were primarily workrooms. The 
partners and staff lived near their work, the ‘governor’ 
sometimes in the same building as the office, so that no 
time was lost in travelling; getting home for meals was 
easy. This explains why business hours were from 10 
till 4, then two hours break, and work again from 6 till 
8 – till 2 on Saturdays – and every Saturday. There were 
no football matches then, although no doubt urgent 
 funerals to attend. Holidays were scarce; both Christ-
mas and New Year’s Day were office working days in 
the eighteen-fifties.
According to his letter, ATN was writing in the late Thurs-
day evening of Christmas Eve in 1846. Gas lighting had been 
introduced to the eastern end of the New Town in the 1820s by 
the Edinburgh Gas Light Company, formed in 1817. If number 
1 George Street had no gas supply, lighting would have been by 
oil lamp or candle. ATN would have worked that evening and 
also the next morning despite its being Christmas Day. ATN ap-
pears to have been residing in his master’s office at this time. 
This arrangement is consistent with an Edinburgh apprentice-
ship of 1845 cited by Walker [1988, p. 132] that provided “Bed, 
Board, washing and clothing” in addition to a salary. It is prob-
able then Peddie was also living at number 1 George Street as 
this is publicly recorded as his residence in 1846. By 1851, ATN 
was no longer at number 1 George Street, residing instead as 
an accountant’s clerk with his younger brother and University 
of Edinburgh divinity student Thomas Brown William Niven 
(1834-1914) in a lodging house in nearby Scotland Street. The 
only other apprentice of Peddie in 1846 was Donald Scott (1830-
1898) (SAE 1855), the son of lawyer Andrew Scott (1798-1874), 
a Writer to the Signet (1823) in Edinburgh. 
The reason for ATN writing to his father on Christmas Eve 
appears to have been the consequence of a necessary splitting 
up of the Niven family in 1846. As previously stated, his father 
was the Church of Scotland minister in the small Stirlingshire 
market and cotton-weaving town of Balfron, and his mother 
(“Mama” in ATN’s letter) was Eliza Brown, daughter of the Very 
7 John Mann was an 1854 founding member of the Institute of Accountants & 
Actuaries of Glasgow [Lee, 2006a, pp. 237-240].
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Reverend Thomas Brown (1776-1847), minister of St. John’s 
Parish Church in Glasgow (1826-1847) and second moderator 
of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland (1844). 
Dr. Brown was one of the leaders with Dr. Thomas Chalmers 
(1780-1847) of the “Disruption” of 1843 that split the established 
Church of Scotland into two parts – the Church of Scotland and 
the Free Church of Scotland [Cheyne, 1993].8
Dr. Brown was ill at his Glasgow home in “Montrose Street” 
(the street mentioned in ATN’s letter) in 1846 and would die 
there in 1847. The street was then a residential road in the heart 
of a large city known as the “Second City of the Empire” be-
cause of its industrial and commercial prosperity [Oakley, 1946]. 
The Brown home was situated near the main square of Glasgow 
where the current University of Strathclyde is located today. 
As suggested by his letter, ATN’s mother was either visiting or 
nursing her father, accompanied by her two-year-old son Fred-
erick Charles Niven (1844-1883). ATN’s other brother, Thomas 
Brown William Niven, was presumably residing with his father 
at Balfron and is not mentioned in the letter. According to the 
letter, ATN’s father had visited his son in Edinburgh during the 
previous week and had problems returning either to Glasgow 
or Balfron due to the lack of an available stage coach. As now, 
travel in mid-19th century Scotland, even when between major 
cities, was not always easy.
Both of ATN’s brothers followed their father and grand-
father into the ministry, and therefore ATN’s chosen path in 
public accountancy differed from the family tradition for eldest 
sons. The Very Reverend Dr. Thomas Niven, Doctor of Divinity 
(University of Glasgow), was minister of Pollockshields Parish 
Church in Glasgow (1876-1914), moderator of the General As-
sembly of the Church of Scotland (1906), and husband (1867) 
of Alice Steuart (1841-1905), a daughter of Lieutenant-General 
George Mackenzie Steuart (1787-1855), a Stirlingshire landed 
gentleman. Frederick Niven became minister of North Paisley 
Parish Church at Paisley in Renfrewshire (1874-1883) and hus-
band (1876) of Elizabeth Josephine McLaren (1849), a daughter 
of Dr. Malcolm McLaren, a medical practitioner at Johnstone in 
8 Dr. Chalmers was the previous minister at St. John’s from 1819 to 1826 and, 
with the approval of the Town Council of Glasgow, put into practice various finan-
cial measures designed to provide relief for the poor of a parish in the center of 
the city [Cleland, 1820, pp. 206-217]. Dr. Brown continued this work throughout 
his ministry. The “Disruption” was a rebellion against a previous system of pa-
tronage in the Church of Scotland that placed power and influence in the Church 
among the ruling landowning élite of Scotland.
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Renfrewshire. Frederick is the “poor Manny” mentioned by ATN 
in his letter.9 
The other relative mentioned in ATN’s letter is “Aunty” who, 
together with ATN’s brother Frederick, had been ill. Aunty was 
Eliza Brown (1810-1879), the only daughter of the Very Rever-
end Brown and his wife Eliza Duncan (1782-1852), a daughter 
of the Reverend Dr. John Duncan (1741-1814), minister of the 
Scotch Church in London. The ATN letter therefore is a means 
of indirectly identifying the predominance of church ministry 
in the Niven family. His father, uncle, paternal grandfather, and 
maternal great grandfather were Church of Scotland ministers. 
Both of his brothers became Church of Scotland ministers, and 
his maternal grandfather was a Free Church of Scotland minis-
ter following the “Disruption” of 1843. His maternal grandfather 
and a brother were moderators of the General Assembly of their 
church organizations. For this reason, it is of interest in ATN’s 
letter to turn to an analysis of its reference to church matters. 
CHURCH MATTERS
ATN makes several references in his letter to the spiritual 
dimension of his young life. According to Devine [1999, p. 364], 
“religious values continued to remain central to the ethos of 
Victorian Scotland” at this time, and “there is clear evidence, 
therefore, that in an era of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion, religion remained a powerful force in the lives of Scottish 
people” (p.367). Also as reported by Devine (p. 368), church 
membership in Scotland probably more than doubled between 
1830 and 1914. ATN’s attendance at church services would have 
been a normal part of his middle-class life in 1846.
Specific statements in ATN’s letter, however, also reveal a 
“coming out” to his clergyman father with respect to a previ-
ously hidden or suppressed faith. The phrases “I am thankful 
that it has been an almighty Father that has been on my right 
hand and on my left for the last year,” and “I feel convinced that 
without Him I could have done nothing” in association with his 
work for and compensation from his master Peddie may ap-
pear strange to an observer from the 21st century. However, it 
is reasonable to argue that it would have been less surprising to 
middle-class Scots in 1846. ATN’s thoughts about his Christian 
faith as part of his professional work, and the later mention in 
9 “Poor Manny” (or mannie) was a term of affection used in Scotland in 1846 
to describe an infant or small boy [Macleod et al., 1999, p. 159].
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his letter of his church attendance, were not merely the conse-
quence of his position as a son, grandson, and great grandson 
of the manse. ATN was part of a generation where membership 
and involvement in institutionalized religion would have been 
expected or even demanded of a professional gentleman. He was 
an employee in a profession with strong associations to religious 
bodies in Scotland [Lee, 2006a, p. 39]. In addition, several Scot-
tish church ministers in the mid-19th century, such as Dr. Chal-
mers, were celebrities of their day, often being the focal point of 
debates on social matters such as the poor law, education, and 
public health [Devine, 1999, p. 336]. Church sanctuaries were 
frequently packed to listen to sermons that were later published. 
Ministers also published regularly on debated social issues of 
the day [e.g., Lee, 2006a, pp. 77, 119, 265, 303].
Donald Peddie was the son of a minister and became in-
volved in church affairs as part of his professional practice. ATN 
followed this model in his career and was significantly associ-
ated with the Church of Scotland in later life [Lee, 2006a, pp. 
287-288]. For example, he was ordained as a Church of Scotland 
elder in his father’s church at the young age of 25 years and was 
treasurer or secretary of numerous church organizations during 
his career. This was typical of Scottish chartered accountants of 
the time [Lee, 2006a, passim]. ATN’s religious beliefs, however, 
were far from liberal. He was treasurer for many years of the 
Scottish Reformation Society, a body devoted to “resist the ag-
gressions of Popery.” He also developed an intense dislike of 
organ music in church even though he played musical instru-
ments and had a sister who was a professional violin teacher in 
Edinburgh [Hutton, 1928, p. 7].
ATN’s other faith-related comment in his letter is in the 
postscript and refers to an obvious dissatisfaction with Sunday 
services at the Tron Kirk or Church in the High Street of the Old 
Town of Edinburgh. Tron to Scots means a commercial weigh-
ing place (e.g., of salt) and the Tron Kirk was commissioned at 
that place in 1635 by the Town Council of Edinburgh. It was 
opened in 1647 [Birrell, 1980, pp. 241-242] and, by 1846, was 
one of the main churches in Edinburgh with two ministers with 
national reputations as ministerial celebrities. The Reverend Dr. 
John Hunter (1788-1866) was born in Edinburgh, the son of the 
Reverend Dr. Andrew Hunter, professor of divinity at the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh. The younger Hunter had been a minister at 
the Tron from 1832 when he replaced his father. He is described 
by contemporaries as “far from prepossessing.” The Reverend 
Dr. Alexander Brunton (1773-1854) was a Tron minister from 
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1813 when he was also appointed professor of Hebrew and 
oriental languages at the University of Edinburgh. He became 
moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 
1823. He has been described as having a “fine, though somewhat 
pompous, presence” [Douglas, 1882, p. 27].
In 1846, Drs. Hunter and Brunton were 58 and 73 years 
of age, respectively and, given the contemporary descriptions, 
ATN’s comments appear consistent with a typical teenager’s per-
ceptions of an older and apparently more conservative genera-
tion. They would not appear out of place today. It is not known 
why he was attending the Tron Kirk. The most obvious reason 
is that it was a major church in Edinburgh and likely to have 
many influential citizens as members. This would be important 
for a young man intent on a professional career in Edinburgh. 
Certainly, it is unlikely the reason for his attendance would have 
been Peddie as the latter belonging to his father’s congrega-
tion which was a break-away community from the established 
Church of Scotland to which ATN belonged. It therefore may be 
speculated that ATN’s anxiously seeking of advice from his min-
isterial father indicated the dilemma he was in as a prospective 
professional accountant in Edinburgh in the mid-19th century. 
It was expected by his family, employer, and peers that he would 
benefit spiritually from church attendance but found the whole 
experience less than satisfying. 
SOCIAL NETWORK AND ACTIVITIES
There are other individuals mentioned in ATN’s letter who 
give some clues about his social network in 1846 Edinburgh.10 
He writes of thinking of giving a gift to Marianne Cairns in 
thanks for kindnesses to him. This lady was the resident do-
mestic servant of Dr. John Minto who is also mentioned in the 
letter. Dr. Minto, doctor of medicine from the University of Jena 
in Germany, was an accoucheur or obstetrician in Edinburgh 
who was born in 1804 at Dunkeld in Perthshire, the town in 
which ATN’s grandfather was minister. The Reverend Niven 
would almost certainly have baptised Minto. The latter had two 
sons in Edinburgh whom ATN would have known. Patrick Wood 
Minto (1840-1914) became a Free Church of Scotland minister 
at Inverurie in Perthshire (1868-1885) and at the Scotch Church 
10 Social networks were an important part of the early Scottish public ac-
countancy community [see Lee, 2000]. By the time of the SAE formation in 1854, 
however, ATN had a relatively small social network within the foundation group 
compared to other founders [Lee, 2000, p. 46]. 
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in Cannes in France (1885-1914). His brother, “Archy” in ATN’s 
letter, was Archibald Minto (b. 1823) who, in 1846, was an Edin-
burgh apothecary or pharmacist. ATN’s comments about “a 
regular quarrel” and “unseated from the foot of the table” sug-
gest a typical breakdown in relationships within a family with 
which ATN is familiar.11 The proposed gift to Marianne Cairns 
further suggests that ATN visited the Minto family regularly. 
Use of such social connections would have been typical for a 
young man such as ATN coming from Balfron to Edinburgh. To 
develop a professional career in commerce, it was essential to 
network socially.
According to his letter, ATN was to visit the “Cresct.” (Cres-
cent) on Christmas Day. The use of the term in such a familiar 
and similar way to “Montrose Street” earlier in the letter sug-
gests a family-related address. In fact, from a search of the 1846 
Edinburgh & Leith Street & Trade Directory, it is probable that 
the address is number 14 Atholl Crescent, the home in 1846 of 
lawyer Humphrey Graham (1789-1862), Writer to the Signet 
(1813), and brother of Frederick Graham (b. 1790) who was 
ATN’s uncle by marriage. Frederick Graham married ATN’s aunt 
Marjory Forbes Niven (1809-1880) in 1824. According to Niven 
family records, Frederick Graham was a former army officer 
who served at Waterloo (1815) and was later factor to the Duke 
of Atholl at Dunkeld where ATN’s grandfather ministered.12 By 
1846, Graham was living in Edinburgh and held the position of 
commissary general in the Department of Army.13 It is reason-
able to presume that ATN was attending a family function on 
Christmas Day.
Invitations to visit during the festive period had also been 
received by ATN from the Messer and Miller families. It is im-
possible to identify the Miller family because of the number 
of Miller families in Edinburgh at the time, but the family of 
Messer is different as only one is listed in the Edinburgh & Leith 
Street & Trade Directory of 1846. Adam Messer (1786-1861) from 
Chain in Berwickshire was residing at 142 Princes Street, the 
11 A regular quarrel was a term then used to denote a dispute between father 
and son [Macleod et al., 1999, p. 209]. To be unseated from the foot of the table 
meant removal from the second most important place at the family dining table.
12 Factor was the term used to denote the individual responsible for the over-
all management of the Duke’s landed estates. It was therefore a position of some 
importance.
13 This was a civilian appointment involving overall responsibility for the sup-
ply to the North British Army of food, clothing, bedding, animal feedstuffs, and 
related matters. 
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main thoroughfare of the New Town. He was a general medical 
practitioner, fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Edin-
burgh (1826), and a medical officer at the Edinburgh Royal Pub-
lic Dispensary & Vaccine Institution.14 Dr. Messer was married 
with two daughters and five sons, including two who became 
doctors. It is not clear what the connection was between ATN 
and the Messer family, although it is possible because of their 
medical association that Dr. Messer and Dr. Minto were known 
to one another.
The ATN letter mentions other possible invitations and 
implies therefore that, together with the above families, ATN 
had an active social life in Edinburgh at the age of 16 years. 
As suggested in connection with Minto, these contacts would 
typically come through ATN’s family. For example, the Nivens 
were associated over many decades with several Ayrshire and 
Perthshire landowning families with Edinburgh roots (particu-
larly, as mentioned previously, that of Dick) [Lee, 2006a, pp.282, 
299-300]. ATN’s accounting master also had family connections 
to Perthshire and the Dick family. The most influential Niven 
connection, however, was that of ATN’s grandfather as minister 
at Dunkeld and his association with the Duke of Atholl.15
The other individuals in ATN’s letter are more difficult to 
determine from the public record. The recipient of a parcel was 
Miss Low and can be identified as Ann Low (b. 1791) from Ber-
wickshire, a long-standing boarder with ATN’s family at Balfron. 
Mrs. Murray cannot be traced in census records to either the 
Brown or Niven family. It is possible she was either a domestic 
servant or a visitor in the Brown household at Glasgow in 1846. 
Victorian households of professional men in the mid-19th cen-
tury typically employed a number of domestic servants, and the 
passage of a parcel to or from Balfron and Glasgow in these cir-
cumstances would not have been unusual, particularly because 
of ATN’s mother’s visit to her father. The Reverend Alexander 
Niven had five domestic servants at Balfron in 1851 and four in 
1861, indicating some degree of prosperity for his family.
ATN’s letter mentions various social activities. The first 
relates to dancing lessons that his father had given him permis-
sion to take. Such lessons would have been a natural part of the 
14 The Institution was formed in 1776 by royal charter and typically had 12 
medical officers and an average of 12,000 mainly outpatients in the mid-19th cen-
tury. 
15 The dukedom was one of the most senior in Scotland, created in 1703 for 
the Murray family.
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social education of a young man. By 1846, the city had eight 
dancing teachers resident in the New Town and a number of 
dancing assemblies or halls [Birrell, 1980, pp. 72-73] at which 
regular dances took place, typically from 5.00 p.m. to 11.00 p.m. 
Ladies would be chaperoned or accompanied by servants, and 
men would attend in evening dress. In ATN’s time, many of these 
dances took place in the assembly rooms at 54 George Street, a 
large ballroom opened in 1787, located a short distance from 
ATN’s workplace and residence.
The second social activity mentioned by ATN relates to his 
obtaining a “Ticket” from his master Mr. Peddie for “lectures.” 
Although there is ambiguity in the letter in relation to this mat-
ter, in all probability the ticket would have given him admission 
to a series of evening lectures on scientific and literary matters 
by leading celebrities of the day. The only publicly recorded of-
fice held by Peddie in 1846 that can be related to such lectures 
is his ordinary directorship of the Philosophical Institution of 
Edinburgh at 54 Hanover Street, located near his office. The In-
stitution was founded in 1846 to provide the public with access 
to topics of interest in literature, science, and art by means of a 
popular lecture series, a library, a reading room, a news room, 
and evening classes. As with dancing classes, attendance by ATN 
at scientific or literary lectures in 1846 would not have been un-
usual. 
MR. PEDDIE
Arguably, the pivotal character in ATN’s letter is “Mr. Ped-
die,” his public accountancy master. This is not just because 
ATN received a quarterly payment of £5 instead of the con-
tracted £3.15s., a largess for which he would have been grate-
ful. Instead, it is because Peddie later proved to be a notorious 
fraudster who committed his frauds throughout and beyond 
the period of ATN’s apprenticeship [Walker, 1996a]. There is no 
evidence that ATN would have been aware of Peddie’s activities, 
and it can only be speculated what his reaction must have been 
in 1882 when his former master’s frauds were discovered, forc-
ing Peddie to flee to Spain and thence to the U.S. before dying at 
Philadelphia in 1883. 
Peddie was university-educated and trained as a lawyer be-
fore becoming a founder member of the SAE in 1853 and 1854. 
He came from a respected family. Indeed, his family background 
was similar to that of ATN. His paternal grandfather was James 
Peddie, a parish schoolmaster from Perth in Perthshire, and his 
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father was the Reverend James Peddie (1758-1845), Doctor of 
Divinity (University of Edinburgh), minister of the United Asso-
ciate Synod Church at Bristo Street in Edinburgh (1782-1828), 
and twice moderator of the General Assembly of the United 
Associate Synod.16 The Reverend Peddie was a founding hon-
orary director in 1812 of one of the most respected insurance 
companies in Scotland, the Scottish Widows Fund, and author 
of A Defence of the Associate Synod against the Charge of Sedition 
(Glasgow: J. Ritchie, 1800) and many other works. He was also a 
noted philanthropist.
Donald Peddie also had two respected brothers – lawyer 
James Peddie (1798-1885) was a Writer to the Signet (1819) in 
Edinburgh, and William Peddie (1805-1898), Doctor of Divinity 
(University of Edinburgh), followed his father as minister of the 
United Associate Synod Church at Bristo Street from 1828. He 
was moderator of the Church’s General Assembly in 1858 and 
author of Comparison of the System of Religious Establishments 
with That of Voluntary Churches (Edinburgh, 1835) and Dis-
courses by James Peddie (Edinburgh, 1846). According to Walker 
[1996a], Donald Peddie’s father was treasurer (1797-1845) of the 
Friendly Society of Dissenting Ministers, a charitable organiza-
tion created mainly to assist United Associate Synod ministers. 
The accounting and administration of the Society was conduct-
ed by his accountant son from 1833. The fraud by the latter took 
place in the early 1840s. Although his brother William replaced 
his father as the Society’s treasurer in 1845, Donald continued 
to maintain its accounting records. In 1883, it was discovered 
that £21,840 of the Society’s £30,940 funds were irrecoverable 
and a further £4,100 doubtful. Donald had been involved with a 
German property speculator in Edinburgh, provided him with 
funds, and facilitated further funds from a firm of lawyers.
Peddie resided at number 1 George Street and also with his 
mother and two sisters in a large house, Laverock Bank, in the 
newly developed north Edinburgh district of Trinity. The Peddie 
neighbors in 1846 included a retired army major, a senior cus-
toms and revenue official, the Belgian consul, and John Brown 
Douglas (1809-1880), Writer to the Signet (1833). The Peddie 
family employed two female servants and a male gardener in 
1851. By 1861, there were five servants at Laverock Bank with 
Donald and a sister. This degree of affluence is contrary to 
16 The Synod was a break-away church from the Church of Scotland and had 
24 presbyteries in Scotland by 1846. It was later renamed the United Presbyterian 
Church of Scotland.
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the instability of his professional practice as noted by Walker 
[1996a, p. 313]. Peddie’s fraudulent activity was national news 
and resulted in the SAE removing him from membership and 
instituting disciplinary processes for its members.
INDENTURED ACCOUNTING SERVICE
As previously stated and indicated in his letter, ATN’s ap-
prenticeship was with Peddie. However, on the death of his 
son JBN in 1950, the Touche Niven Bailey & Smart Newsletter 
(4/1) wrongly stated that ATN came to Edinburgh in 1844 to 
be an apprentice to an accountant Andrew Prentice and was 
later Prentice’s partner. There is no record of Andrew Prentice 
as an accountant in Edinburgh at this time, although ATN was 
employed in 1850 by Andrew Murray Paterson (1823-1861), a 
fellow founder member of the SAE in 1854. Paterson resided at 
Wardie Villa in Trinity close to Peddie at Laverock Bank. ATN’s 
contracted annual salary of £15 as an apprentice was low in 
comparison with similar contracts of the time. Walker [1988, p. 
130] describes, for example, several contracted sums pre-1855 
that averaged £25 annually. Thus, the increase to £20 by Peddie 
for ATN remained well below this average. However, much de-
pended on the entry fee paid by the father of the apprentice. The 
entry fee was typically returned by the master to the apprentice 
as salary over the five-year contract. The contracted sum of £15 
for ATN therefore suggests an entry fee of five times that amount 
or £75, apprenticeships typically being for five years.
The author has the indenture contract for ATN’s son JBN, 
dated November 1, 1887 and registered May 1, 1888 with char-
tered accountant David Pearson (SAE 1862), a son of Charles 
Pearson, one of the SAE founders mentioned previously as 
working on George Street. It was discharged on December 5, 
1892, and signed by ATN as cautioner. The entry fee was £105, 
providing an average annual salary of £21 over five years. It 
would therefore appear that ATN’s salary in 1844 was little 
different from that of his son in 1887. Public accountancy ap-
prenticeships in Scotland in the 19th century were economically 
advantageous to the contracted masters as they typically had to 
pay little for the services provided by the apprentice during an 
extensive training period.
GOODS AND OTHER MATTERS
The ATN letter also provides several insights to everyday 
matters in the lives of middle-class Scots in 1846. For example, 
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ATN promises to purchase almanacs for his father. These were 
annual publications containing details on a national, regional, 
and local basis of past and forthcoming events, significant indi-
viduals, organizations, and companies, as well as lists of clergy, 
lawyers, and military men. In all probability, the purchases 
would have included the New Edinburgh Almanac & National 
Repository 1847 (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd). This was published 
on the day before the date of ATN’s letter and consisted of 552 
pages plus a 120-page Advertising List 1847. It cost 5s. Several of 
the facts reported in this paper have been derived from the 1847 
Almanac. There were almanacs for each of the major cities as 
well as more nationally based publications. They were the mid-
19th century equivalents of web-based databases.
The other publication mentioned in ATN’s letter is the “Pict. 
Times.” The Pictorial Times: A Weekly Journal of News, Literature, 
Fine Art, and the Drama was a London-based illustrated newspa-
per, founded in 1843 and published weekly at a cost of 6d. The 
Pictorial Times was published as a rival to The Illustrated London 
News, founded in 1842. These publications were examples of 
19th century innovation in public communication and contained 
a mixture of news items (including foreign correspondence), fic-
tional stories, and wood-engraved illustrations (the precursors 
of photographic illustrations). The Times had a short life as its 
publication stopped shortly after 1846. In contrast, there were 
16 newspapers in Edinburgh in 1846. Eight were published 
weekly, six bi-weekly, one thrice times a week, and one monthly. 
This compares with three newspapers today. This city-based 
provision, as well as ATN’s father’s readership of The Pictorial 
Times, reflects the extent to which middle-class families such as 
the Nivens relied on newspapers as a major source of news and 
comment.
The next item to be mentioned in the letter is a jar of 
“extract of malt.” This was and remains a multi-vitamin grain 
product used for a variety of household purposes including hot 
drinks and beer making. The plaid that ATN received from his 
father was a length of tartan wool cloth then used as a blanket 
or bed cover, today part of the ceremonial dress of a pipe band 
member [Macleod et al., 1999, p. 198]. The need for such a bed 
cover perhaps reflects the coldness of large Victorian houses in 
1846, particularly in winter and in rooms reserved for domestic 
servants and other employees such as ATN.
The phaeton reported in the letter was a four-wheeled, 
horse-drawn carriage. It was pulled by either one or two horses 
with large wheels and strong springs and had a reputation for 
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speed and accidents. There was a commercial version of the 
carriage that used harder springs and carried mail, passengers, 
and baggage. It is this type of vehicle to which ATN presum-
ably refers. The name phaeton is derived from the Greek for the 
son of Helios, the sun god, and, in more recent times, has been 
used as the name for luxury cars manufactured by Chrysler and 
Volks wagen.
Carriages were a major means of public transport in central 
Scotland. A coach service between Edinburgh and Glasgow left 
daily from Princes Street at 9:45 a.m. There was no stage coach 
service directly to Balfron in 1846 and only a single Saturday 
service between Balfron and Glasgow. This lack of transport 
connection lies behind the comment of ATN in his letter about 
his father’s health and his journey from Edinburgh to Glasgow 
to visit his wife. Public transport in Scotland in 1846 did not 
permit easy travel between towns outside the main cities.
ATN also mentions taking a “4th class drive” to Glasgow to 
visit his mother and her relations there. This would not have 
been a stage coach journey as there was a single fare for such 
vehicles. Instead, the journey was by railway train for which 
there were four classes of fare. In 1839, the Edinburgh & 
Glasgow Railway Company began to construct a railway line 
between Edinburgh and Glasgow. It was opened in 1842. By 
1846, there were ten trains running daily between Edinburgh 
and Glasgow, starting at 7:00 a.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m. The 
journey lasted 90 minutes with three stops for a train carrying 
first and second-class ticket-holders only. The train took 125 
minutes with 11 stops with all four classes of fare aboard. The 
ticket prices ranged from 8s. for first-class, 6s. for second-class, 
3s.10d. for third-class, and 2s.6d. for fourth-class. The fact that 
ATN was contemplating a fourth-class ticket from Edinburgh to 
Glasgow is consistent with the low level of his salary because the 
price comprised more than 7% of his monthly income.
Finally, the letter written by ATN was delivered to his father 
by the Post Office. This service was much more frequent than 
that of today. In Edinburgh in 1846, for example, there were five 
postal deliveries daily. These involved post-box collection and 
delivery at about the same time. The first delivery started at 7:00 
a.m. This was followed by services starting at 10:45 a.m., 1:30 
p.m., 3:15 p.m., and 5:15 p.m. Postal rates as now depended on 
the weight of the package, and there were two postage rates – 
prepaid and unpaid (to be paid on delivery). The rates ranged 
from 1d. prepaid and 2d. unpaid for a package less than half an 
ounce to 2s.8d. prepaid and 5s.4d. unpaid for 16 ounces. The 
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Post Office did not deliver packages of more than 16 ounces. 
The frequency of service reflects the importance of this means 
of communication in 1846 to individuals such as ATN and mem-
bers of his family.
CONCLUSIONS
The previous analyses attempt to demonstrate the diver-
sity of information to be derived for historical purposes from a 
single archival source such as a personal letter. The ATN letter in 
1846 reveals professional as well as social insights. The contents 
of the letter, however, have been related to other primary and 
secondary sources in order to provide a more complete rendi-
tion of hidden voices in a micro-history. This is the essence of 
archival research, drawing out evidence and information from 
archival sources and bringing them together with relevant sec-
ondary sources to provide a coherent and comprehensible his-
tory. The following are offered as conclusions to be drawn from 
the above analyses.
The analyses reveal the extent to which a relatively innocu-
ous or trivial archival source such as ATN’s personal letter to his 
father can be used in conjunction with other primary and sec-
ondary sources, such as almanacs and directories, to report, at 
a specific point in time, a detailed history of the people, places, 
and events associated with an ordinary individual.
The letter and analyses reveal ATN as a young man at the 
start of his professional career and adult social life. Therefore, 
the paper is not a typical historical account of a man of influ-
ence, power, or prestige. Instead, it represents a hidden voice 
of history by providing insight to the life of an apprentice clerk 
working long hours for modest wages, caring about his family 
and acquaintances, and expressing modesty about his achieve-
ments at work and anxiety about his religious experiences.
The ATN letter also reveals a complex social mixture of pro-
fessional career and employer, family and acquaintances, church 
and faith, and social activities that is useful in understanding 
public accountancy and accountants in mid-19th century Scot-
land. The life of a public accountant such as ATN was not just 
about his training, practice, and influence as a professional, 
which is the typical focus in accounting biography. Instead, 
as suggested in this paper, it was also about social networking 
within the middle class of a major city with little separation of 
work, family, and friends. It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
such networking at 16 years of age would have had a longer-
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term impact on the professional career of ATN.
There are clues in the letter and the above analyses that 
indicate ATN’s social life and employment in Edinburgh were 
influenced by family associations vital to his social network-
ing; e.g., his employment as a son of the manse by a son of the 
manse and social visits to Edinburgh families with direct or 
indirect connections with the Niven family. In particular, there 
the letter suggests ATN came from an upper-middle-class Scots 
family and interacted with other upper-middle-class families. 
Ministers and doctors were members of traditional professions 
that had a social status in 1846 commensurate with the upper-
middle-class in mid-Victorian Scotland [Walker, 1988, p. 271; 
see also, Checkland, 1964, pp. 294-295]. More specifically, ATN 
was part of a church dynasty in the established church in Scot-
land. He was later to head a public accountancy dynasty that 
stretched to the U.S. with a son who greatly influenced the early 
American profession and a grandson who contributed to a major 
public accountancy firm in more recent times.
ATN worked at number 1 George Street, a street that ap-
pears to have been a major location for the Edinburgh public 
accountancy community in the mid-19th century. Seventeen 
public accountants provided services in George Street in 1846, 
and 13 of these men were later invited to join the SAE in 1854.
The letter by ATN reveals his connection to Donald Smith 
Peddie who was later identified as a significant fraudster. The 
letter, however, shows Peddie in a more favorable light with 
regard to the payment of a salary one-third in excess of the con-
tracted amount. The less favorable light is that the contracted 
sum appeared low by the standards of the time. The significance 
of Peddie in the early history of modern public accountancy is 
the impact that his fraud had on a conservative Victorian Britain 
that effectively created what Perkin [1989, pp. 3-4] describes 
as a “professional society” based on the “professional ideal” of 
“trained expertise and selection by merit.” Peddie was the son 
of a minister and was accused of defrauding an organization in-
tended to provide ministerial pension benefits. The SAE not only 
expelled Peddie from membership but was the first professional 
body to institute explicit disciplinary procedures to maintain 
public confidence in the professional ideal of public account-
ancy [Walker, 1996a, p. 31].
The influence of religion and the established church in Scot-
land in 1846 is clear from ATN’s description of his delight at re-
ceiving a bonus salary from Peddie and his concern over the lack 
of spiritual benefit he was receiving from attendance at Sunday 
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service. These aspects of ATN’s life in 1846 provide a relevant 
background to understanding his attitude and involvement with 
religious and church matters later in life and, more generally, 
for understanding public accountancy and public accountants 
in a Victorian Britain that valued religion and incorporated it 
into the workplace.
As is the case today, the importance of transport and com-
munication in the life of the early Victorians is clear from the 
ATN letter, whether it was through the availability of a stage 
coach or railway train, the use of the postal service, or reading a 
weekly newspaper.
A final feature of the ATN letter that is significant is its po-
sitioning chronologically in the personal professional projects of 
ATN and his son JBN. ATN had a relatively modest career as a 
public accountant in Edinburgh. He was respected and trained 
several chartered accountants. However, he is best known his-
torically as the longest surviving founder of the SAE [Lee, 2006a, 
p. 289]. On the other hand and as previously stated, his son JBN 
formed Touche, Niven & Company, a predecessor firm of the 
present-day Deloitte Touche, in 1900 with fellow SAE member 
George Touche, became president of the American Institute of 
Accountants in 1924, and was involved in successfully defending 
the landmark auditing case of Ultramares v Touche in 1931 [Lee, 
2006b, pp. 108-112]. 
These conclusions, based on relevant analyses of a single 
letter, suggest that, when archival material exists, accounting 
historians can make considerable use of it, not only to inform 
accounting history, as in this case with ATN’s public account-
ancy apprenticeship, but also to add a social context that creates 
greater understanding of the historical times as with travel op-
tions, postal services, and social activities. In this micro-history, 
the historical subject of ATN is a hidden voice who, within a 
social context, adds to existing knowledge of the Scottish public 
accountancy profession in the mid-19th century.
It is also hoped that this study encourages use of archival 
materials in private as well as institutional holdings. In this 
respect, as in the case of ATN and his son JBN, there is consider-
able benefit to be gained from tracing the ancestors of biograph-
ical subjects in order to determine whether there are private 
archival holdings available for research purposes.17 In this case, 
17 Readers interested in an earlier example of this practice in the research of 
early Scottish public accountants should refer to a study of one of ATN’s contem-
poraries, George Auldjo Jamieson (1828-1900) (SAE 1854) [Walker, 1996b, p. 9]. 
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a “Google” search identified an address and phone number that 
led to the Niven family archive.
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REFORM: AGRICULTURE AND THE 1913 
INCOME TAX LAW
Abstract: Farmers have benefited from unique tax treatment since 
the beginning of the income tax law. This paper explores agricultural 
influences on the passage of the income tax in 1913, using both quali-
tative and quantitative analysis. The results show that agricultural 
interests were influential in the development and passage of tax/tariff 
laws. The percentage of congressmen with agricultural ties explains 
the strong affection for agriculture. Discussion in congressional 
debates and in agricultural journals was passionate and patriotic in 
support of equity for farmers. The quantitative analysis reveals that 
the percentage farm population was a significant predictor of passage 
of the 16th Amendment by the states and of adoption of state income 
taxes in the 20th century.
INTRODUCTION
Tax legislation is a political process, with taxes levied and 
collected both to raise federal revenues and to achieve social 
goals. Numerous researchers have addressed the forces influ-
encing tax policy during the 19th and early 20th centuries. This 
study provides a different perspective by exploring the contribu-
tions and considerations of agriculture in the development of 
our modern income tax laws.
Looking at the results of current income tax laws, it appears 
that agriculture is considered a distinct sector of society when 
Congress debates tax policy. There are many examples of pref-
erential tax treatment for farmers. For example, only farmers 
can use income averaging and elect the cash, accrual, or crop 
methods of accounting.1 (Under the crop method, the entire 
1 These and other tax advantages can be found in Tax Angles for Special Tax-
payers by Commerce Clearing House and other books.
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cost of producing the crop must be taken as a deduction in the 
year in which the gross income from the crop is realized and 
not earlier.) Comparing two individuals, one a farmer and one a 
non-farmer, the non-farmer, on average, pays more in federal in-
come taxes than does a farmer with similar income. This dispar-
ity results mainly from the opportunity for farmers to convert 
ordinary income to capital gain and the use of the cash method 
of accounting. How did farmers get these tax privileges? Search-
ing for the answer to this question should provide insights as to 
how special interest groups may gain advantages in the current 
debate over tax reform. 
Several studies provide the theoretical background for 
this research. Hansen [1990] points out that party leaders have 
only one objective – election, and that politicians assume that 
voters will respond to changes in their incomes induced by 
the government – taxes. Further, party leaders have two major 
considerations in the formulation of tax policy. The first is to 
raise revenue for the government. Second, party leaders use tax 
policy to distribute burdens and benefits across the electorate. 
In the Hansen study and in this research, “a closer examina-
tion of these two characteristics yields a number of predictions 
about the forces that shape the politics of tariff [tax] revision” 
[Hansen, 1990, p. 531]. Two propositions follow: (1) political 
parties adopt ideological positions on tax policy that correspond 
to the impact on their partisans; and (2) parties amend their tax-
policy positions to reflect changes in the proportions of voters 
upon whom the heavier tax burdens rest in order to reflect the 
relocation of the political center [Hansen, 1990, p. 534]. One 
of the applications of these propositions is that parties adopt 
ideologies that match the interests of their core supporters, as 
will be shown in the later discussion of the history of the tariff 
and income tax [Hansen, 1990, p. 535]. Epstein and O’Halloran 
[1996, pp. 301, 319] concluded that the interests that lobbied 
government for favorable policies and the political parties that 
mediated these demands did significantly affect tariff policy 
from 1877-1934. Political “parties affected the manner in which 
interests were translated into policy outcomes by aggregating 
interests through coalitional politics….” “With the adoption of 
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 the United States entered the 
modern age of special-interest politics” [Baack and Ray, 1985, p. 
624]. The results of the present study will confirm the impact of 
one special interest group, agriculture, on the evolution of the 
income tax. These results emphasize the need to monitor tax-
policy statements and lobbying efforts of special interest groups 
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as they attempt to shape platforms of political parties and tax 
legislation. 
In his dissertation research, Holland [1978, p. 24] found 
that tax laws specifically directed toward agriculture developed 
slowly over several decades. He concluded that the evolution of 
the farm income tax laws began shortly after ratification of the 
16th Amendment in 1913, which marks the beginning of the 
modern era of income taxation in the U.S. Holland asserts that 
the first tax law or regulation overtly affecting agriculture was 
allowing farmers to use the cash method in 1915. This paper 
will produce evidence that the actual story begins well before the 
1913 ratification of the 16th Amendment and the 1913 Tariff Bill. 
In fact, the story begins in the 1800s and before. To understand 
how agriculture influenced passage of the income tax provision 
of the 1913 Tariff Bill requires considering taxes, tariffs, and ag-
ricultural movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Previous researchers have traced the support for income 
tax provisions to regional (South and West versus Northeast), 
class (poor versus rich), occupational (working class versus 
wealthy), and social (i.e., Populist, Progressive, Socialist) argu-
ments. While it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate 
regional, class, social, occupational, and agricultural positions, 
this study will trace support for the income tax provisions to 
agriculture. 
The contribution of this paper is an exploration of agricul-
tural influences on the passage of the income tax section of the 
1913 Tariff Bill.2 A rather large body of literature exists concern-
ing the development of U.S. income tax laws. Baack and Ray 
[1985, p. 607] trace the origin of the income tax to the War of 
1812. Several studies have explained the forces for and against 
income taxes as based partly on regional and class differences. 
Congressmen from the Northeast opposed income taxes because 
their constituents were, on average, the wealthiest in the nation. 
Southern and western congressmen preferred the income tax 
over tariffs because of the undue burden the tariffs placed on 
their constituents. This study adds to this body of literature by 
exploring agricultural influences on the debates about tariffs 
and various forms of taxation.
2 Many congressmen in the formative years of federal income tax legislation 
had agricultural backgrounds. Because of the relatively large percentage of farm 
population in 1913, it is reasonable to explore the influence of agricultural inter-
ests in the formation of the current tax laws. 
82
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/9
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200874
A study of the impact of special interest groups on tax 
reform is important due to the discussion concerning major re-
form of the tax system generated by several events including the 
release of the final report of the President’s Advisory Council on 
Federal Tax Reform, the presidential campaign, the debates over 
social security reform, and taxation of e-commerce. Now begins 
the speculation over the prospects for major reform and the re-
sultant winners and losers under a reformed system. 
The insights provided by this study will be based on three 
sources of information. First, a historical review of political, 
economic, and social activities of the 19th century is related to 
agricultural movements, taxes, and tariffs. This study provides 
a different perspective by exploring the contributions and con-
siderations of agriculture in the development of our modern 
income tax laws. Second, primary qualitative research studies 
the influence of agriculture on the politics of taxes and tariffs 
by examining tax commentary in agricultural periodicals, the 
Congressional Record, congressional committee reports, and 
congressional hearings from 1909 to 1915. Third, statistical 
analyses further explore agriculture’s influence on ratification of 
the 16th Amendment. Therefore, the primary research reported 
in the present study focuses on congressional activity between 
1909, when the income tax amendment was sent to the states 
and the corporate excise tax was enacted, and 1915, when the 
cash method was allowed.
Immediately below are the research questions and the 
methodology, followed by a review of the literature. Next are the 
results of the primary qualitative research into the Congressional 
Record and agricultural publications. Correlation and regression 
results follow in the statistical analyses section. Summaries and 
conclusions are last.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES
This study hypothesizes that agricultural interests influ-
enced passage of the 1913 income tax law. The study’s review of 
agricultural publications and the Congressional Record from this 
period confirms the widely held notion that agricultural inter-
ests, farmers and their congressional representatives, preferred 
the use of income taxes instead of tariffs to generate federal rev-
enue. Did senators and representatives consider agricultural de-
sires when debating the 1913 income tax law? The first research 
question is: did agricultural interests impact passage of federal 
tax/tariff legislation? 
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To research the first question, the Congressional Record3 
and agricultural publications from the period 1909 to 1915 were 
examined. The following primary research section incorporates 
articles and commentary in agricultural periodicals of the pe-
riod several years before and up to passage of the U.S. individual 
income tax with agricultural discussions in the Congressional 
Record. The purpose of the research is to note if farmers, farm 
advocacy groups, or agricultural periodicals attempted to moni-
tor and influence federal legislation on tariffs and income taxes 
and if agricultural interests were considered in the debate on 
tariff/tax laws. 
The researchers reviewed national agricultural publications 
for the period 1905 to 1915. The sample included all issues of 
Farm Journal, American Agriculturist, Successful Farming, and 
The News and Farmer for this period and all issues available for 
Today’s Farmer, Progressive Farmer, and Prairie Farmer.4 These 
journals, for the most part, did not advocate or oppose the in-
come tax directly. The debate in these journals mainly centered 
on tariffs, with some discussion of other taxes. The income tax 
is discussed as an alternative, possibly a favorable alternative, 
to current tariffs. Excerpts taken from these journals provide 
some insight into the presentation given to the tariff/income tax 
debate and how this debate was portrayed to the general agri-
cultural audience. American Agriculturist (average weekly cir-
culation in 1912 was 149,663) [American Agriculturist, February 
17, 1912, p. 242] and Farm Journal (average monthly circulation 
in 1914 was 955,2075) gave the most space for discussion of this 
topic. The News and Farmer6 and Successful Farming (average 
monthly circulation in 1914 was 655,5327) also provided some 
coverage. Today’s Farmer, Progressive Farmer, and Prairie Farmer 
focused heavily on production agriculture with little coverage 
of political issues. Quantitative analysis used correlation and 
regression in presenting correlations of percentage farm popula-
3 Investigation of the Congressional Record shows Congress held no hearings 
on the income tax issue from 1909 to 1915, and the only congressional reports 
were the income tax laws, which contained no specific mention of agriculture 
relevant to this research. 
4 The research was limited by the lack of availability of early issues of some 
periodicals.
5 per telephone discussion April 27, 2000 with E.J. Rittersbach, vice president 
of circulation, Farm Journal
6 News and Farmer is no longer published and its circulation numbers were 
unavailable.
7 per telephone discussion May 5, 2000 with Dan Holland, vice president of 
circulation, Successful Farming
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tion and per capita income tax paid in 1914 by state and year 
of each state’s ratification of the 16th Amendment. Year of each 
state’s ratification is also regressed on percentage farm popula-
tion and per capita income tax paid in 1914 by state.  
The second research question is: Did agricultural popula-
tion percentages impact adoptions of states’ income tax laws in 
the 20th century? Correlations of farm population percentage 
and per capita income by state in 1914 and year of each state’s 
adoption of state income tax laws in the 20th century are pre-
sented. Year of each state’s adoption of state income tax laws in 
the 20th century is regressed on farm population percentage and 
per capita income tax paid in 1914 by state.
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE AND TAXES
Brownlee [2004, p. 2] postulates that sweeping changes in 
the federal tax system have occurred only during times of great 
national emergencies – the constitutional crisis of the 1780s, the 
Civil War, World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. 
He reviews these times of change and speculates on the pros-
pects for radical reform in the future. What follows is a similar 
review, but with the focus on the impact of a special interest 
group – farmers. 
Congress passed the first national tariff law on July 4, 1789. 
From that date until passage of the Underwood-Simmons Tariff 
Act of 1913, there were 58 U.S. tariff laws [Kip, n.d., pp. 21-27]. 
Tariffs provide revenues for the government and protection for 
domestic companies. The 1789 tariff was principally intended as 
a revenue-raising measure.
For much of this nation’s history, farmers constituted a 
majority of the population; agrarianism8 or farm fundamental-
ism was strong. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, and Ralph Waldo Emerson were among the many indi-
viduals who manifested a special feeling for farmers and farm-
ing. Jefferson revered farmers and called farmers “God’s chosen 
people.” Jefferson was a less enthusiastic supporter of manufac-
turing interests in the U.S. and was willing to continue to import 
manufactured goods from England. Alexander Hamilton, on 
the other hand, supported the view that encouraging large com-
mercial interests ultimately helped all other interests in the U.S. 
economy. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 is a good example of 
8 Agrarianism is the idealization of the American farmer. Agrarianism is the 
belief that rural life is the ideal life, that farmers are virtuous, hard-working, hon-
est, and independent. 
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these two contrasting views and the reaction of farmers [Ratner, 
1942, p. 37]. 
After 1812, tariffs helped the nation begin a transition from 
agriculture to industry. Republicans were strong proponents of 
tariffs for the protection of industries. Many of these industries 
were in their infancies, and protectionists considered tariffs 
necessary to help the foundling industries flourish. The period 
from 1830 to 1860 saw considerable changes in tariff legislation 
as parties in power changed. Businessmen in northeastern states 
and their Republican congressmen favored tariffs. The middle 
class and farmers opposed tariffs, and this was the general view 
of the Democratic Party [Ratner, 1942, p. 26]. Farmers opposed 
tariffs as economically detrimental to agriculture because the 
tariffs forced up prices of farm inputs, such as machinery, with-
out equally protecting farm produce.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Congress passed an income 
tax. Congressmen from the Northeast were vehemently opposed 
to the income tax. Representative Justin Morrill of Vermont, 
author of the Morrill Tariff Act of 1861, argued that the progres-
sive tax rates were a sign of agrarianism [Witte, 1985, p. 69]. The 
Civil War led to increased tariff rates and expansion of the items 
on which tariffs were placed. Congress discontinued the income 
tax in 1872, but high tariffs continued after the war. Tariffs were 
highest on cheaper grades of products. “Thus an undue share 
of the taxes for the support of the national government and the 
payment of its enormous war debt was borne by the people of 
small means, among whom we must certainly class the agricul-
tural population” [Buck, 1933, pp. 22-23]. Two important lessons 
were learned from the Civil War income tax experience. “The 
first was that the income tax generated an impressive amount of 
revenue…The second lesson was that the burden of the income 
tax fell only on a few states. New York alone paid about one 
third of the entire tax. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania each 
contributed about 13 percent” [Baack and Ray, 1985, p. 608]. 
Rise of Anti-Tariff Movement: During much of the 1800s, espe-
cially after the Civil War, pioneers moved west. Land opened 
up for expansion and farmers and ranchers settled the land. As 
the latter half of the 1800s unfolded, the powerful manufactur-
ing interests in the Northeast lost much of their stranglehold 
on U.S. politics. Constituencies of new states consisted heavily 
of the working class, small-shop owners, and farmers [Ratner, 
1942, p. 160]. Farmers often had few options as to where to 
buy inputs and supplies or where to sell produce. The tariff 
86
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/9
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200878
situation further tightened the price/cost squeeze. Tariffs were 
generally placed on imported manufactured goods, such as 
farm machinery, while farm products competed on a fairly open 
world market. In general, farmers favored reduction or elimi-
nation of import tariffs on manufactured goods and tariffs on 
imported agricultural goods. Farmers complained that prices for 
their produce fluctuated according to the world market, while 
input costs were set unfairly high to put money in the hands of 
northeastern manufacturers. “The objection to the protective 
tariff seems to have been based upon the feeling that it was class 
legislation – that it taxed the farmer for the benefit of the manu-
facturer...” [Buck, 1933, p. 101]. “The farmers and workers upon 
whose shoulders the business groups attempted to place the tax 
load resisted, as best they could ...” [Ratner, 1942, p. 16] 
These injuries gave rise to the Grange (or Patrons of Hus-
bandry, see Table 1) in 1867. The intent of O.H. Kelley, founder 
of the Grange, was to form a nonpartisan fraternity to advance 
the position of farmers throughout the nation. The Grange did 
not receive much attention from farmers, however, until it ad-
dressed the political and economic issues of most importance to 
them. One of the items on the Grange platform was “...equitable 
revision of the tariff...” [Farm Journal, March 1909, p. 134]. The 
Grange also desired that Congress set up a national tariff com-
mission, and that farmers hold positions on this commission 
[Farm Journal, February 1909, p. 25]. However, the Grange’s 
foremost organized effort was to confront railroads and mer-
chant middlemen.
Numerous branches of the Grange developed in the ensuing 
decade, predominantly in the upper Midwest. The Grange de-
clined as an important power after 1880, but some of its policy 
objectives lived on in the Greenback Party, Farmers’ Alliance, 
Populist Party, and Progressivism [Ratner et al., 1979, p. 267]. 
The Populist Party incorporated several of the platforms of the 
farmers’ alliances, including the progressive income tax. The 
hard economic times, especially on farms, strengthened the po-
sition of the Populist Party [Seligman, 1914, p. 494]. 
These agricultural movements may have had some impact 
on tariff rates. In the latter half of the 1800s, tariff rates, as a 
percent of duties to total imports, were highest in 1868 at 46%. 
This rate declined to about 30% in 1873, dropping to about 
20% in 1892. “The trouble with the whole tariff question lies 
in the growing sentiment at Washington that the United States 
is a manufacturing nation and not an agricultural country – 
Anything to promote manufactures, regardless of the effect on 
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farming” [American Agriculturist, February 4, 1911, p. 176]. The 
average tariff rate fluctuated from 20 to 25% until 1911. Once 
the national income tax became a possibility in the early 1900s, 
tariff rates dropped precipitously to a low of 6% in 1919. Rates 
later rose to about 15% in the 1920s, but never regained their 
pre-1900 importance [Taussig, 1931, pp. 527-528].
During a seven-year period in the 1870s, congressmen 
from heavily agricultural states introduced 14 bills proposing 
income tax legislation. Wealthy capitalists from the Northeast 
did not allow any congressional votes on these bills [Ratner, 
1942, p. 148]. While the industrial powers of the Northeast were 
well organized and singularly focused, at least regarding tariffs 
and taxes, farmers were politically unorganized and had many 
different goals. Their numbers were great, but they were inde-
pendent. Farmers raised many different crops (i.e., corn, wheat, 
hogs, oranges, potatoes). Due to diversity in operations, great 
geographic distances, and their independence, farmers seldom 
agreed on issues of importance and had even greater trouble co-
operating in joint political activity. For example, southern farm-
ers, even though they agreed with northern farmers on many 
issues, did not wish to forsake the Democratic Party for fear 
of giving northern Republicans too much power [Ratner, 1942, 
p. 167]. However, “the agrarian movement achieved political 
strength and consolidated that strength in the formation of the 
Populist Party during the 1880s and early 1890s…” [Baack and 
Ray, 1985, p. 611]. 
Given the previous problems of combining efforts for 
the common good of farmers, the rise of the Populist Party is 
evidence of the power of “pocketbook” issues, such as taxes, to 
unite members of an industry. In fact, the 1894 Tariff Act in-
cluded a provision for a federal income tax, which would have 
resulted in the taxation of only about 5% of the population, most 
of whom were in the Northeast. Northeastern businessmen and 
their congressmen cited it as an attempt to rob from the wealthy. 
Populists responded that the wealthy gained their wealth at the 
expense of the poor and middle classes. Congress passed the 
income tax bill in hope of appeasing agricultural interests and 
Populists. The Supreme Court, however, in a five to four vote, 
cited the income tax provision as unconstitutional because it did 
not apportion taxes directly [Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust, 
1895]. Congressmen made numerous proposals for income 
taxes between 1895 and 1909, but none became law. All of these 
proposals were made by congressmen from the South and West 
[Blakey and Blakey, 1940, p. 8].
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In the 1896 presidential election, William Jennings Bryan of 
Nebraska ran with Populist support, but the loss of the Populist 
candidates in the 1892 and 1896 elections was a blow to agricul-
ture. Farmers and agricultural interests, while still a majority of 
the U.S. population, apparently did not carry the political clout 
needed to win presidential elections. The Populist movement 
lost much momentum and support after the 1896 election, but 
still carried some political influence well into the 20th century. 
“Traditional Democratic support came from the South. But the 
ultimate merger of the agrarian Populist movement with the 
Democratic party also suggests that during the 1880s and early 
1890s support for the political objectives of the Democrats came 
from Midwestern agricultural states” [Baack and Ray, 1985, p. 
611]. Two of the movements that came out of Populism were the 
Progressive Party and the Country Life Movement. Many Popu-
lists joined the Progressive Party in its push to reduce tariffs, im-
plement a graduated income tax, and gain government control 
of railroads. The Country Life Movement had a shorter life than 
the Progressive movement. Country Life supporters were gener-
ally urban individuals with strong rural ties. Theodore Roosevelt 
was a Progressive and a strong supporter of the Country Life 
Movement. In 1908, he appointed a commission to investigate 
rural life and disclose hardships faced by farmers. The com-
mission noted that there was a distinct migration of individuals 
from farms to cities and that farmers did not have the political 
influence of industrial and urban interests because farmers were 
unorganized [Ratner, 1942, p. 261] .
Table 1 provides a summary of the important events depict-
ed above. Several items are significant to note. The influence of 
agricultural movements, such as the Grange, is greatest during 
times of relatively high tariffs. The U.S. ended the Civil War with 
a deficit, inaugurating a period of higher tariff rates. After ratifi-
cation of the 16th Amendment and passage of the U.S. income 
tax law, tariff rates declined and never again regained their pre-
vious high levels.
History Immediately Preceding Debate on the 1913 Income Tax 
Law: From 1900 to 1909, congressional debate flared over the 
questions of tariffs and taxes. Federal income tax proposals 
abounded. Congressmen debated how to frame these income tax 
proposals in accordance with the Constitution. Nelson Aldrich 
of Rhode Island, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
was strongly opposed to any income tax provision. Instead, he
89
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2008, Vol. 35, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2008
81Barney and Flesher, Agriculture and the 1913 Tax Law
TABLE 1
19th and Early 20th Century Timeline
Budget Deficit or 
Surplus (000s)*
Tariff Duties
as % of
Imported Value **
Agriculture and Tax
Movements
1800 63 Most New England states tax 
some form of income.
1805 3,054
1810 1,228
1815 -16,979
1820 -380
1825 5,984
1830 9,701
1835 17,857
1840 -4,837 Seven states adopt income tax 
due to recession.
1845 7,033
1850 4,060
1855 5,608
1860 -7,066 16% 1861-1872, North uses income 
tax to support war effort.
1865 -963,841 38%
1867 133,091 Grange founded.
1870 101,602 42% 1874-1878 Grange grows 
rapidly.
1875 13,377 28% Independence Party represents 
Grange.
1880 65,884 29%
1885 63,464 31% decline of Grange
1889 87,761
1890 85,040 29% Bryan and other westerners 
support Populist Party, 
Farmers’ Alliance, and Knights 
of Labor founded on platforms 
in St. Louis.
1892 9,914 Weaver runs for President.
1894 -61,170 income tax amendment to 
1894 tariff act
1895 -31,466 20% U.S. Supreme Court rules 
income tax unconstitutional. 
1896 -14,037 Bryan runs for president.
1900 46,380 28%
1905 -23,004 24%
1909 -89,423 16th Amendment submitted to 
the states.
1910 -18,105 29%
1913 -401 16th Amendment ratified by 
needed majority of states. 
Tariff Bill of 1913 includes 
income tax provision.
1915 -62,676 15%
1920 291,222 6%
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census [1975b]
**F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States
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designed a tariff bill that dramatically increased tariff rates.9 
This move caused a severe backlash from Democrats and mod-
erate Republicans. Conservative Republicans wanted to take 
the “wind from the sails” of the Populists and Progressives by 
proposing income tax laws. Taft, the Republican president, and 
Aldrich proposed submitting to the states for ratification of a 
constitutional amendment providing Congress the power to levy 
income taxes. Aldrich did this as a compromise measure in the 
hope that this amendment would ultimately fail, resulting in no 
income tax law [Ratner, 1942, p. 287].
Congressmen from heavily agricultural states continued 
to make income tax proposals in the years leading up to 1909, 
but all were effectively blocked by congressional Republicans. 
The Democratic platform of 1908 called for a federal income 
tax as part of the system to raise revenue and for the passage of 
an amendment to the Constitution to allow Congress to impose 
and collect income taxes. At the turn of the century, “Agriculture 
had undergone a relative decline in economic importance as 
urban manufacturing, commerce, and the service industries had 
increased their share of the national labor force and the national 
income” [Ratner et al., 1979, p. 253]. A division in the power of 
the Republican Party in 1909, however, provided an opportu-
nity for passage of income tax legislation [Ratner, 1942, p. 273]. 
Due to a compelling speech by Senator Elihu Root, Congress 
passed a corporate tax bill instead of the individual income tax 
bill [Ratner, 1942, p. 290]. At least some amelioration was given 
to farmers as the final version10 was more favorable to farm-
ers than Aldrich’s original proposal due to a “determined stand 
taken against Aldrich and his gang by the president” [American 
Agriculturist, August 7, 1909, p. 113]. 
After the elections of 1912, the Democrats held control of 
both houses of Congress. With this power and subsequent ratifi-
cation of the 16th Amendment by the needed majority of states 
in 1913 (see Table 2), Democrats quickly submitted a federal 
income tax law. This income tax law also incorporated the cor-
porate excise tax of 1909.
Table 2 provides some information on the above discus-
sion and the data on which the resulting statistical analyses are 
9 Review of national budget deficits and surpluses of this time shows that the 
nation was operating at a deficit in both 1909 and 1913, but there was a surplus 
in 1911 and 1912 (see Table 1). 
10 The News and Farmer provided a comprehensive discussion of the proposed 
1909 income tax law and its implications for farmers.
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based. The regional split in Table 2 shows the low percentage 
farm population in some New England and Middle Atlantic 
states in 1910. Several of these states (Rhode Island, Con-
necticut, and Pennsylvania) with low farm populations either 
rejected the 16th Amendment or took no action. It is interesting 
that New York, with only a 10% farm population, was an early 
adopter of both the 16th Amendment and its state income tax. 
This is especially ironic as New York easily had the highest per 
capita income taxes paid. The table shows the year each state 
adopted an income tax up to 1942. This table provides the input 
for the correlation and regression analyses that follow. 
TABLE 2
State Taxation Record and Farm Population
Percent 
Farm 
Population 
in 1910*
Date of 
16th 
Amendment 
Passage**
Year of First 
Modern 
State Income 
Taxes (up to 
1942)***
Per Capita 
($) Individual 
Income Taxes 
Paid in fiscal 
year ended
June 30, 1914#
New England
Maine 33 03/30/1911 .113941
New Hampshire 24 02/19/1913 1923 .061527
Vermont 40 02/19/1913 1931 .027135
Massachusetts 4 03/04/1913 1916 .163556
Rhode Island 4 Rejected .139847
Connecticut 10 Rejected .139396
Middle Atlantic
New York 10 07/12/1911 1917 .254368
New Jersey 6 02/04/1913 .131723
Pennsylvania 14 No action 1935 .189499
East North Central
Ohio 26 01/19/1911 1931 .114332
Indiana 37 01/30/1911 .053525
Illinois 21 03/01/1910 1932 .202436
Michigan 32 02/23/1911 .188782
 Wisconsin 39 05/26/1911 1911 .063155
West North Central
Minnesota 40 06/11/1912 1933 .156847
Iowa 47 02/24/1911 1934 .043400
Missouri 41 03/16/1911 1917 .101313
North Dakota 64 02/16/1911 1919 .024158
South Dakota 64 02/03/1912 1935 .015709
Nebraska 53 02/08/1911 .057982
Kansas 49 02/18/1911 1933 .034661
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TABLE 2 (continued)
Percent 
Farm 
Population 
in 1910*
Date of 
16th 
Amendment 
Passage**
Year of First 
Modern 
State Income 
Taxes (up to 
1942)***
Per Capita 
($) Individual 
Income Taxes 
Paid in fiscal 
year ended
June 30, 1914#
South Atlantic
Delaware 28 02/03/1913 1917 .171158
Maryland 23 04/08/1910 1937 .163556
Virginia 52 No action 1916 .047634
West Virginia 45 01/29/1913 1935 .078259
North Carolina 64 02/11/1911 1921 .038264
South Carolina 64 01/19/1910 1922 .045780
Georgia 61 07/11/1910 1929 .042955
Florida 36 Rejected .045320
East South Central
Kentucky 56 02/09/1910 1936 .035836
Tennessee 58 04/07/1911 1923 .022518
Alabama 64 08/10/1909 1933 .029047
Mississippi 75 03/07/1910 1912 .010401
West South Central
Arkansas 70 04/22/1911 1929 013112
Louisiana 44 06/28/1912 1934 .062493
Oklahoma 62 03/09/1910 1915 .028546
Texas 59 08/16/1910 .041476
Mountain
Montana 30 01/30/1911 1917 .063622
Idaho 45 01/20/1911 1931 .028506
Wyoming 36 02/03/1913
Colorado 25 02/15/1911 1937 .147643
New Mexico 56 02/03/1913 1933 .033150
Arizona 42 04/06/1912 1933 .075804
Utah 33 Rejected 1931 .175933
Nevada 13 01/31/1911 .011476
Pacific
Washington 23 01/26/1911 1929 .109362
Oregon 31 01/23/1911 1929 .131305
California 17 01/31/1911 1929 .233423
The states are divided in this manner to give a better view of income taxes paid 
by region of the nation. Average individual income taxes across the nation were 
$.115869 per capita.
* U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census [1913, p. 56; 1975b, pp. 
24-37]
** Blakey and Blakey [1940, p. 69]
*** Blakey and Johnson [1942, pp. 3-4]
# Individual income taxes paid contained in a letter from the acting secretary of 
commerce to the 63rd Congress, dated December 14, 1914; 1910 state census 
populations from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census [1975b].
93
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2008, Vol. 35, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2008
85Barney and Flesher, Agriculture and the 1913 Tax Law
As this secondary research shows, there is considerable 
evidence that the histories of agriculture, taxes, and tariffs are 
deeply intertwined. Whether this connection is strong enough to 
create an identifiable relationship between agriculture and tax/
tariff legislation is the subject of the following qualitative and 
quantitative primary research.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND  
AGRICULTURAL PERIODICALS
In 1909 and in 1913, the Senate debated two new tariff bills 
and proposals for an income tax. If Congress dropped tariffs as 
a major source of revenue, then another tax must take its place. 
The income tax was the major alternative to tariffs. In 1909 and 
1913, the Senate debated proposed income tax amendments to 
tariff bills. In 1913, both houses debated the first income tax.
Before 1909, tariff revenues were important in financing 
the federal budget. Congress was under pressure, however, from 
several sides on the tariff issue as it related to agriculture. First, 
consumers called for repeal of the tariffs imposed on agricul-
tural goods in order to reduce the cost of these goods. Second, 
some congressmen proposed imposition of higher tariffs on 
imported agricultural goods, such as hemp,11 to bolster falter-
ing farm prices. These congressmen primarily addressed goods 
grown in their home states. Third, congressmen from highly 
agricultural states proposed removal of tariffs on agricultural 
equipment needed by farmers. 
The debate over use of tariffs for protection or revenue usu-
ally split along party lines unless constituents’ interests were at 
stake. As noted by Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas, “…our 
Republican friends will find that they are dealing with a thinking 
and intelligent class, who can not be easily fooled by the trickery 
of the political orator” [Congressional Record, May 6, 1913, p. 
1247]. Congressman Rayburn took exception to the use of tariffs 
as a protective measure. Texas’ population was 59% agricultural 
in 1910 (Table 2). Nationwide, many farmers voted for Demo-
cratic candidates because of the party’s platform position on 
tariffs. [Hibbard, 1902, p. 170].
Speaking for the other side, Senator Chauncey Depew (New 
York) was very much opposed to income taxation and argued 
against it on constitutional grounds [Congressional Record, May 
11 Senator Bradley proposed a tariff on the importation of hemp with the ob-
jective of helping hemp farmers of the Midwest. His oratory implies a strong alli-
ance with these farmers [Congressional Record, May 4, 1909, p. 1703].
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17, 1909, p. 2102]. Only 10% of New York’s population lived on 
farms in 1910. During the imposition of the Civil War income 
tax, New York paid approximately 30% of the income tax paid by 
all states (North and South) [Seligman, 1914, p. 482, Table III].
News and Farmer [June 24, 1909] identified members of 
Congress for and against the law by name. Several American 
Agriculturist issues also named individuals pro and con on the 
tariff law. “The party line-up will, of course, be maintenance of 
the protective policy by the republicans and tariff for revenue 
only by the democrats” [American Agriculturist, March 27, 1909, 
p. 423]. In the Senate, the vast majority of the farm-state Demo-
crats and Republican Senators Dolliver and Cummins of Iowa, 
Nelson and Clapp of Minnesota, Beveridge of Indiana, Bristow 
of Kansas, and LaFollette of Wisconsin, “popularly known as 
progressive republicans,” voted against the 1909 Payne tariff bill 
[American Agriculturist, August 14, 1909, p. 129]. 
Agricultural publications mentioned Senator Porter Mc-
Cumber of North Dakota, for example, who spent considerable 
congressional time analyzing various agricultural aspects of tar-
iff legislation, including the impact on each agricultural pro duct 
and debating at length the plight of the American farmer on 
several occasions. When American Agriculturist [July 31, 1909, 
p. 88] announced the proposed 16th Amendment in 1909, the 
publication noted that eastern states will probably be against the 
amendment with the rest of the country for it. During the years 
of agricultural publications and congressional debate examined 
here (1909 to 1915), the rhetoric often relied heavily on key 
 values, such as fairness and patriotism, and the lack of solidarity 
of the farm vote.
“Fairness” Issue: The main issue of concern to farmers was one 
of “fairness.” The general sentiment regarding the inequity of the 
tariff laws to farmers echoed in agricultural publications and in 
agricultural political parties. The popular slogan was “Tariff for 
all or tariff for none. A square deal” [Farm Journal, April 1910, 
p. 249]. The American Agriculturist [February 10, 1912, p. 260] 
reduced the tariff issue to a question of fairness.
The whole thing is simple. If the products that the farm-
ers sell are to be admitted duty free, then the things 
the farmers buy must also be admitted duty free. If 
the products that the manufacturer makes for farmers 
and others are to be protected, then the products that 
the manufacturer and his workmen buy of the farmer, 
either in the raw or finished state must also be protect-
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ed....The tariff must apply to one and all alike. It can’t be 
one system for one half the people and another system 
for the other half. If tariff reform is to be undertaken, it 
must be on the principle that all are to be treated alike.
The concept of fairness also had its roots in economic con-
cerns. Farmers were caught in a price/cost squeeze. The goods 
they purchased were protected manufactured goods subject to 
transportation costs (particularly railroads) and to middlemen’s 
handling fees. 
During the first decade of the 20th century, there was in-
creasing resentment of tariffs by farmers. Farmers felt that their 
economic group suffered more than others: “To a greater extent 
than ever before the farmer is subject to conditions which he 
did not create and which he is powerless to control. The central-
ization of business of all kinds in the hands of the few, and in 
populous centers, has closed the little shops and factories and 
destroyed communal life in hundreds of thousands of villages 
and small towns” [Farm Journal, April 1910, p. 235]. 
Congressmen received letters and telegrams from their con-
stituents asking for repeal of the tariffs. The American Agricul-
turist [April 17, 1909, p. 512] urged farmers everywhere to send 
a message to win the victory over the tariff. 
According to Hibbard [1902, p. 135], it was common for 
farmers and agricultural organizations to petition Congress. 
Appeals, noted or included in full in the Congressional Record 
[April 1909, pp. 1354-1372], often focused directly on repeal of 
tariffs on specific farm produce: sugar, wool, wood, hides, and 
cigars. The American Agriculturist [April 29, 1911, p. 658] called 
on farmers to send letters to congressmen to maintain tariffs on 
trade with Canada. This appeal is made in several consecutive 
issues. The January 11, 1913 issue [p. 37] called on farmers to 
write their congressmen and enclose a copy of a petition calling 
on Congress to confer “justice in taxation” for farmers. The May 
3, 1913 issue [p. 606] calls again on farmers to “Above all, act! 
And act quickly!” by sending a petition (provided in the issue) 
to their congressmen to prevent injustice to farmers in tariff 
reduction. The periodical asked that tariffs be applied to both 
manufactured and farm goods or lifted from both. Farm Jour-
nal12 reiterated the Grange’s platform of “Tariff for all or tariff 
12 Agricultural publications were not the only periodicals criticizing taxa-
tion for its detrimental effects on agriculture. An article in the Journal of Political 
Economy (Vol. 17, June 1909, pp. 354-362) determined that property taxes were 
harmful to agriculture. 
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for none” [May 1911, p. 320] and called on farmers to unite and 
write their congressmen [February 1910, p. 76]. 
One agricultural periodical subscriber summarized his 
perception of the tariff issue: “[t]he Democrats are more guilty 
than the Republicans. The Republicans are frankly prejudiced, 
insular and afraid. The Democrats, however, see the light, use 
it against their opponents, and yet lack the courage to push the 
knowledge they have to its only logical conclusion – absolute 
free-trade” [Farm Journal, May 1913, p. 330]. 
Patriotic Appeal: Support of agriculture often had patriotic ap-
peal: “Civilization in all modern countries proves that agricul-
ture is the basis of a nation...Under these conditions, American 
agriculture will feed not only our own people but Europe’s popu-
lation...and the American flag insure peace around the globe!” 
[American Agriculturist, May 10, 1913, p. 632] 
Debate on the tariff bill was heated, and congressmen 
used patriotic rhetoric to support their positions. According to 
Senator McLaurin of Mississippi [Congressional Record, May 14, 
1909, p. 2047]: 
The farming people of this country do not ask that you 
give them any protection, when ‘protection’ is used in 
the sense of an opportunity or power to rob the masses 
of the people, or to take the money that belongs to oth-
ers and put it into their own pockets; but they do ask 
an opportunity to devote the fruit of their labor to their 
own interest, their own protection, their own comfort, 
and their own welfare. They ask that you take off of 
them the heavy hand of what you call ‘protection,’ but 
what really, in fact, is an opportunity for extortion…The 
farmers of this country produce the provisions upon 
which all of us live. They produce the clothing that 
clothes us….
Senator McLaurin’s home state of Mississippi had a farm popu-
lation representing 75% of its total population. This percentage 
was significantly above the national average of 34.9% in 1910.
Ties to agriculture are evident in the following speech by 
Representative Hamlin of Missouri, a speech that proclaims the 
deleterious effects of tariff legislation on farming [Congressional 
Record, July 12, 1909, p. 4431]:
…I undertake to say that no man with a proper regard 
for the truth will deny that no class of people has been 
as persistently discriminated against in tariff legislation 
as has the farmer. I am his friend, and I am proud of 
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it. I was born and reared on the farm. I have plowed, 
I have planted, I have sown, I have reaped, and I know 
that the farmer literally ‘earns his bread in the sweat of 
his face,’ but I have never ceased to be thankful that I 
was born and reared on the farm...Therefore I believe 
that I know what the farmer wants, at least I know 
something of his condition and his relation to national 
legislation, and so long as I shall remain a Member of 
Congress I shall do what I can to see that he receives 
fair and equal treatment. 
Senator Porter McCumber of North Dakota was not about 
to be left out of the patriotic call to arms in defense of farmers 
against tariffs [Congressional Record, July 14, 1913, p. 2400]:
And so I shall address myself first to you, the Democrat-
ic Party, with reference to your assault upon the Ameri-
can farmer. In this year 1913 you are about to commit 
a greater crime against the American farmer than has 
ever been perpetrated by any political party against any 
class of people during any period of recorded history. 
You are about to rob him of sacred rights which he 
has paid for through long years of toil, self-denial, and 
patient waiting. With violent hands you are about to 
strip him of every advantage which the changed condi-
tions of home supply and demand were about to yield 
him. You have declared that he is an outcast in the land 
which he has made, the only one of all classes of Ameri-
can people who is not entitled to any consideration at 
your hands...My first question is, What crime has the 
American farmer committed against the Democratic 
Party that has awakened in the heart of that party this 
dire vengeance against him?...Let me ask another ques-
tion: Is not the American farmer equal in intelligence 
to the American stonecutter, bricklayer, carpenter, or 
plasterer?...I want to protest right here with all the ear-
nestness in my power against the assumption which 
seems to prevail everywhere that the tiller of the soil is 
not expected to live on a plane of equality with the aver-
age person engaged in city avocations. 
Senator McCumber was one of the most outspoken support-
ers of farmers during the early years of the 20th century.13 His 
home state of North Dakota had 64% of its population living on 
farms in 1910. Of the senators speaking for farmers, McCumber 
13 Senator McCumber supported the use of income taxes and here lambastes 
the 1913 Tariff Bill, not for its income tax provision, but for the effects of its tariffs 
on agriculture.
98
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/9
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200890
was from the state with the second highest percentage of farm 
population behind only Mississippi’s 75%. Even these patriotic 
appeals were not enough to sway congressional votes toward the 
desires of farmers when farmers could not cooperate on political 
issues. 
Solidarity: Due to geographic dispersion, differences in farm 
enterprises, and a strong sense of independence, solidarity as a 
political unit eluded farmers. The diverse interests of farmers 
made it difficult to build a strong community [Farm Journal, 
April 1914, p. 270]. “The farmer’s interests have undoubtedly 
suffered most because of the absence of that solidarity that pre-
vails in other fields of effort” [Farm Journal, November 1912, 
p. 539]. Senator McCumber also explained why the American 
farmer had comparatively little political influence [Congressional 
Record, July 14, 1913, p. 2398]:
Labor is organized into a great federation, the head of 
which appears before our committees, tells us what or-
ganized labor demands, sits in our galleries, and checks 
our votes, and we are afraid of him. The farmer is not 
organized; his interests are so scattered and the char-
acter of his products so diversified that he has been un-
able to organize a great national political society, and so 
you are not much afraid of him.
A comment in the Farm Journal [March 1911, p. 165] ar-
gued that farmers pay more than their share of taxes due to in-
adequate organization. “It is ‘up to’ the farmers, by organization, 
to save themselves and others from the effects of extravagance, 
corruption and injustice.” Farmers deserved a “front seat at the 
political table,” not “shoved into the back seats” nor “forced to 
accept what few crumbs fell from the politician’s table” [Ameri-
can Agriculturist, May 7, 1910, p. 676]. As the tariff debate pro-
gressed, the discussion shifted to focus on what could replace 
tariffs as a primary revenue generator.
Alternative Forms of Raising Revenue: American Agriculturist 
published numerous articles about alternative forms of raising 
federal revenues, including tariffs, income taxes, and property 
taxes. Senator Moses Clapp of Minnesota provided a synopsis of 
the possible sources of revenue. Increased revenues could come 
from increased taxes on tobacco or liquor; or inheritance tax, 
property tax, income tax; or corporate tax. The taxes on tobacco 
or liquor did not meet with congressional approval. Therefore 
only the last four were viable options [Congressional Record, 
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July 1, 1909, p. 4008]. The inheritance tax, however, was given 
little consideration, and the major focus was on whether to tax 
income or property. 
Concerning the income tax, Congress debated levying the 
income tax on corporations or on individuals. Dudley Hughes 
of Georgia was among the senators who proclaimed that a tax 
levied only on corporations could not be passed because of neg-
ative feedback from farmers who had incorporated their farms 
[Congressional Record, July 2, 1909, p. 4045]. Senator Cummins 
of Iowa (with a farm population of 47%) felt that there were 
enough farmers who had incorporated their operations to cause 
resentment of a corporate income tax law: “These small corpora-
tions have sprung up in every part of our country, and there are 
no exemptions in this provision” [Congressional Record, June 30, 
1909, p. 3979].
American Agriculturist [July 24, 1909, p. 68], on the other 
hand, was much in favor of the corporate income tax:
The corporations are appealing to the farmers to assist 
in defeating this measure, pointing out that co-operative 
associations, creameries and other organizations having 
directly to do with agriculture will suffer. This comes 
with mighty poor grace from men who, with very few 
exceptions, have combined to wring from the farmers 
and the agricultural interests in general a larger propor-
tion of their earnings than existing conditions warrant. 
They have combined to make the farmer pay larger 
prices for his machinery, his groceries, his dry goods, 
his fencing and everything else which he has to buy. The 
farmer is the creator of wealth. Corporations attempt to 
get this wealth from him, leaving simply enough for a 
bare living in most cases, with occasionally a few luxu-
ries thrown in as a sop. The farmer is looked upon as 
legitimate prey for corporate interests. It comes with 
very bad grace, therefore, for the corporations to appeal 
to farming interests. Let them fight their own battles. 
Let them pay their just proportion of taxes. 
Property taxes were also a possible source of federal revenue, 
although some congressmen felt that property owners were 
already taxed too heavily [Congressional Record, May 4, 1909, p. 
1701]. According to Senator Charles Dick of Ohio [Congressional 
Record, August 5, 1909, p. 4958]: “In the United States the great 
[tax] burden rests upon the middle class, the small farm owners 
and small home owners.” Senator George Sutherland of Utah 
[Congressional Record, May 17, 1909, p. 2092] spoke against 
property taxes “because it destroys the equality of taxation 
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and saddles the farmers with an undue burden.” Agricultural 
sentiment was strong against using property taxes to generate 
federal revenues. Taxes on property would have serious implica-
tions to those property-owning taxpayers who could not shift 
the increased cost of taxes to the consumers of farm products. 
Farmers had no influence in fixing prices as manufacturers did 
[Stewart, 1927, p. 69]. 
The average farmer earned well below the exemption 
amount provided in the income tax provisions. Therefore, most 
farmers would not be subject to income tax, certainly a reason 
farmers preferred income taxes to tariffs. In fact, few farmers 
paid federal income taxes in the first years of the tax because of 
the exemption levels and relatively low farm incomes.14 
The August 28, 1909 issue of American Agriculturist [p. 167] 
provides considerable discussion on the proposed income tax 
amendment, including some history of how earlier attempts to 
enact an income tax had met with opposition from the eastern 
states. “In this country the wealthy people who habitually evade, 
so far as possible, every form of taxation, are bitterly opposed to 
an income tax.”
Congressional Backgrounds: Many congressmen of the era under 
study had ties to agriculture. As of the 1910 census, 34.9% of the 
U.S. population were farmers [U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1975a, 
p. 457]. This percentage was down from approximately 50% in 
1870. A cursory review of the biographies of the senators identi-
fied in the above discussions indicates that the average age of 
senators was about 55 years [Biographical Directory, 1989]. This 
would mean that these senators were born about 1855. In 1855, 
over half of the U.S. population was engaged in agriculture. 
Most of the vocal congressmen grew up in small-town, agricul-
tural settings. 
Table 3 lists the major farm supporters identified in the 
Congressional Record, their home state, and the percentage farm 
population in 1910. Most of these states had farm populations 
well over the national average, including four states with farm 
populations over 50%. Eight of the 11 states listed are west of 
the Mississippi. None of the states represented in Table 3 are 
from New England or the Middle Atlantic states listed in Table 
2.
14 “Few farmers pay income-tax: only twenty-nine farmers out of every thou-
sand paid income-tax in 1923” [Stewart, 1927, p. 69].
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TABLE 3
Strong Agricultural Supporters
Senator Hometown State Represented
% Farm 
Population
Joseph Bailey Crystal Springs (MS) Texas 59%
Thomas Carter Pana (IL) Montana 30%
Moses Clapp Delphi (IN) Minnesota 40%
Albert Cummins Carmichaels (PA) Iowa 47%
Charles Dick Akron Ohio 26%
Dudley Hughes Jeffersonville Georgia 61%
Porter McCumber Crete (IL) North Dakota 64%
Anselm McLaurin Brandon Mississippi 75%
George Sutherland Springville Utah 33%
William Thompson Garden City Kansas 49%
Representative Hometown
State 
Represented
% Farm 
Population
Courtney Hamlin Brevard (NC) Missouri 41%
Sam Rayburn Bonham Texas 59%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census [1975b]
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774-1989 [1989]
Two of the most vocal supporters of farmers, Senators Cum-
mins and McCumber, were from highly agricultural states, Iowa 
and North Dakota, respectively. In 1910, 47% of Iowa’s popula-
tion and 64% of North Dakota’s population were agricultural. 
The repeated references to farmers in the Congressional Record 
show that congressmen considered farmers in the tax debates.
Summary of Qualitative Research: The qualitative research shows 
that agriculture was considered in the congressional income tax/
tariff debates. If left to the designs of Senators McCumber and 
Cummins, early tax law and possibly current tax law, might be 
much more favorable to agriculture. Other congressmen, while 
not as vocal, gave notice that they too felt a kinship with agri-
culture or at least a concern for the farm vote. The number of 
congressmen coming from rural settings explains their strong 
affection for agriculture. The discussion of agriculture in the 
congressional debates was pervasive. Agricultural publications 
of the time also focused considerable attention on the debate 
between tariffs and taxes and whether taxes should be based on 
property or income. Congress decided to base the tax calcula-
tion on income, partially because property, much of which was 
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held by farmers, was already highly taxed. The agricultural 
magazines also encouraged readers to petition congressmen to 
favor farm interests. These letter-writing campaigns would have 
reminded politicians of the importance of the farm vote.
STATISTICAL RESEARCH RESULTS
The previous sections have shown qualitatively that con-
gressmen considered agriculture in the income tax/tariff debate. 
This section explores this issue statistically and further introduc-
es the possibility that individual states’ votes on the 16th Amend-
ment and adoption of state income tax laws in the 20th century 
were influenced by their percentage of agricultural population.
This study hypothesizes that the percentage farm popula-
tion of a state will be a determining factor in adoption of the 
16th Amendment. The factors analyzed were: percentage farm 
population of each state in 1910, year of the passage of the 16th 
Amendment in each state, year in which each state adopted state 
income taxes in this century, and per capita federal individual 
income tax in each state in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1914. 
Table 2 shows the input data for the statistical analyses.
A related area of interest is to study the adoption of state in-
come tax laws in this century to see if the percentage farm popu-
lation had an impact on increased reliance by states on income 
taxes for raising revenues instead of other forms of revenue gen-
eration. Another reason for including this factor is the diversity 
that existed among state taxation systems. Einhorn [2006, pp. 
218-224] notes that by the antebellum era, there were two pat-
terns of state tax structures, northern and southern, even though 
the government systems of the North and South were more sim-
ilar than they had ever been. These differing state backgrounds 
may have influenced the adoption of the 16th Amendment. “Im-
portant to the new support for federal income taxation was the 
formation of an urban-rural alignment of middle-class citizens 
who favored state and local tax reform” [Brownlee, 2004, p. 49]. 
The economic depression of the 1890s caused more demand for 
services from state and local government and led states to look 
at adopting an income tax to bolster revenues [Brownlee, 2004, 
pp. 49-50]. A leader of one Grange recommended: “...that if the 
federal government by reason of the income tax can uncover 
millions that heretofore have been concealed, the states should 
likewise take up the matter and assess such wealth in order that 
the burden unfairly placed upon the farmer might be relieved” 
[Farm Journal, February 1914, p. 102].  
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Table 4 presents the results of correlation analysis.15 The 
results show that percentage farm population is significantly 
correlated with 16th Amendment passage (p<.01), the year in 
which states adopted state income taxes (p<.10), and with per 
capita income taxes paid by state (p<.01). In addition to being 
significant correlations, the levels of these correlations were 
notable. The negative correlations are as expected. As percent 
farm population increases, states adopted the 16th Amendment 
and their own state income taxes earlier. As mentioned above, 
percent farm population is highly correlated with per capita 
income taxes. Those states with higher farm populations tended 
to pay lower income taxes per person. Per capita income taxes 
paid by state significantly correlated (p<.10) with passage of 
the 16th Amendment in the anticipated direction, but not with 
the year in which states adopted state income taxes. The cor-
relation between per capita income taxes and 16th Amendment 
passage is positive; states paying lower income tax rates passed 
the 16th Amendment earlier. In addition, the level of correlation 
and degree of significance between per capita income tax and 
16th Amendment passage is not as great as the correlation and 
degree of significance between percentage farm population and 
16th Amendment passage respectively. 
Table 5 provides the results of regression analysis.16 In the 
15 Correlation analysis examines the relationship between two variables. Cor-
relation coefficients can range from -1 to 1. The absolute value of the correlation 
is the level of the relationship. The sign of the coefficient shows if the two vari-
ables move in the same direction (positive sign) or opposite directions (negative 
sign). For example, if two factors change perfectly proportionately in the same 
direction their correlation would be 1. If they change perfectly proportionately in 
opposite directions, their correlation is -1. Two variables that are not correlated 
would have a coefficient of correlation near 0. The level of significance gives the 
odds that this relationship is the result of random occurrence. For example, in 
Table 2, percent farm population and 16th Amendment passage have a coefficient 
of correlation of -.437 and a level of significance of .002. This means that the two 
variables move moderately in opposite step with each other (-.437 is between 0 
and -1), and the chances of this level of correlation happening randomly are about 
2 in one thousand (.002). This would be designated p<.01. The negative sign in-
dicates that when one variable increases, the other variable tends to decrease. 
In this case, earlier passage of the 16th Amendment (smaller years) is correlated 
with higher farm population, hence the negative coefficient of correlation.
16 Regression analysis is another statistical method to analyze data. Regres-
sion analysis, when combined with supporting theory, as in our qualitative dis-
cussion above, can lend support to the theory that one variable affects another 
variable. In this paper, the theory postulates that percentage farm population is 
at least partially predictive of 16th Amendment passage and year of state income 
tax adoption. As with correlations, the coefficients in regression models show the 
relative direction of movement of the independent and dependent variables. Sig-
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TABLE 4
Correlation Analysis
16th Amendment 
Passage# Income Tax Year^
Per Capita
Income Taxes
Percent Farm 
Population -.437** -.269* -.728**
.002 .065 .001
48 48 48
16th Amendment 
Passage .224 .265*
.125 .069
48 48
Income Tax Year .054
.718
48
Input data are from Table 2.
The first number is the correlation coefficient, the second is the degree of signifi-
cance, and the third is the number of observations.
*significant to .10
**significant to .01
#Year of 16th Amendment passage was coded as follows: 
1909=1, 1910=2, 1911=3, 1912=4, 1913=5, no action=6, and rejection of the 
amendment by the state=7.
This coding was used as it was felt no action was a more negative outcome than 
passage in 1913 and rejection was an even more negative outcome than no action. 
Thus, the possible outcomes formed an ordinal ranking.
^Income tax year was coded as the year that state adopted a state income tax law 
in the 20th century, with a maximum of 1942 for those states not adopting a state 
income tax by that year.
Sources:
Percentage Farm Population: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus [1975b].
Year of 16th Amendment passage: Blakey and Blakey [1940, p. 69]
Income Tax Year: Blakey and Johnson [1942, pp. 3-4]
Per Capita Income Taxes: letter from the secretary of the treasury to the 63rd 
Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Document No. 623, December 7, 1914 [U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975b]
nificance provides the odds that this relationship would occur randomly. For ex-
ample, in Table 5, model 2, as percent farm population decreases, states delayed 
passage of a state income tax to later years (negative coefficient). This relationship 
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TABLE 5
Regression Analysis
Model 1 Dependent Variable:  
16th Amendment Passage
Independent Variables Coefficient t Significance
Constant 5.506 5.758 .000
Percentage Farm 
Population -.04127
-2.665 .011
Per Capita Income -.002673 -581 .564
Adjusted R-Square .161
F-Statistic 5.518 .007
Model 2 Dependent Variable:  
Year of State Income Tax Adoption
Independent Variables Coefficient t Significance
Constant 49.087 6.177 .000
Percentage Farm 
Population
-.308 -2.391 .021
Per Capita Income -.0566 -1.48 .146
Adjusted R-Square .076
F-Statistic 2.932 .064
Input data is from Table 2.
Year of 16th Amendment passage was coded as follows: 
1909=1, 1910=2, 1911=3, 1912=4, 1913=5, no action=6, and rejection of the 
amendment by the state=7.
This coding was used as it was felt no action was a more negative outcome than 
passage in 1913 and rejection was an even more negative outcome than no action. 
Thus, the possible outcomes formed an ordinal ranking.
Year of Income tax adoption was coded as the year that state adopted a state 
income tax law in the 20th century, with a maximum of 1942 for those states not 
adopting a state income tax by that year.
Sources: same as for Table 4
was significant to .021, meaning that the chances of this relationship occurring 
randomly are about 21 in a thousand. The adjusted R-Square of .076 shows that 
the two independent variables together explain about 7.6% of the variation in year 
of state income tax adoption. While this may seem minimal, R-Squares are often 
low for significant models due to the many possible unanalyzed systematic and 
unsystematic variables that might impact the dependent variable. The probabil-
ity of the F-statistic (.064 for model 2) indicates the degree of significance of the 
relationship between the independent variables of the model and the dependent 
variable.
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two regressions, the independent variables were percentage 
farm population and per capita income taxes paid by state.17 
The dependent variables in the two regression models were year 
of passage of the 16th Amendment and year of adoption of the 
state income tax, respectively. In both models, percentage farm 
population was a significant predictor (p<.05) and per capita 
income taxes paid was not a significant predictor. This result is 
consistent with the correlation analysis. Both models were also 
significant overall (p<.01 and p<.10, respectively).
The conclusion of both the correlation analysis and the 
regression analysis is that percentage farm population was a 
significant predictor of passage of the 16th Amendment by the 
states and adoption of state income taxes in the 20th century 
and a stronger predictor than per capita income taxes paid. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The testimony in Congress during the years 1909 to 1913 in-
dicates that congressmen did consider agricultural taxation. Leg-
islators who considered agriculture in the development of the 
tax laws generally grew up in or represented states with a higher 
than average percentage of farm population. Perhaps there were 
no specific provisions that overtly favored farmers until 1915, as 
Holland states, but the mere existence of an income tax instead 
of tariffs or property taxes is the result of some dispensations to 
the farm population. Agricultural tax preferences may not have 
been necessary in 1913 because most farmers did not earn more 
than the exemption amount. From a U.S. population of 100 mil-
lion, only 368,000 (.368%) filed returns for 1913. According to 
the 1913 definition of taxable net income, the average taxable 
net income of farmers in 1910 was $2,194, well under the $4,000 
exemption for couples [U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975a, 
p. 99]. In 1935, only about 10% of the nation’s farmers earned 
$4,000 or above [U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975a, Table 
G756]. A need for agricultural tax preferences may have devel-
oped as farm incomes increased relative to the exemptions.
Farmers have benefited from unique tax treatment since 
the beginning of the income tax law. This special treatment may 
be explained by the following conclusions based on the qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis. (1) Agricultural interests were 
17 These regressions are not intended to be complete predictive models of 16th 
Amendment passage and of adoption of state income tax laws. These regressions 
are only used to examine the effects of percentage farm population and per capita 
income taxes on the dependent variables. 
107
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2008, Vol. 35, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2008
99Barney and Flesher, Agriculture and the 1913 Tax Law
influential in the development and passage of tax/tariff laws. (2) 
The percentage of congressmen with agricultural ties explains 
the strong affection for agriculture. (3) Discussion in congres-
sional debates and in agricultural journals was passionate and 
patriotic in support of equity for farmers. (4) Percentage farm 
population was a significant (p<.05) predictor of passage of the 
16th Amendment by the states. (5) The quantitative analysis 
shows that percentage farm population was a significant (p<.05) 
predictor of adoption of state income taxes in the 20th century.
As major tax reform is debated, the actions of special in-
terest groups should be monitored. Today, as then, there are 
charges that the wealthy receive preferential treatment and 
the arguments are divided along political lines. According to 
Hansen’s theory, political parties adopt ideological positions 
on tax policy that correspond to the impact on their partisans 
and amend their tax policy positions to reflect changes in the 
proportions of voters upon whom the heavier tax burdens rest 
in order to reflect the relocation of the political center. Modern 
groups may be as successful as farmers in securing preferential 
tax treatments. These successful groups will be the eventual 
winners under the reformed systems, while those with lesser 
voices will be the losers. A particular segment of the economy 
to watch is e-commerce. E-commerce is perceived as a threat to 
store-front merchants and state and local tax revenues. Could 
states with strapped budgets and businesses with a desire to see 
e- commerce taxed be compared to farm states and the economic 
interests of farmers in the early 1900s? The lesson to be learned 
from this work is that an industry could be similarly united 
to push for or oppose a major tax reform proposal today. For 
instance, if a tax on e-commerce were proposed, Internet mer-
chants who constitute an even more diverse group than farmers 
would certainly unite to fight the new tax. Judging from the 
impact that farmers had on major tax reform, legislators should 
beware.
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Abstract: In 1765, the British Parliament imposed stamp duties on the 
American colonies, setting in motion the chain of events which ulti-
mately led to the American Revolution. This paper analyzes the prac-
ticalities of the Stamp Act to provide insights into the way in which 
a tax instrument that was successful in one setting failed to achieve 
similar success in another. The reasons for choosing stamp duties as 
an appropriate fiscal measure, the colonial reaction to the tax, and 
the way in which the tax was accounted for by the British government 
bureaucracy are examined. The paper demonstrates the value of us-
ing an accounting lens to provide a more nuanced interpretation of 
the Stamp Act crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Taxation lies at the heart of the relationship between the 
state and its subjects and is intertwined with accounting. Its de-
sign is informed by accounting and its implementation creates 
new accountings for both the state and the subject. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine a particular incarnation of taxation 
– the imperial stamp duty imposed by the British Parliament 
on the American colonies briefly from 1765 to 1766, the demise 
of which is referred to as the “Stamp Act crisis.” The version of 
stamp duty imposed on the colonies bore strong resemblance 
to that in operation in Great Britain with some modifications 
to accommodate colonial conditions. By the middle of the 18th 
century, a stamp duty had become an accepted part of the tax 
landscape in Britain, and the administrative machinery by 
which it was collected was firmly established. In view of this, the 
vehement rejection of a similar impost by the colonists was not 
a response that was either anticipated or expected. The response 
by the colonists can, we argue, be partly attributed to inadequate 
design. The British government failed to consider fully the logis-
tical difficulties that would arise in putting the stamp duty in 
place in a remote location.
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As a precursor to the American Revolution, the Stamp Act 
crisis is an important object of study. Indeed, much has been 
written about it in terms of its broader political implications 
[Morgan and Morgan, 1953; Gipson, 1954; Morgan, 1973; Thom-
as, 1975; Bullion, 1982] and from the perspective of contempo-
rary ideology [Bailyn, 1967]. We have, however, identified a gap 
in the literature as little has been written about the Stamp Act 
crisis from the viewpoint of its logistics. The questions of how it 
was to be administered, what problems were associated with its 
implementation, and how the proceeds were accounted for have 
rarely been addressed. In this paper, we consider the practicali-
ties of the Stamp Act, its initial design, and the mechanics of its 
operation, so as to provide insight into a neglected aspect of the 
crisis and the method of accounting. This paper also makes a 
contribution to the literature relating to 18th century taxation in 
a colonial setting, another topic on which little has been written.
The focus of our examination is a set of accounts discussed 
below. These were drawn up in 1772, and provide clear evi-
dence in an accounting context of the failure of the stamp duty 
to  operate as planned. We consider these, together with other 
primary source documents, and formulate an additional ex-
planation for the failure of the imperial Stamp Act. The episode 
highlights the difficulties in achieving action at a distance in a 
pre-modern setting. The set of audited accounts, contained in 
the National Archives, followed the return of unused stamped 
paper to Britain and relate specifically to the “American Stamp 
Duties” [N.A.: AO3/10861]. The main account, shown in Figure 
1, is supported by a number of subsidiary accounts. In order to 
explain the way in which the final version of the Stamp Act was 
administered, we draw on these accounts, which raise a number 
of questions about the logistics of implementing the stamp duty. 
Although referred to in passing by a number of commentators, 
we have been unable to uncover any systematic attempt to 
unravel and explicate the 1772 American Stamp Act accounts, 
other than a description of its contents in Koeppel [1976]. The 
accounts provide a fascinating glimpse into the convoluted way 
in which the process of handling the stamped paper was man-
aged between the various actors responsible for putting the 
Stamp Act into operation. Unfortunately, we have been unable 
to locate the underlying working papers and, as a result, some 
1 An explanation of the references from the U.K. National Archives (N.A.) and 
the British Library (BM) can be found at the end of the paper for those unfamiliar 
with them.
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of the entries depicted in the accounts cannot be verified or even 
explained.
A cursory examination raises some interesting issues to 
which this paper will refer; for example, the role of the ware-
house keepers, one of unstamped goods and one of stamped 
goods. In addition, there is the matter of only £4,000 recorded 
as received for a tax that was predicted to produce significantly 
more revenue, the cancellation of stamped paper to the value of 
approximately £155,000, and the outstanding balances due from 
the stamp distributors in the colonies. All of these are evidence 
of the signal failure of the Stamp Act in America.
EXCURSUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF  
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS
Lamb [2003] stresses the importance of engagement with 
wider scholarship, not only within the accounting history field, 
but also beyond to areas in which general historical literature 
deals with issues of concern to the accounting historian. There 
is a rich and established literature around the Stamp Act crisis, 
and, at this point, it is apposite to clarify our contribution. Some 
of the documents to which we refer have not been prominent in 
the literature, in particular the accounts which we reproduce in 
this paper. The American historiography of the Stamp Act crisis 
remains dominated by the work of the Morgans, specifically 
The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution. Breen [1997, p. 
14] notes that in 1957, Morgan “effectively shifted the focus of 
research from the metropolitan centre to the colonial periph-
ery.” Consequently, as British historians busied themselves with 
remapping 18th century British politics and culture, American 
historians tended to ignore “the English side of the story.”
In the opinion of Hecht [1976], few aspects of the American 
Revolution have been more thoroughly studied. She divides into 
three streams the “vantage points” from which the Stamp Act 
crisis is viewed. The first considers the Stamp Act crisis as an 
essentially American phenomenon. Indeed, this is the approach 
taken by the Morgans and by Bailyn [1967], who examined the 
ideological arguments based on careful analysis of pamphlets 
and other literature. The second is a wider approach that con-
siders the colonial events in the light of a broader imperial 
context as adopted in Gipson’s work [1954]. Finally, a number of 
historians approach the topic from a purely British perspective 
[e.g., Ritcheson, 1954]. Thomas [1975] conducts a microanalysis 
of British politics of the period. Langford [1976, p. 394], in a re-
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view of Thomas, proclaimed it the definitive account, and went 
so far as to say that “the story of the stamp act crisis will certain-
ly not need telling again.” Breen [1997, p. 15] comments that, by 
the 1980s, there was evidence of an “interpretive shift” in studies 
of 18th century England, with revisionist accounts shifting the 
focus from “elite political life” to, for example, “the development 
and maturation of an impressive fiscal military state.”
Bullion [1982], again from the third of Hecht’s vantage 
points, focused on George Grenville. Langford [1985, pp. 897-
898] reviewing this work in 1985, suggested that while Bullion 
offered more detail than his predecessors, “on most important 
questions...major conclusions have been reached and the per-
missible area of debate long since reduced to a minimum attain-
able on the evidence available.” We suggest that from an ideo-
logical, political, and constitutional perspective, Langford may 
well be justified in saying that the topic has been exhausted. We 
argue, however, that there is still room for a more finely grained 
analysis of events and outcomes through our exploration of the 
accounting evidence, particularly through the examination of 
contemporary accounting documents not previously traversed in 
detail in the literature. Rose and Miller [1992, p. 177] advocate 
consideration of how the “state is articulated into the activity of 
government, that is, the various elements, devices, techniques, 
knowledge, to make operable the tactics of government.” In our 
view, the failure of the Stamp Act can also be attributed to a 
failure to consider the detail of achieving action at a distance. 
In this regard, existing analyses of the Stamp Act crisis are defi-
cient in that they fail to consider the logistical detail of how the 
Stamp Act was to work. They also fail to examine the specific 
items that were subject to the tax and the then-existing colonial 
taxes.
This paper redresses these omissions by examining the ac-
counts, together with other primary source documents detailing 
the practicalities of the operation of the imperial Stamp Act. 
The outcome is a better understanding of accounting, particu-
larly tax accounting, in an imperial context, and an explanation 
of the conditions under which a tax instrument successful in 
one setting may fail in another. Accounting historians are well 
aware of the neglect of accounts and accounting information by 
historians. As Napier [1991] notes, in the context of aristocratic 
accounting, historians readily draw on evidence of accounts but 
rarely provide detailed descriptions of them. An accounting lens 
can provide valuable, alternative explanations for events and 
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transitions.2 It is not our intention to displace, or even disrupt, 
established views of the origins of and motivations underpinning 
the Stamp Act crisis. Rather, by using accounting evidence, we 
aim to present another factor previously neglected by historians 
to allow for an additional interpretation of the events. Much at-
tention is given elsewhere to political rationalities in analyses of 
government, including the ways in which power is exercised and 
the role and extent of politics. Less attention is generally given 
to the actual technologies deployed in putting governmental op-
erations into practice [Rose and Miller, 1990, p. 175].
This paper also sheds light on the nature of 18th century 
taxation in a colonial setting. The dearth of tax history in the ac-
counting history literature has been discussed elsewhere [Lamb, 
2003; Oats and Sadler, 2004; Noguchi, 2005]. The Stamp Act cri-
sis represents an important episode in tax history. It highlights 
the difficulties in imposing an imperial tax across the globe at a 
time when communication mechanisms meant significant delays 
in relaying information between the center in Britain and the 
periphery in the colonies. Any tax is underpinned by accounting 
techniques and practices, requiring their deployment by both 
the taxing state and the taxed subject. The design of tax instru-
ments is at one level driven by ideological considerations, but 
putting a new tax into place and making it work requires careful 
consideration of the practicalities of its operation and its impact 
on those actors whose job it is to make the tax work effectively.
This paper adds to the accounting history literature in 
three main ways. First, it adds to our understanding of account-
ing, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context. Unlike 
Hooper and Kearns [1997], Neu [1999, 2000], Kalpagam [2000], 
Davie [2003], Bush and Maltby [2004], and Neu and Graham 
[2006], we are not concerned with the use of accounting to con-
trol the indigenous populations of colonies. The object of this 
investigation is imperial control over mid-18th century settler 
colonists. Similarly, while work that deals with accounting in co-
lonial America, such as Baxter [2004] and Schultz and Hollister 
[2004], certainly exists, this paper is concerned with accounting 
for colonial America. Second, it sheds light on the conditions 
under which a tax instrument which is successful in one setting 
fails to achieve that success in another, a failure to achieve ac-
2 Bryer [2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2005, 2006], for example, has shown that an ac-
counting lens can be used to map the transition from feudalism to capitalism and 
has thereby added a new dynamic to the debate around the emergence of capital-
ist mentalities. 
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tion at a distance. Finally, the accounts drawn up by the British 
government some six years after the abolition of the stamp duty 
provide an interesting glimpse into the nature of government ac-
counting in mid-18th century Britain. The accounts were not for 
the purposes of “calculating the loss” on this failed venture, but 
rather to reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those 
responsible for the collection of the tax. This is consistent with 
the residual feudal mentality still extant in the mid-18th century. 
While changes were under way in accounting for profit-making 
ventures, in particular the adoption of double-entry bookkeep-
ing, government accounts continued primarily to use charge and 
discharge.
We conclude that the British Government underestimated 
both the logistics of implementing a complex form of taxation 
across vast geographical distances and the strength of the re-
sistance movement in the local setting. The story of the imperial 
Stamp Act is one of failure, and many explanations have been 
posited for this failure. This study proposes another, previously 
neglected, explanation, that the design of the operation of the 
Stamp Act was flawed and the impracticalities of its imple-
mentation contributed significantly to its downfall. Successful 
implementation of action at a distance requires a process of 
translation [Robson, 1992; Preston, 2006] which the British gov-
ernment failed to achieve.
The remainder of this paper is comprised of three parts. 
Part one begins with a short contextual review of the relation-
ship between the American colonies and Britain. This is fol-
lowed by an outline of both the rationale for the choice of stamp 
duty as a fiscal instrument appropriate to extract revenue from 
the colonists, and the accounting techniques by which it was 
brought into existence and its intended maintenance. Part two 
examines the colonial reaction to the tax and its subsequent 
repeal. Part three offers some insights into the way in which 
the short-lived Stamp Act was accounted for by the British 
government bureaucracy, leaving aside the wider philosophical 
and ideological debates which are, as noted above, dealt with 
adequately elsewhere.
BACKGROUND: TAXATION IN AND OF  
THE AMERICAN COLONIES
In 1700, there were only 200,000 inhabitants in the Ameri-
can colonies, but by 1770, its non-indigenous population had 
risen to over two million [Plumb, 1963, p. 124]. By the mid-18th 
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century, there were 13 British mainland colonies, together with 
eight island colonies in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea, 
each with representative institutions which enjoyed a certain 
commonality despite markedly different economic and social 
conditions. Each colony was separate from an imperial point 
of view and had different initial forms of constitution, although 
over the course of the first half of the 18th century, there was 
a tendency “towards assimilation of colonial governments to a 
single pattern” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448]. 
The governors of the colonies derived their functions from 
the sovereign and acted as heads of civil administration. As-
semblies were elected as decision-making bodies, although 
“their legislative functions were subordinate to those of the 
Imperial parliament” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448]. By the 18th century, 
each colony was represented by an agent in London, men who 
knew Westminster and were able to act as parliamentary lobby-
ists. Beloff [1965] notes that British attempts to tighten imperial 
control had begun in the 1750s, but the Seven Years’ War3 in-
tervened. Under mercantilist ideology, the reason for a colonial 
empire was to derive economic benefit from it so that regulation 
of trade was fundamental government policy. By 1763, however, 
increasing evidence of evasion signaled the need for an overhaul 
[Ritcheson, 1953, p. 544; Thomas, 1975, p. 44]. It was with 
this in mind that Prime Minister Grenville’s administration of 
1763-1765 acted as it did in relation to colonial legislation. For 
Grenville, “it was a simple matter of justice that the eastern sea-
board colonies who would profit greatly from a regulation of the 
new west and who would enjoy military protection from attack, 
should carry at least a share of the financial burden largely aris-
ing from services performed in their behalf” [Ritcheson, 1953, 
p. 545]. While the colonists did not deny the imperial right to 
regulate trade, they were opposed to the new rules regarding the 
prosecution of offences, particularly the increased use of vice-
admiralty courts.
Rationale for Stamp Duties: Stamp duties were first introduced 
in Britain in 1694 and were a well-established and acceptable 
form of taxation by the mid-18th century. Hughes [1941] pro-
vides a comprehensive discussion of their introduction and 
development up to the period immediately preceding the Stamp 
3 The Seven Years’ War is referred to as the French and Indian War in Amer-
ica.
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Act crisis.4 Blackstone [1766, pp. 312-313] described in his Com-
mentaries the range and extent of British stamp duties. His list 
included items such as parchment or paper containing details of 
legal proceedings, licenses for retailing wines, almanacs, news-
papers, advertisements, and pamphlets of less than six sheets 
of paper. After noting that the tax greatly increased the cost of 
mercantile and legal proceedings, Blackstone defended it as 
providing a means of authenticating documents and that made 
forgery more difficult.
Based on notions of fairness in taxation at the time, stamp 
duties were an appropriate and widespread form of revenue 
exaction. What is significant, in the context of this paper, is 
that stamp duties require the cooperation of the taxpayer who 
is responsible for ensuring that relevant documents and other 
dutiable items are appropriately stamped. The attraction of 
stamp duty as a revenue-raising measure to the state, compared 
to other forms of taxation, is further demonstrated by a debate 
that took place in the New York General Assembly [1766] during 
which James Delancey on August 6, 1755, said:
I have thought of three of the following: a poll tax of 
ten shillings or more on every slave from fifteen to fifty 
years of age, an excise upon tea and a stamp duty. The 
first cannot be thought heavy, as none but persons of 
substance possess slaves, and the tax will fall equally 
according to men’s abilities; the second is a tax upon a 
superfluity of pernicious consequence to the health and 
purses of the people, and therefore a proper object of a 
tax, and the third [the stamp duty] will be so diffused as 
to be in a manner insensible.
Diffuse incidence was seen as a virtue of the stamp tax in 
that the burden was spread across a wider section of society. The 
individual burden was thus lower than the more targeted forms 
of tax aimed at the wealthy alone, such as land tax in Britain 
and slave taxes in the colonies. On the other hand, another ad-
ministrative virtue of the stamp tax was its visibility; payment of 
the tax was denoted by a clear mark or cipher, an issue to which 
we will return later in the paper.
By mid-century, Britain had established a sturdy financial 
system, underpinned by “legions of new bureaucrats” (tax collec-
tors and inspectors) as well as a “new consumer marketplace,” 
4 See also Dowell [1873], although he does not canvass the full range of stamp 
duties considering those such as on newspapers and playing cards to be aberrant 
and focuses instead on duties placed on legal documents.
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developments which pre-date the industrial revolution and the 
increased prominence of the middle class [Breen, 1997, p. 19]. 
Breen argues that these developments fed into the “birth of a 
powerfully self confident British nationalism” (more narrowly, 
English nationalism) which can be viewed as a factor contribut-
ing to the eventual rejection of the Stamp Act by the colonists.
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 ended the Seven Years’ War. 
Bullion [1982, p. 12] suggests that the idea of colonial taxation 
began to be discussed informally soon after.5 In March 1763, 
the King wrote to Bute that “[t]he subject was new to none, 
having been thought of the whole winter.” The King also noted 
that “every branch of government” had considered the question 
of taxing America. In June 1762, Charles Jenkinson, Secretary 
to the Treasury, produced a paper entitled Observations on the 
Money Faculties of the State in which he demonstrated that the 
increased burden of taxation in Britain was £1,400,000 per an-
num. Consequently, he concluded that the government had no 
choice but to impose new taxes, but as new taxes diminished 
the revenue arising from old taxes, the nation’s capacity to meet 
debts “was very considerably impaired.”6 Discussions about 
the need for a new tax therefore revolved around accounting 
calculations of the quantum of the national debt, the existing 
burden of taxation in Britain, and the circumscribed potential to 
increase that burden further.
The Treasury decision relating to the taxation of America 
was not made purely on fiscal grounds. Commercial consider-
ations also came into play; hence, Grenville’s statement to the 
House of Commons that the “great object” of the proposals was 
to “reconcile the regulation of commerce with an increase of 
5 The idea of Britain imposing a stamp duty on the colonies was not new; 
extension of the duty to the colonies had been suggested in 1722, 1726, 1728, and 
1742 [Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. Sir W. Keith, exchequer-deputy governor of Virginia, 
had also suggested it to Walpole in the wake of the 1733 excise crisis, who rejected 
the idea, stating: “I have Old England set against me and do you think I will have 
new England likewise” [Dowell, 1888, p. 150]? In 1751, Henry McCulloh, a Lon-
don merchant with land speculation in North Carolina, suggested a stamp duty 
for the colonies to Lord Halifax, the then-president of the Board of Trade, and, in 
1757, submitted a scheme for a poll tax and a stamp duty [Ritcheson, 1953, p. 549; 
Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. In addition, one of the secretaries to the treasury, Samuel 
Martin, had, in 1759, recommended to Newcastle the imposition of a stamp tax 
on the colonists [Bullion, 1982, p. 12].
6 Liverpool Papers [BM Add Ms 38334 f.233-238], quoted in Bullion [1982, 
p. 19]
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revenue.”7 In Britain, there was a general acceptance of Parlia-
ment’s authority, and taxes were on the whole paid regularly 
(that is not to say there was no tax evasion). In planning to tax 
the colonies, resistance was anticipated as the government 
recognized that similar conditions did not pertain there. This 
awareness influenced the choice of tax instrument to be adopted 
[Bullion, 1982, p. 2]. Grenville and his ministers were acutely at-
tuned to the need to secure colonial support for their decisions 
and that the prevailing mood in the American colonies was not 
receptive to imperial interference. 
It was against this background that on March 9, 1764, 
Grenville announced his intention to levy a stamp duty on the 
colonies in a year’s time. This statement was made at the time 
of the passage through Parliament of the Sugar Act. Grenville 
stated that in delaying the introduction of a stamp duty, he was 
allowing the colonies to formulate alternative plans for raising 
revenue, although it seems that this was not made explicit to the 
colonial assemblies [Morgan, 1973, p. 24].8 In Grenville’s opin-
ion, the Stamp Act was an appropriate basis for Anglo-American 
relations, putting British and colonial taxpayers on the same 
footing and establishing that America should rightly contribute 
to the cost of its defense [Lawson, 1980, p. 561].
One significant factor which may have led Grenville to 
choose a stamp duty for the colonies is the prior use of such 
taxes by the colonies themselves. Although not specifically dis-
cussed in Kozub’s [1983] wide-ranging survey of colonial taxes, a 
stamp duty was used in Massachusetts in 1755 and New York in 
1757. The New York tax included a stamp duty of ½d. per copy 
on newspapers, against which James Parker protested [McA-
near, 1941], drawing on the arguments of Swift in relation to the 
British newspaper stamp introduced in 1712 [Sadler and Oats, 
2002]. Thompson [1969, p. 257] is of the view that there was 
little popular resistance to these duties, which may well have di-
rectly encouraged Grenville to use a stamp duty to raise colonial 
revenue. In addition, the use of stamp duties in the colonies was 
not confined to the mainland colonies. In Jamaica, a stamp duty 
was imposed from 1760 to 1763 to provide revenues to fund the 
militia in the face of a slave revolt [Spindel, 1977, p. 210].
7 in a speech of March 9, 1965, Ryder Diary [p. 234], quoted in Bullion [1982, 
p. 2]
8 Thomas [1975, p. 72] disputes Morgan’s assertion in this regard and is of the 
view that Grenville did not intend to seek the views of the colonies.
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DESIGNING THE IMPERIAL STAMP DUTY
Having decided to adopt a stamp duty as the most appropri-
ate form of tax in the colonies, it then became necessary to de-
vise specific mechanisms by which it would operate. Miller and 
Rose [1990, p. 2] comment that through “apparently humble 
and mundane mechanisms” such as “techniques of notation, 
computation and calculation,” action at a distance can “incite, 
induce and seduce populations to behave in certain ways.”9 
Robson [1992, pp. 691-693, 696], drawing on Latour [1987, 
1988], discusses the development of accounting as inscriptions 
that enable action at a distance. He notes that relations between 
inscriptions and the things to which they refer are not unam-
biguous, and the extent to which they correspond is influenced 
by the distance between them. Co-location of representation and 
referent minimizes the need for “strong” explanations to achieve 
action, in part due to tacit knowledge shared by the actors. Ac-
tion at a distance, on the other hand, is more problematic, and 
the greater the distance between the actor and the location in 
which the desired action is to take place, the greater the need 
for translation. Here translation suggests “movement or dis-
placement from one context to another.” To act upon a remote 
site, networks are required to “gather, transmit and assimilate 
transcriptions.” Robson goes on to describe the features of 
transcriptions best able to achieve action at a distance, specifi-
cally mobility, stability, and combinability. Mobility is required 
since inscriptions need to be able to “move from the setting to 
actor and back,” an attribute of written documents which can 
be inspected and re-inspected. Stability ensures that inscriptions 
retain the relation to their referents without corruption. Robson 
notes, by reference to Hoskin and Macve [1986], that the devel-
opment of special ways of writing such as alphabetic ordering 
“enhanced the ability of texts to record, reference and retrieve 
information.” The final property of inscriptions that facilitates 
action at a distance is combinability; that is, the ability to be 
combined and recombined “to establish new relationships.” Ac-
counting, with its numerical inscription, is capable of playing an 
important role in achieving action at a distance. By quantifying, 
or ascribing monetary values to concepts, they can be combined 
to form a new concept.
In drawing up a suitable plan for the imposition of a stamp 
9 The term “government” here is used in the Foucauldian sense of the attempt 
to shape rational human conduct beyond its modern political meaning. See, for 
example, Neu [1999].
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duty on the colonies, thought was given to the nature of the du-
ties imposed in Britain, while some consideration was also given 
to the special circumstances of the American colonies, such as 
differences in legal systems and higher levels of poverty. The 
governors of the colonies were requested to produce an account 
of legal documents in use in the colonies. This information, to-
gether with the Massachusetts and New York versions of stamp 
duty, was used to assist in deciding to what the imperial stamp 
would apply (referred to as “heads of duty”) and at what rate. A 
table was drawn up showing the current British heads and rates 
of duty side by side with the colonial duties [N.A.: T1/433/141]. 
These accounts of the local position demonstrate the way in 
which inscriptions are gathered from their remote location, 
combined and recombined at the center, and used to design a 
plan of action to be put into effect back in the local setting.
Work began on the stamp bill in 1763, with two draft ver-
sions submitted to the Treasury for consideration on November 
19, 1763. The version preferred by the Treasury was one drawn 
up by Thomas Cruwys, solicitor to the Stamp Office.10 Thomas 
Whately, joint secretary to the Treasury Board, presented a 
report to the Board outlining the features and rationale of the 
stamp bill. He stated that the rates of duty in the colonies were 
necessarily different to those in England as the same legal in-
struments were not always used in both places and, in some in-
stances, a different rate of duty may be appropriate for the same 
instrument.11 
Whately’s report recommended two new heads of duty in 
the colonies. One was on Crown grants of land and the other on 
registration of conveyances and securities; that is, the registers 
themselves were taxed as well as the legal documents. In com-
parison with the duties in place in Britain, higher duties in the 
colonies were proposed for the system of registering transfers 
of land. In addition, for reasons that are not clear, the decision 
10 The other version was drafted by Henry McCulloh, who was largely in agree-
ment with Cruwys as to the nature of the duties that should be imposed, but dif-
fered as to the use to which the funds should be put. Cruwys did not specify how 
the funds raised were to be deployed, whereas McCulloh apparently held strong 
views on this and believed the revenue arising from the stamp duty should be used 
“to provide presents for Indians; to pay rangers for frontiers; for the maintenance 
of the king’s forts and garrisons; to encourage settlers and settlements in frontier 
parts”; and finally, “to discharge the salaries of the kings [sic] governors and of-
ficers abroad” [quoted in Thomas, 1975, p. 71].
11 The full text of Whately’s report can be found in BM Add Ms 35910 f.310-
323 and is partly reproduced in Hughes [1941] and Koeppel [1976].
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was taken to subject documents in foreign languages (includ-
ing newspapers) to double the rate of duty. There were to be 
lower duties in the colonies for legal proceedings and bonds in 
light of the higher levels of both poverty and litigiousness in the 
colonies. The rate of duty on retail licenses for the sale of ale, 
cider, and spirits was also lower than in Britain. Two items of 
duty which applied in Britain were not imposed in the colonies, 
specifically that on admission to corporations and that on inden-
tures.12
The final bill was handed to the Treasury on January 24, 
1764 [Thomas, 1975, p. 71]. As noted earlier, in deciding how the 
stamp duty would operate, to which instruments and objects it 
would apply, and to what extent, some consideration was given 
to the particular circumstances of the colonies. It is not possible 
merely to recreate rules and regulations that exist in another 
location. Success of regulatory control is dependent on its be-
ing tailored for the specific circumstances of the location of its 
operation.13 As noted by Robson [1992], the greater the distance 
from the center of decision making to the location of enactment, 
the more translation or information is required to overcome the 
difficulties of distance. Information about legal instruments in 
use in the colonies played an important role in the design of the 
stamp duties, in choosing which documents would be subjected 
to the duties, and how much tax would be charged on each.
One factor which was not taken into account in deciding 
what form an imperial tax should take, which is also a neglected 
area in the historiography of the Stamp Act crisis, is the extent 
to which the colonial assemblies imposed other forms of taxes, 
often with great ingenuity. It seems that the British government 
failed to consider adequately the nature of the other taxes in 
place or had been previously imposed in the individual colonies. 
Kozub [1983] documents the array of taxes imposed by the colo-
nial governments and concludes that the “colonial forefathers” 
attempted in their design of tax instruments to measure the fac-
ulty or ability of individuals to pay the taxes. Indeed, several col-
12 Other heads of duty remained largely the same and taxes at the same rates 
as in Britain. It was decided to retain the duty on admission to professions and 
degrees so as to “keep mean persons out of those situations in life which they 
disgrace” [BM Add Ms 35910].
13 In a contemporary tax context, a growing body of research deals with this 
notion. See, for example, the work of the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the 
Australian National University (http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/) and Law and Policy (2007), 
volume 29, issue 1, which is devoted to the notion of responsive regulation in taxa-
tion.
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onies imposed taxes actually designated as “faculty taxes” which 
were taxes on the assumed income of specific occupations. In 
Connecticut, for example, it applied to attorneys. Residents of 
Massachusetts, in particular, were heavily taxed compared to 
other colonies.14 The imposition of an imperial stamp duty then 
would impact unevenly throughout the colonies, which raised 
questions akin to those subsequently debated in the context of 
federal taxing powers.15
Grenville intended to introduce the stamp duty in 1764. In 
his budget speech of that year, he indicated that he considered 
the stamp duty to be the “least exceptionable because it requires 
fewer officers and even collects itself. The only danger is forg-
ery” [Thomas, 1975, p. 74]. Clearly Grenville failed to appreciate 
the complexity of implementing the tax in the colonies and the 
extent to which it would inflame the colonists. Objections were 
raised during debate, however, and the progress of the bill was 
halted. Opponents suggested that the colonies should be ap-
prised of Parliament’s intentions [Thomas, 1975]. The response 
from the colonies was a series of protests sent by the assemblies 
of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
As concern over the implications of a colonial stamp tax 
rose, the colonial agents met with Grenville on May 17, 1765 to 
clarify the position. There are several accounts by witnesses to 
this meeting, including one by Jasper Mauduit whose brother 
was present and who reported the meeting to the Massachusetts 
Assembly on May 26, 1765 [Morgan, 1973, p. 27]. Echoing Gren-
ville’s 1764 budget speech, Mauduit stated that Grenville had 
suggested that, of the available forms of taxation, “the stamps 
was the most equal, required the fewest officers, and was at-
tended with the least Expence in the Collecting it.” Recognizing 
14 There are a number of individual studies of the taxes in various colonies pri-
or to independence. Gipson [1931, p. 721] examines the tax burdens on residents 
of Connecticut, which Jared Ingersoll said in 1765 was: “Eighty Thousand Pounds 
in Debt, Arrears of Taxes, that cannot be collected by Reason of the Poverty of 
these on whom they are laid.” Henderson [1990] notes the difference with respect 
to colonial taxation and subsequent state taxation between the Chesapeake and 
New England colonies, particularly Massachusetts and Virginia. He attributes 
these variations to differences in cultural and demographic factors, including the 
prevalence of slaves, which affected the types of tax instrument used in those 
colonies as well as the incidence of taxes.
15 Crane [2006] discusses the first federal stamp taxes imposed in 1798, and 
their role in the downfall of the Federalists. Notwithstanding the grant of taxing 
power to the federal government, there were persistent concerns that some meas-
ures were too intrusive upon state autonomy. 
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that the preferred choice would be no tax at all, but given the 
necessity of imposing some form of revenue-raising measure, 
the colonies were expected to assent or request appropriate 
modifications. When one of the colonial agents asked for details 
of the heads of duty, Grenville apparently replied that “it was not 
necessary. That everyone knows the stamp laws here; and that 
this Bill is intended to be form’d upon the same plan.” Benjamin 
Franklin proposed an alternative to the stamp duty as a means 
of raising colonial revenue in the form of a plan for a paper 
currency for the colonies. Later, in 1766, he reflected that “Mr. 
Grenville paid little attention to it [Franklin’s alternative pro-
posal], being besotted with his Stamp Scheme, which he rather 
chose to carry through” [Labaree, 1968, p. 48]. 
In another conference with four of the colonial agents on 
February 2, 1765, an attempt was made to forestall the imple-
mentation of the Stamp Act. By the time the bill reached its 
second reading on February 15, the agents presented colonial 
petitions against it, which were not, however, admitted into the 
House of Commons [Morgan, 1973].
It seems that there was a change in the underlying purpose 
of the Stamp Act during the 12-month delay in its implementa-
tion. On November 5, 1764, Whately explained to John Temple, 
Surveyor General of Customs for the Northern District of Amer-
ica, that finance was the motivation behind the bill. By February 
9, 1765, once the colonies’ objections to the new tax were known 
in Britain, he stated that “it establishes the right of Parliament 
to levy an internal tax on the colonies” [Thomas, 1975, p. 85].
The “peel of remonstrance which sounded across the Atlan-
tic found an echo” in England where merchants were concerned 
about the ability of the Americans to pay their debts, which at 
the time were apparently in the vicinity of £4,000,000 [Dowell, 
1888, p. 152]. “The Grenville ministry did not proceed with the 
Stamp Act in ignorance of colonial opinion, but thought the 
measure would be accepted without protest” [Thomas, 1975, p. 
88]. We return to the question of the colonial resistance in the 
next section of the paper.
During the passage of the bill, 28 speeches were made by 
18 different members; there were 55 resolutions and numer-
ous alterations and additions which prolonged its passage by 
two days. There was no debate in the House of Lords, and the 
Commons was informed on March 8 that the bill had passed 
without amendment. Royal assent was received on March 22, 
1765 [Thomas, 1975, p. 98]. After the third reading of the bill on 
February 27, Thomas Cruwys drew up the bonds for the stamp 
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distributors. Over 50 different duties were imposed, the highest 
being £10 on licenses for solicitors and attorneys. There was 
little opposition in either the House of Commons or the Lords; 
indeed, according to Burke, “[t]here scarcely ever was less oppo-
sition to a bill of consequence.”16 In addition, there was little in-
dication that the tax would be as controversial as it subsequently 
turned out to be [Sosin, 1958].
In support of the contention that the act was carefully de-
signed for colonial sensibilities, Thomas [1975, p. 99] notes five 
points which represent reasons why the measure should have 
been acceptable to the colonists:
the total tax to be raised by the bill was quite small;1. 
the stamp duty was chosen as it was considered to be 2. 
equitable in terms of its burden;
the detailed variations from the British duties at the time 3. 
reflected careful consideration of the particular circum-
stances in the colonies;
the money raised by the tax was to stay in the colonies 4. 
(although there was some confusion in this regard); and 
it was to be administered by leading men resident in the 5. 
various colonies.
The choice of a stamp duty to extract revenue from the colo-
nists was sensible for Britain on a number of grounds. The im-
pact of the tax was not concentrated onto one particular section, 
such as the wealthy, but was widely dispersed across a broad 
cross-section of colonial society. The design of the administra-
tion of the tax was also such that it required the active partici-
pation of taxpayers. Evidence of payment of the tax was highly 
visible, and, yet, because it was built into the cost of undertak-
ing the transaction that was the subject of the duty, it could be 
interpreted as merely an increase in ultimate price compared 
to other taxes, such as the tax on slaves, which required pay-
ment without anything visible being received in return. These 
justifications seem reasonable on the face of it, but as will be 
discussed below, an interpretation of the accounts in Figure 1 
suggest that the way in which policy makers envisaged that the 
stamp duty would operate was unduly complex and insensitive 
to the situation in the affected colonies.
16 Edmund Burke’s “Speech on American Taxation” [quoted in Dowell, 1888, 
p. 150]. For the full text of this speech, see Langford [1981, pp. 406-462].
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PUTTING THE STAMP DUTY INTO OPERATION
The administration of the stamp duty was to be tightly 
controlled by the British stamp commissioners. In presenting 
the final proposals for the stamp duty to the Treasury Board, 
Whately discussed the additional costs of administering the 
new tax, specifically “an increase in salary to the Secretary, the 
Receiver General and Comptroller, a small increase in salary to 
the first clerks of those officers, two additional clerks…[and] an 
additional porter to the warehouse and [almost as an aside] a 
warehouse” [BM Add Ms 35910 f.323].
It was recommended that the British authorities be respon-
sible for the supply of all the stamped paper and parchment, 
and it was conceded that “the quantities…may be difficult to 
ascertain at first, but…will be easy to furnish afterwards.” This 
deserves a little more thought, bearing in mind the number of 
objects of this tax and the different denominations of duty po-
tentially applicable, it is quite an understatement to suggest that 
the quantities may be “difficult to ascertain.” To determine what 
types of paper were to use for which transactions and to arrange 
for them to be stamped using one of 30 dies specially designed 
for the purpose was difficult enough. But then to further al-
locate these sheets among the 13 mainland colonies and the 
island colonies, all of which had different degrees of commercial 
sophistication, was an enormous accounting task. In addition to 
the calculation of the value of the stamps, the cost of the paper 
and parchment also had to be computed and marked on the pa-
per. In this way, the government also controlled the price which 
taxpayers ultimately paid for the paper they were forced to use 
in order to comply with the tax.
It was intended that, at least initially, the paper be stamped 
in London and then transported to the colonies for dispatch to 
the various stamp distributors appointed in each colony. This 
may have been an interim measure to get the Stamp Act up and 
running. Certainly Benjamin Franklin indicated by letter of June 
8, 1765 to his partner David Hall an expectation that a stamp 
office would be set up in Philadelphia for stamping paper for 
newspapers and almanacs in due course [Labaree, 1968, p. 65]. 
The stamps that were prepared for use for stamping colonial 
newspapers were of three values – halfpenny, penny, and two-
pence. The design of the stamps consisted of a royal crown with 
the sword and scepter crossed at the back in the center of the 
stamp, surrounded by the garter with the inscription honi soit 
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qui mal y pense.17 Above the garter band was heraldic mantling 
with the word “America” at the top [Turner, 1941]. Figure 2 
shows the purchase of blank paper and parchment from Tonson 
& Co. stationers, subsequently placed in the charge of the ware-
house keeper of unstamped goods. The values at which these 
transactions were recorded appear to be historical cost.
FIGURE 2
American Stamp Duties General Account by
Virtue of an Act of Parliament &c Tonson & Co Stationers
£ s D 1765 £ s D
Parchment
488 8 - Augst 2nd
By Warehouse Keeper 
of Unstampt Goods
3,599 8 11
Paper Blanks & 
Printing Paper
3,118 15 9 Octr 31st
Do
337 7 6
Profit by Discount 
thereon
Parchment at 12pr 
Cent
66 12 -
Paper at 10pr Cent 263 - 8
3,936 16 5 3,936 16 5
Source: N.A. AO3/1086
Unlike Continental European incarnations of the stamp 
duty, such as in France where the government had a monopoly 
over the stamped paper and its supply, the paper for the British 
version was purchased by taxpayers, taken to the stamp office 
for stamping, and then used as required (e.g., overprinted as 
newspapers). This system could not feasibly be instituted in the 
American colonies without costly investment in the stamping 
equipment necessary to stamp the paper. In this regard, how-
ever, three colonies had previously levied their own stamp duties 
and presumably had the equipment in place to facilitate stamp-
ing there. This is one of the problematic operational features of 
the Stamp Act which exacerbated the resistance to it. Forcing 
taxpayers to purchase pre-stamped paper shipped from Britain 
provided a constant and visible reminder of the nature of the 
tax as an imperial imposition. Had the paper been stamped in 
situ, its visibility as an externally imposed duty would have been 
17 the motto of the Order of the Garter, which can be loosely translated as 
“Shame on he who thinks evil of it”
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diminished. In addition, the accounts in Figure 1 show that it 
was commercial stationers who provided the paper and that two 
warehouse keepers were employed in its storage and handling. 
These factors were additional cost and administrative burdens 
borne in Great Britain, but any ancillary benefits, such as busi-
ness and employment opportunities, accrued to Great Britain. 
If the colonies themselves had been entrusted with the local 
procurement, stamping, and storage of paper, providing employ-
ment for colonists and furthering business in the colonies, there 
would have been some benefit in amelioration of the burden, 
and the stamp duty may have been better received.
For the purposes of the administration of the Stamp Act, the 
colonies were divided into nine districts, each with an inspector 
answerable to a new American Stamp Office of five commission-
ers in London [Thomas, 1975, p. 100]. The districts were subdi-
vided into areas for which stamp distributors were responsible 
(see Figure 4). The creation of a new tax with its concomitant 
administrative structure provided opportunities for new roles. 
In the mid-18th century, patronage was the norm. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, ambitious men saw opportunities for profit and 
advancement in obtaining posts within the new administrative 
structure. Of paramount importance to the successful admin-
istration of the stamp duty was the role of stamp distributor. It 
was proposed that a head distributor be appointed in the capital 
of each province that “must be a responsible person and give 
large security.” The head distributor would be charged with stor-
ing and distributing the stamped paper, collecting the appropri-
ate tax, and remitting it to the British exchequer. Distributors 
were to be remunerated by an 8% commission on monies col-
lected and were reimbursed for postage and carriage costs [N.A. 
T1/439 f.93].
There was some competition for the stamp distributor posts, 
which is a fairly clear indication that the violence of the resis-
tance was not anticipated. Three Americans in London at the 
time secured posts – Colonel Mercer from Virginia, Jared Inger-
soll for Connecticut, and George Meserve from New Hampshire. 
On May 14, 1765, Martin Howard Jr., a Rhode Island lawyer, 
wrote to Benjamin Franklin seeking his support for a post in the 
stamp office [Labaree, 1968, pp. 129-130]:
The English prints acquaint Us that it is probable, a Na-
tive of each Colony will be appointed Receiver of Stamp 
Duties. Should this be the Case, it may possibly fall in 
your Way, as you are an American, to recommend some 
persons for that purpose. If no other Connection claims 
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the Preference, I would ask your Friendship to name me 
for that office, or any other in the Stamp Office which 
you may think worth accepting…”
Sensitive to the possibility of resistance, these new distribu-
tors were proposed to be Americans to avoid inflaming colonists 
by imposing British tax collectors upon them. The appointment 
of Americans to the role of distributor can be interpreted as an 
attempt to form an actor network necessary to implement action 
in the local setting [Preston, 2006, p. 561].
In recognition that a large volume of the stamped paper 
would be used for legal matters, it was proposed to use the 
clerks of county and circuit courts to assist in the distribution 
of stamped paper to more remote locations. The distribution 
of stamped paper and collection of the tax would be overseen 
by inspectors, as it was in Britain, who would be empowered to 
travel across the colonies and act as auditors of the collection 
process. Inspectors were to receive a salary of £100 per an-
num, commencing on the day of leaving England, plus 20s. per 
diem to cover expenses of traveling in the course of their duties 
[T1/439 f.92].
FIGURE 3
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765 £ s D 1765 £ s D
Oct 31st to Stampt 
goods received 
from the Teller
222,506 11 6½ Oct 31st
By sundry 
consignments 172,586 11 1¾ 
Sept 3rd 
Commissioners 
order paid receiver 
general for stamps
17 17 8
1766
Oct 14th 
Do for parchment 
and paper 
cancelled
49,902 2 8¾ 
222,506 11 6½ 222,506 11 6½ 
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
Figure 3 is the top part of an account which shows the 
receipt of stamped paper from the teller to whom it had been 
passed by the warehouse keeper of unstamped goods. Figure 3 
also shows how the warehouse keeper of stamped goods dealt 
with the consignment of stamped paper received from the teller. 
Paper and parchment to the value of £172,586.11s.1¾d. was 
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consigned to the distributors appointed in the American colo-
nies. The value of the paper and parchment in this account ap-
pears to be inclusive of the stamp duty. Figure 4 is an extract 
from a “distributors’ abstract” which shows how this first con-
signment of stamped paper was allocated among the various 
colonial distributors. For the purposes of this section, only the 
first five columns are relevant. Figure 4 serves to reinforce the 
complexity of the calculations required to achieve this result. 
Based on the returns previously provided by the governors of 
each colony as to the nature and type of transactions conducted 
at each location, decisions were taken as to the volume of each 
size and type of paper and parchment that would be required 
to meet the needs of each individual colony. The reason for the 
transfers from Montreal to Quebec and back (see Figure 7 for 
the contra entries) is not clear. The allocation of identical values 
of paper to Bermuda and the Bahamas would appear to be arbi-
trary and related to there being only one distributor responsible 
for both locations. This account of the consignments for each 
distributor shows the way in which combinability is brought 
into play as a feature of accounting inscriptions necessary to en-
able action at a distance [Robson, 1992]. 
Another potential sensitivity to be addressed in the design 
of the stamp duty was the way in which the proceeds were to be 
remitted to the British exchequer. Specie was in short supply in 
the colonies at the time, and there was concern that this duty 
would further drain the supply. It is not clear whether the origi-
nal intention was to ship the proceeds of the Stamp Act back 
to His Majesty’s exchequer in Britain. The Act, when passed, 
required that the duties be paid in sterling values at 5s. 6d. per 
ounce of silver [5 Geo III: C12 s57]. The pragmatic response to 
these concerns was addressed by Whately as follows [BM Add 
Ms 35910 f.323]:
The expense and hazard of remitting the money to be 
raised by this duty may be saved, and the complaint 
of draining the country of money may be obviated by 
a transaction between the Paymaster General and the 
Commissioner of Stamps… 
It was not until July 1765, however, that the Treasury Board or-
dered that receipts be paid over to the deputy paymaster of the 
army in America, with a series of credit transactions in England 
with the Treasury then reconciling the accounts of the offices 
involved [N.A.: T1/439 f.94]. In this way, the Treasury envisaged 
using accounting mechanisms to deal with the flow of funds 
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rather than the physical transfer of specie. Certainly this became 
a point of contention in subsequent protests, and the confusion 
as to whether or not the Stamp Act would be a drain on colonial 
specie [Sosin, 1958] arose largely because of delays in communi-
cation between the imperial center and the colonial periphery. 
While considerable care had been undertaken in the design 
of the new measures to ensure they were appropriately adapted 
to colonial conditions, there were several potential problem 
areas, particularly for the fledgling colonial paper-making and 
printing industries. On February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin 
wrote to his partner in the Pennsylvania Gazette that: “I think it 
will affect the printers more than anybody” [Schlesinger, 1935, 
p. 66]. The tax on advertisements dealt a bitter blow for colonial 
newspaper advertisements, which generally cost from 2s. to 5s. 
local currency, and to which the addition of a 2s. stamp duty 
would then add, possibly putting advertising out of the reach 
of many businesses and so reducing the profitability of news-
papers. It was expected that the duty on advertisements would 
be reduced to 1s. but, according to Benjamin Franklin, the 
reduction “slipt in passing the bill” [Labaree, 1968, p. 170].18 In 
a letter to his partner David Hall on June 8, 1765, he remained 
optimistic, however, that it would be altered, with other refine-
ments, in the next sitting of Parliament. In addition, the Stamp 
Act required payment in advance of a security for the advertising 
duty by the printers before the stamped paper could be obtained 
as was the practice in Britain [Labaree, 1968, p. 65, fn. 3]. In a 
letter to a colleague on February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin 
said [Labaree, 1968, p. 68]:
Every Step in the Law, every Newspaper, Advertise-
ment and Almanack is severely tax’d…. If this should, 
as I imagine it will, occasion less Law, and less Printing, 
‘twill fall particularly hard on us Lawyers and Printers.
In addition, there were problems with differences in the sizes 
and quality of paper used. For example, in Britain, almanacs 
were generally printed on foolscap paper sized 17x13½ inches, 
and it seems the original intention was to ship foolscap to the 
colonies pre-stamped for use in printing almanacs. In Penn-
sylvania, however, almanacs were produced using Demi paper 
18 It seems, however, that he was pragmatic about the tax and viewed it as an 
opportunity as well as a threat. He secured the post of stamp distributor in Phila-
delphia for a friend. He also ordered “100 reams of half-sheets of extraordinary 
size, the kind used by the London Chronicle, in the hope of avoiding the penny tax” 
[Labaree, 1968, p. 65, see also, Schlesinger, 1935, p. 67].
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sized 20x15½ inches. It seems that Benjamin Franklin was able 
to intervene and have Demi sent instead, albeit of a lesser qual-
ity than the foolscap [Labaree, 1968, p. 171]. English paper was 
more expensive, which made the cost of complying with the 
Stamp Act even higher than just the tax itself [Koeppel, 1976, p. 
58].
The requirement to have paper and parchment stamped in 
Britain and then shipped to the colonies was potentially devas-
tating to colonial paper mills. In a letter printed in the London 
Chronicle, August 17-20, 1765, attributed to Charles Thompson 
[Labaree, 1968, p. 186]:
The paper mills, nursed with care and brought to so 
great perfection in this province [Philadelphia] must 
now fall, at the same time the business and trade of the 
Printers is ruined...
Having examined the motivation for the choice of tax 
instrument and the manner in which it was expected to be ad-
ministered, the next part of the paper examines the colonial re-
sponse to the tax. As mentioned earlier, one difference with this 
analysis, compared with other studies of colonial accounting, is 
that the Stamp Act was a failed measure. The colonial resistance 
proved strong enough to force the imperial government to with-
draw the tax a mere six months after the commencement of its 
operation. Another difference is that this study considers all of 
the colonies rather than just the mainland colonies, which more 
adequately reveals the complexity of the colonial response.
THE COLONIAL RESPONSE
Breen [1997, p. 27] marks the 1760s as a turning point, 
prior to which the American colonists were fiercely loyal and 
saw themselves as a valued part of the empire, with equal stand-
ing to British residents. “They believed that the English accepted 
them as full partners in the British Empire, allies in the continu-
ing wars against France, devout defenders of Protestantism, 
and eager participants in an expanding identity.” A significant 
feature of the colonial response to the Stamp Act was the way 
in which it brought the disparate colonies together. The effect 
of British policy subsequent to the Peace of Paris had not been 
even throughout the colonies; for example, the Sugar Act of 
1764 did not affect the southern colonies as much as it did New 
England or the port towns [Pole, 1973, p. 36]. One key differ-
ence with the Stamp Act was its universal impact; it affected all 
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colonies, all of which shared a mutual interest in opposing the 
measure. Colonial ministers preached resistance to the Stamp 
Act, drawing on philosophers such as Milton, Sydney, and Locke 
[Van Tyne, 1913]. Colonial assemblies met to produce various 
resolutions and petitions, while printed newspapers and pam-
phlets added fuel to the fires of resistance. This neither implies 
that the response was uniform nor that there was unanimity in 
the grounds for or against the tax.
In the British view, the right to tax was disassociated with 
the right to parliamentary representation since at the time only 
a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were represented 
[Beloff, 1965]. Brewer [1988, p. 375] notes that “the extent of 
tax resistance in those territories where the legitimacy of parlia-
mentary jurisdiction was challenged” underlined the importance 
of “parliamentary consent in securing effective tax gathering.” 
The colonists distinguished between internal and external taxes 
and were prepared to accept external duties, the main purpose 
of which was to regulate trade. Internal taxes (i.e., those for the 
purpose of revenue raising) were considered to be the province 
of colonial assemblies. In evidence to the Stamp Committee of 
1766, Benjamin Franklin, agent for Philadelphia, stated: “I never 
heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate com-
merce, but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to 
be in parliament, as we were not represented there” [Labaree, 
1969, p. 137]. Earlier, in 1764, Franklin had said: “two distinct 
Jurisdictions or Powers of Taxing cannot well subsist together in 
the same Country. They will confound and obstruct each other” 
[Slaughter, 1984, p. 4]. There is some debate among historians 
as to how enduring the distinction between internal and external 
taxes was. Wood [1969] maintains that it was dropped after the 
Stamp Act crisis, whereas Bailyn [1967] sees it as part of a wider 
distinction between internal and external government. The 
Morgans [1953] were of the view that the distinction was never a 
popular one. Slaughter [1984], however, maintains that the dis-
tinction remained significant throughout the pre-revolutionary 
period and beyond because it was never really resolved.
News of the Act reached the colonies in April 1765 and, 
subsequently, a number of resolutions were passed opposing the 
Act, first in the Virginian House of Burgesses on May 30, 1765, 
followed by the other colonies. The stamp, which in Britain 
represented evidence of contribution towards the cost of state 
protection, discharge of an obligation, and acknowledgement of 
Parliament’s legitimate right to impose taxes, took on a different 
complexion in the colonies.
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On October 7, 1765, the Stamp Act Congress was held in 
New York, attended by 27 delegates from nine colonies and 
culminating in 14 declarations of principle [Morgan, 1973]. The 
eighth of these stated that the “rights and liberties of the colo-
nists” were subverted by the Stamp Act [Morgan, 1973, p. 45]. 
A memorial to the House of Lords from the colonists expressed 
concern on similar grounds; this was one of several memorials 
and petitions sent to various bodies in Britain [Morgan, 1973, 
p. 66]. The two fundamental “rights” referred to were the right 
to trial by jury and the right to “exemption from taxes but such 
as are imposed on the People by the several Legislatures in these 
Colonies” [Morgan, 1973, p. 66]. A petition to the House of Com-
mons pointed out that there would be serious consequences 
for the commercial interests of Great Britain and her colonies 
should the Stamp Act be put into effect [Morgan, 1973, p. 67].
In addition to the resolutions and petitions formulated by 
the colonial assemblies, the American press was galvanized to 
report the news and to argue the colonial view. A number of 
newspaper articles and pamphlets were published registering 
the outrage of the colonies. Before 1765, “newspapers were 
relatively unimportant as agencies for moulding and reporting 
public opinion” [Dickerson, 1951, p. 454]. In the English press, 
on the other hand, while many were supportive of the colonial 
arguments, others considered the Stamp Act just and equitable. 
The various responses to the Stamp Act, both in the colonies and 
in Britain, are well documented elsewhere.
As well as the official action taken by the colonial assem-
blies, resistance to the Stamp Act comprised boycotting of 
English imports and action to force the resignation of stamp 
distributors [Morgan, 1973, p. 104]. The first manifestation of 
violence in the context of the latter of the two resistance strate-
gies was in Boston on August 14, 1765, followed by Newport on 
August 29, 1765. 
The Stamp Act further aggravated the growing antagonism 
toward heightened British interference partly because, as Schles-
inger [1935, p. 65] pointed out, it was the printers, lawyers, and 
merchants who bore the brunt of the impost, and these were 
the people who “formed the most literate and articulate section 
of the colonial public”. David Ramsay [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 65] 
said: 
It was fortunate for the liberties of America, that News-
papers were the subject of a heavy stamp duty. Print-
ers, when uninfluenced by government, have generally 
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 arranged themselves on the side of liberty, nor are they 
less remarkable for attention to the profits of their pro-
fession. A Stamp Duty, which openly invaded the first, 
and threatened a great diminution of the last, provided 
their united zealous opposition.
In the main, however, the colonies largely disregarded the 
Act although the formation of the Sons of Liberty, an “inter-
colonial union for the purpose of resisting enforcement of the 
Stamp Act” [Morgan, 1973, p. 105], was complete by the end of 
that year. Fueled by the rhetoric of the Sons of Liberty, public 
opinion turned towards securing the resignation of the stamp 
officers prior to the starting date of November 1, 1765. By mid-
August 1765, riots had commenced and spread throughout the 
colonies [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 72]. Schlesinger was of the view 
that it was the ceaseless propaganda of the press which kept 
the public mind at fever pitch. In a letter to the commissioner 
of stamps, dated October 12, 1765, one of the victims, John 
Hughes, stamp distributor for Pennsylvania, said “the printers 
in each colony, almost without exception, stuffed their papers 
weekly for some time before with the most inflammatory pieces 
they could procure and excluded everything that tended to cool 
the minds of the people.” 
As previously noted, not all the colonies reacted in the same 
way to the Stamp Act, and in Pennsylvania, for example, Quaker 
conservatism prevailed and violent resistance was avoided 
[Newcomb, 1966, p. 272]. “Nova Scotia, alone of all the colonies 
on the seaboard, submitted without opposition to the laying 
of stamp duties. In her settlement there were no riots, no non-
importation agreements and apparently, except for Liverpool, no 
murmurs” [Weaver, 1904, 58]. In most of the colonies, there was 
serious rioting when the stamped paper arrived, and some of the 
stamped paper was seized and burned. The officially appointed 
stamp distributors found themselves to be in such a perilous 
situation that they resigned en masse, with the exception of the 
distributor in Georgia, George Angus, who arrived well-guarded 
in Georgia with the stamps in late 1765. During January 1766, 
about 60 ships offloaded stamped paper in Savannah. This ac-
tivity angered the other colonies and also those inhabitants of 
Georgia not resident in Savannah, “for their betrayal of Ameri-
can unity” [Koeppel, 1962, p. 10]. Learning that there was to be 
a mob march on Savannah, the governor dispatched the stamps 
out to a British warship. Koeppel records that the stamps were 
used in Quebec, Nova Scotia, Florida, and some of the West 
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Indian colonies, namely Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, and Ja-
maica.
Spindel [1977] analyzes, in particular, the reaction of the 
colonies in the British West Indies.19 On the whole, their re-
sponse was moderate in comparison with the mainland colonies 
although, even in the West Indies, “the response of each colony 
was unique, determined by differences in history and environ-
ment.” 20 The government in the West Indies was similar to 
that in North America with some inevitable differences based 
largely on demographic factors, such as smaller populations and 
higher proportions of slaves. In addition, the chief executives 
in the West Indies enjoyed significant financial privileges and 
had powerful representatives in London. Other forces which 
underlined the differences between the Caribbean colonies and 
North American colonies included the “lack of cultural life, the 
scarcity of land, geographic isolation, a debilitating climate, and 
exposure to attacks from French and Spanish ships” [Spindel, 
1977, p. 207]. Throughout the colonies, both mainland and is-
land, stamp officials were attacked and abused, stamp distribu-
tors burned in effigy and their families threatened, and stamped 
paper was stolen and destroyed.
Numerous petitions were received from America and, in 
February 1766, the House of Commons appointed a parliamen-
tary committee to inquire into the operation of the Stamp Act. 
Before the committee reported, Grenville was dismissed from 
office and, following some difficult negotiations, administration 
was formed under the Marquis of Rockingham for whom Ed-
mund Burke acted as private secretary. 
The depth of colonial resistance to the Stamp Act, albeit 
not uniform, rendered it impossible to enforce. It became clear 
to the new ministry that compliance with the stamp duty could 
not be obtained. The question arose as to whether, given that the 
Stamp Act was not self-enforcing as originally envisaged, mili-
19 In 1765, the British colonies in the West Indies were the Bahamas, Jamaica, 
and the lesser Antilles, comprising Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Barbuda, Domi-
nica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Tortola.
20 Reaction varied across the island colonies. Jamaica and Barbados, for ex-
ample, showed only token resistance to the Stamp Act. In St. Kitts, however, the 
reaction against the Stamp Act was more violent. Stamped papers stored at a 
merchant’s house were torched by a mob of some 300-400 people, and the stamp 
distributor, William Tuckett, was forced to resign his post. The St. Kitts authori-
ties apparently made no effort to enforce the Act, and the St. Christopher Gazette 
was published unstamped throughout the period of operation of the Stamp Act 
[Spindel, 1977].
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tary force should be used to secure compliance [Bullion, 1992]. 
Following the report of the parliamentary committee and subse-
quent debate, the decision was taken to repeal the Stamp Act. As 
Bullion [1992] concludes, “[w]hen their expectations of Ameri-
can acquiescence proved incorrect, the majority of the cabinet 
were too familiar with the difficulties of a military response and 
too unimpressed with the Stamp Act to favor a confrontation.”
The committee noted that insurrection had taken place in 
some of the North American colonies, and that the insurrection 
had been encouraged by resolutions of the colonial assemblies 
in the respective provinces. The committee resolved that these 
matters be put before the King with a request that he direct the 
governors of the colonies to find the principal trouble makers 
and punish them. The King was also to be asked to instruct the 
governors to recommend to the assemblies that recompense be 
made to those who had suffered loss during the insurrection. 
The committee resolved finally that “the Parliament of Great 
Britain had, hath and of Right ought to have, full Power and 
Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and 
Validity, To bind the Colonies and Peoples of America – subjects 
of the Crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever” [BM Add 
Ms 33030 f.74].
The merchants in the House of Commons were naturally 
foremost among the advocates of the repeal and, according to 
Namier [1966, p. 254], only “six only out of some 52” voted for 
repeal. On division, the resolution for the repeal of the Stamp 
Act was approved by 275 votes to 167, and the resulting bill 
repealing the Stamp Act was given royal assent on March 18, 
1766. 
The repeal of the Stamp Act by the Rockingham ministry 
should not be read as acceptance of the American view. Indeed, 
according to Thomas [1975, p. 33], the repeal came about be-
cause of “an unusual combination of circumstances, not through 
widespread support for the colonial cause. In the general context 
of British political attitudes towards America, it was a mislead-
ing fluke.” The repeal was accompanied by a declaratory act 
which set out the right of Parliament to pass laws binding on 
the American colonies [Plumb, 1963, p. 127; Beloff, 1965]. Wil-
liam Pitt had attacked the Stamp Act on the basis that England 
had no right to impose internal taxes in America, and its repeal 
has been attributed to his efforts [Dowell, 1888, p. 154]. In notes 
for a Speech on the Declaratory Resolution, Burke said [Langford, 
1981, p. 47]:
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The situation extended from between the Tropicks to 
the pole in such an Extent in such Situations and under 
such a variety of Circumstances, that it would be im-
possible to govern them all upon a plan of Government 
settled even there. Taxation the nicest part of Domestic 
polity, so that Had the Question been now before us to 
form a new Plan of Polity for our Colonies, it would be 
right totally to leave the affair of internal Taxation to 
themselves.
In the breadth of the duties encompassing nearly all legal 
transactions as well as newspapers and pamphlets, Grenville 
had impinged on “each nerve centre in American life at which 
either economic or intellectual activity was registered” [Pole, 
1973, p. 42]. The anticipated revenue had been estimated at 
between £60,000 and £100,000 per year but, according to Dowell 
[1888], and as confirmed by the accounts in Figure 1, the actual 
yield was £3,000 in 1767 and £1,000 in 1768 plus a bitter legacy 
of resistance.
As noted by Preston [2006, p. 572] in the context of the Nav-
ajo, action at a distance may be well intentioned, here bringing 
the colonists into the imperial fiscal web, but may nonetheless 
“become a brutal fact to those upon whom it is enacted,” reveal-
ing a fatal mismatch between “global and local logics.” 
THE AFTERMATH
Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, it remained to deal 
with the shipping back the unused stamped paper and parch-
ment not destroyed in the disturbances. This process took some 
time with Figure 5, an expanded version of Figure 3, demon-
strating how it played out. In October 1766, the stamped paper 
and parchment that had not been sent to America was ordered 
to be “made usefull [sic] to Britain” by having the stamp cut 
off so that it could be re-used [Koeppel, 1976, 15]. Figure 3 (re-
peated as the top half of Figure 5) is an extract from the account 
of the warehouse keeper of stamped goods charged with receipt 
of the returned paper from America. Following the repeal, this 
officer was discharged from his obligations by the cancellation 
of the stamps and removal of the paper into the hands of the 
warehouse keeper of unstamped goods.
Figure 6 shows that the paper was sold back to the stationer 
who had supplied it in the first instance to be re-used in Britain. 
This process took some time, consignments being delivered over 
the course of the period from 1767-1772.
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FIGURE 5
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765 £ s D 1765 £ s D
Oct 31st to Stampt 
goods received 
from the Teller
222,506 11 6½ Oct 31st By sundry consignments 172,586 11 1¾ 
Sept 3rd 
Commissioners 
order paid receiver 
general for stamps
17 17 8
1766
Oct 14th 
Do for parchment 
and paper 
cancelled
49,902 2 8¾ 
222,506 11 6½ 1766 222,506 11 6½ 
Nov 29th
Commissioners 
orders to discharge 
the returns same 
having been 
cancelled
23,924 12 6½ 
1767
June 16th Ditto 19,533 10
8½
Sept 8th Ditto 11,440 1 3¼
1768
April 12th Ditto 39,848 6
6¾
1769
Sept 26th Ditto 10,391 17
8¼
Returns from the 
several distributors 105,138 8 9¼ 105,138 8 9¼
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
Earlier, Figure 4 showed how the consignments of stamped 
paper were allocated among various colonial distributors. The 
remainder of this abstract, reproduced as Figure 7, shows 
which colonies collected the tax, which returned the paper and 
parchment, and which “mislaid” it during the disturbances. The 
abstract shows cash received from the distributors in Quebec, 
Montreal, West Florida, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Barbados, and Geor-
gia.
Finally on this point, the accounts in Figure 1 show that 
stamped paper to the value of approximately £155,000 was 
cancelled. Without the underlying working papers, it is not im-
mediately apparent what constitutes this total, given that to the 
distributors’ abstract, returns totaled only £105,138. The dif-
ference may represent paper and parchment which had not yet 
been dispatched to the colonies.
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FIGURE 7
Distributors’ Abstract (extract)
Districts Cash Returns Transfers Balances
£ s D £ s D £ s D £ s D
Connecticut - - - - - 6,793 8 4¼ - - - - - 1,909 10 11
New Hants - - - - - 1,657 7 - - - - - 2,488 17 7
Pensilvania - - - - - 7,950 10 9 - - - - - 3,902 4
Quebec 316 10 8 4,437 4 2¾ 84 2 8 2,097 5 3½
Virginia - - - - - 4,948 6 7½ - - - - - 4,735 13 7
Montreal 273 3 9 2,587 15 9 1,039 5 - 2,073 1 ¼
Nova Scotia - - - - - 473 14 4¾ - - - - - 1,133 7 5½
New Jersey - - - - - 3,552 8 6½ - - - - - 1,859 19 4½
Marylands - - - - - 4,948 6 7½ - - - - - 2,479 14 10
Grenada - - - - - 3,219 1 8½ - - - - - 756 4 ½
West Florida 50 - - 2,797 15 4 - - - - - 138 1 4½
North Carolina - - - - - 4,966 11 7½ - - - - - 2,479 14 10
New York - - - - - 181 3 - - - - - - 8
Boston New England - - - - - 8,245 17 5¾ - - - - - 4,167 19 2½
Rhode Island - - - - - 3,236 8 9 - - - - - 3,823 1 7
Bermudas - - - - - 1,199 4 2¼ - - - - - 786 16 6
Bahama - - - - - 1,986 - 8¼ - - - - - - - - - -
Spanish Town Jamaica 2,097 2 - 5,953 12 4½ - - - - - 7,730 7
South Carolina - - - - - 11 3½ - - - - - - - - - -
Antigua - - - - - 5,486 8 - - - - - 2,275 10 ¼
St Kitts 8 13 6 4,100 3 11 - - - - - 3,711 7 6
Barbadoes 500 - - 18 5 - - - - - 579 14 6
Georgia 45 - - 3,820 6 7¾ - - - - - 285 15 5¾
East Florida - - - - - 1,000 1 2½ - - - - - 1,985 15 6
3,292 9 11 8 9¼ 1,123 7 8 12 5½
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STAMP ACT ACCOUNTS
The final account is shown in Figure 1. Aspects of that ac-
count remain unresolved. We have been unable to ascertain 
the nature of the two entries for “incidents,” £371.16s.11d. and 
£335.1s.8d. respectively, but this possibly includes some element 
of compensation paid to distributors and ship owners who lost 
money during the disturbances. There were several petitions 
to Parliament seeking such compensation, but whether these 
would be reflected in the accounts is uncertain. One such peti-
tion related to damages of £55.10s. for additional expenses 
incurred as a result of having to unload stamped paper up-
river from the port as a result of danger from the disturbances 
[T1/479 ff 223-224]. It certainly appears, furthermore, that the 
accounts do not include a bill from the solicitor of the Stamp 
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Office, Thomas Cruwys, for the drafting of the Stamp Bill.
As is clear from Figure 1, the accounts produced in 1772 
are in charge-discharge form. This was the prevailing form for 
government accounting during the 18th century, not only in 
Britain but also in Continental Europe. It was not until the first 
half of the 19th century that attempts were made to standardize 
government accounts using double-entry bookkeeping [Edwards 
and Greener, 2003]. Lemarchand [1994, pp. 193-194] examines 
the transition to double-entry bookkeeping from charge and 
discharge in France during the 18th century and notes that 
mineral and metallurgy operations did not make the transition, 
most probably because they were, in large part, financed by the 
nobility and financiers for whom charge and discharge was a 
more familiar system. The essence of charge and discharge is 
stewardship accounting, based on the separation of ownership 
of capital and management and couched in terms of responsi-
bility, accountability, and control. “The initial framework [of 
charge and discharge] was the control of those in charge of han-
dling royal or seigniorial funds or in the running of the domain. 
This was much more than a method of bookkeeping, it was a 
way of rendering accounts.” Charge and discharge goes beyond 
cash accounting; the accountant “takes charge of everything he 
receives, either at the outset of his management or during it. He 
is discharged for all expenditure made for the purposes of such 
management and then must settle the balance.” The process was 
geared to ensuring the integrity of the accountant through the 
obligation to render a final account subject to auditing.
Lacombe-Saboly [1997, p. 271] examines the accounting 
systems of three French hospitals in the 18th and 19th centuries 
and finds that, in the pre-revolutionary period, the same model 
was used as that of French bankers and public accountants (i.e., 
charge and discharge). Movements in funds were recorded in 
monetary units, even where actually exchanged in kind. “The ac-
counting organization seems to have been conceived for submit-
ting accounts to the management committee and supervisors, 
and not merely for the gathering of information.” Lacombe-
Saboly concludes that the system in use satisfied the need for 
information. It was not used to record debtors and creditors in 
the way that private merchants accounts did, and it seems that 
the recording of receipts and expenditure was sufficient for the 
needs of the hospital management.
Similar features can be noted in the colonial Stamp Act ac-
counts. In particular, for the final account (Figure 1), the charge 
is for the value that the stamped paper was expected to realize 
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on sale, not the cost of its purchase and the stamping process. 
The final account is also supported by subsidiary accounts show-
ing the charge and discharge at other stages in the process. 
Holmes [1979] examines government accounting in colo-
nial Massachusetts and, as part of his analysis, considers the 
Treasurer’s books of account from 1754. While underpinned by 
double-entry subsidiary accounts kept in the Italian method, 
the reports of the fiscal position of the colony to the legislature 
adopted charge-and-discharge format. Holmes corresponded 
with Yamey regarding his findings, who apparently tentatively 
confirmed that such accounts were unlikely to have been used 
anywhere in Europe by government departments at that time. 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the underlying accounts for the 
Stamp Act would have been kept in double-entry form.
CONCLUSION
The attempt by Britain to levy a stamp duty on the Ameri-
can colonies is an extraordinary episode in fiscal history. Unlike 
other instances of tax-related rebellion [see Burg, 2004, for a 
comprehensive analysis], however, it concerned not domestic 
impositions but a new tax levied across vast geographical dis-
tances. Careful planning, sympathy with local conditions, and an 
attempt to enlist the support of the colonies in its execution may 
have assisted a successful implementation of the Stamp Act, but 
clearly these issues were not sufficiently understood by the Brit-
ish Parliament. The episode stands as an example of how a tax 
instrument which is successful in one setting will not necessarily 
have the same effectiveness when transposed into another. The 
tax displayed characteristics of a sovereign power as evidenced 
by the inspection regime by which it was enforced, and the po-
tential penalty of death without benefit of clergy for those found 
to be forging stamps. The tax also, however, displayed character-
istics of a disciplinary power, requiring taxpayers to be complicit 
in its collection.21 This holds true for the British version of the 
tax and explains in part its success at a time when other forms 
of taxation, specifically tax on incomes, were unthinkable. In the 
case of the imperial version, the government failed to enroll lo-
cal actors to the extent necessary to make the tax work in prac-
tice at a distance.
By examining the literature, we have shown that the signal 
failure of the Stamp Act is due to a number of contributing fac-
21 These concepts of power are derived from Foucault [1979].
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tors. Some of these are discussed extensively in the existing lit-
erature of the Stamp Act crisis. For example, the British Parlia-
ment failed to appreciate that the relationship between Britain 
and the colonists was perceived in an increasingly different way 
by both parties. In the British view, the right to tax was disasso-
ciated with the right to parliamentary representation at the time 
when only a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were 
represented. Distinguishing as they did between internal and 
external taxes, the American colonists were prepared to accept 
duties whose main purpose was to regulate trade. They were 
far less inclined to accept a stamp tax regarded as an interfer-
ence with their internal affairs. As a result of the differences in 
outlook, the British government underestimated the depth of 
the feeling against imperial taxation in any form. Communica-
tion delays rendered the implementation of the tax problematic 
and contributed further to the tensions in the colonies. Most 
importantly, the timing of the attempt to tax the colonies was 
misjudged. Had earlier proposals, made as early as 1720, been 
implemented, the colonists may not have been so quick to reject 
it, but, by 1765, a growing sense of independence meant that any 
form of taxation, no matter how carefully chosen, was bound to 
interfere with that trend.
In this paper, we posit an additional explanation for the 
failure of the imperial Stamp Act, which relates to the capacity 
of the chosen fiscal instrument to galvanize a violent resistance 
movement. We argue that the logistics of implementing a highly 
complex form of taxation across vast geographical distances 
were completely underestimated by Parliament, demonstrating 
the failure to enact action at a distance. Even with the full coop-
eration of the colonists, it would have been extremely difficult 
to manage the efficient operation of the Act and to reap the 
expected revenue. More careful consideration of the different 
economic and social conditions in the colonies and how these 
would impact the implementation of the tax may have led to a 
different design.
A number of features of the Stamp Act operations contrib-
uted to its rejection by some of the colonies. While stopping 
short of a counterfactual argument, we note a number of possi-
bilities. Had the colonies been allowed to stamp their own paper 
(i.e., paper made in the colonies), the need to ship large bales of 
stamped papers across the Atlantic would have been avoided. 
The colonists would not then have been faced with such visible 
evidence of imperial interference and would have been deprived 
of the opportunity to demonstrate disapproval in such an in-
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flammatory way. In addition, the costs of producing newspapers 
and other publications would not have been increased to such 
an extent. Another feature relates to the choice of objects to be 
taxed. Had the tax not been imposed on newspapers, pamphlets, 
and almanacs, the printers may not have incited resistance 
through the publication of inflammatory tracts. 
Furthermore, had the British government paid heed to the 
way in which the colonies were taxing themselves, the overlay of 
stamp duties on items such as licenses to practice law or a pro-
fession, already subject to faculty tax, could have been avoided. 
Massachusetts, in particular, was heavily taxed at the time 
through a variety of different instruments.
Through the examination of primary source documents, 
this paper shows the way in which the British government bu-
reaucracy drew up the accounts for the American stamp and 
demonstrates that it was not designed to “calculate the loss.” 
Rather the accounts are charge-and-discharge accounts which 
reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those responsible 
for the collection of the tax, consistent with the residual feudal 
mentality still extant in the mid-18th century.
Finally, the examination of the accounts drawn up by the 
British government some six years after the abolition of the 
stamp duty provides insight into the nature of government ac-
counting in the mid-18th century while underscoring both the 
unnecessarily complicated nature of administering the impost 
and the depth of its failure.
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Abstract: Joseph Hardcastle was one of the foremost authorities on 
subjects connected with the mathematics of finance and other topics 
in accounting in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As a teacher, 
author, and leader in the profession, he figured prominently in the 
elevation of accountancy. Hardcastle is relatively unknown in the lit-
erature except for having the distinction of scoring the highest grades 
on the first CPA exam in New york in 1896. However, he was well 
respected during his time as one of the premier theorists in account-
ing and was awarded an honorary degree of Master of letters by New 
york University. Because of his prolific writings, his teaching of future 
accountants, and his interactions with members of the institute of 
Accounts, he had a strong impact on the “science of accounts,” the 
dominant accounting theory in the U.s. at the turn of the century. 
Joseph Hardcastle, born in england in 1827, is probably 
best known for being one of only three individuals to pass the 
first Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exam in New york in 
1896. Remarkably, he was just four months shy of his seventieth 
birthday and received the highest score of those that passed the 
exam [flesher et al., 1996, p. 17]. However, Hardcastle was a 
regular contributor to various early journals about accounting 
in the U.s., and he became one of the foremost authorities of 
his time on the theory of accounting. through an analysis of 
his articles, the goal of this paper is to reconstruct his theories 
and contributions to accounting thought and history, and to 
discuss these theories of accounting as related to the “science of 
accounts” that dominated accounting thought in the late 19th 
century U.s.
acknowledgments: the authors wish to thank the anonymous referees and 
Richard K. fleischman for their valuable suggestions
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this paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, 
a second section will include a short analysis of the functional 
approach in explaining the accounting profession in the late 
19th century, with an emphasis on the specific knowledge and 
technical skills required by the profession. the third section 
will provide background information on Joseph Hardcastle, fol-
lowed by discussion of Hardcastle’s theories on accounting with 
comparisons to the literature of his time. A conclusion will sum-
marize Hardcastle’s contributions to accounting history. 
iNtRoDUCtioN
Carnegie and Napier state that it is important to understand 
the context within which historical events have occurred [1996, 
pp. 7, 22], and the importance of referencing key personalities 
who have contributed to accounting development. since indi-
viduals as well as events create history, the study of individuals 
is crucial in understanding a profession, its history, and the 
success of its organizations. During the 19th century, many 
considered accounting in the U.K. to be more mature and estab-
lished than in the U.s. the historical literature on 19th century 
U.K. is rich, especially with articles tracing the genesis of its 
professional accounting organizations and the men involved in 
forming them [Parker, 1983; lee, 1996a, b; edwards, 2001; and 
numerous others]. 
in reference to 19th century accountants in the U.s., Miran-
ti [1990], as well as webster [1954], discuss various participants 
in the emerging CPA movement. other histories of accounting 
in the U.s. have included brief biographies devoted to individ-
uals and their contributions to the development of the profes-
sion during the 19th century [Carey, 1969; Previts and Merino, 
1998; loeb and Miranti, 2004]. The New York Certified Public 
Accountant published short articles on the history of accounting 
in the state of New york starting in the late 1940s and ending 
in 1972. the New york society’s Committee on History, initially 
headed by Norman webster, prepared these articles, which were 
reprinted in 1995 in The New York State Society of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants – Foundation for a Profession. the majority of 
the biographies included were accountants whose careers were 
mostly situated in the 20th century, although three of the articles 
were on three prominent 19th century accountants – Hardcastle, 
Charles ezra sprague, and Charles waldo Haskins. in addition, 
an article on Hardcastle by flesher et al. [1996] was published in 
The CPA Journal and another on Anson o. Kittredge by Romeo 
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and Kyj [2000] appeared in the Accounting Historians Journal. 
there have also been published biographies of sprague by Mann 
[1931] and Haskins by Jordan [1928].
Considering the number of individuals and the amount 
of progress accountants made toward professionalism in the 
19th century U.s., there have been relatively few published 
bio graphies about the founders of the American accounting 
pro fession of that century. Accounting must be cognizant of 
the fact that “when professionalization is studied by following 
the  process of differentiation among ideas, there is some risk 
of losing sight of the individuals…that shaped the disciplines” 
[furner, 1975, p. 306]. Despite the shortfall of biographical 
work, much professional progress was accomplished in the 19th 
century U.s.
McMillan [1999] argues that the accounting profession 
was based upon the establishment of a “community of the 
competent” during the last two decades of the 19th century. 
Many leaders of the accounting profession sought to distinguish 
themselves as professionals by making the claim that there was 
a “science of accounts.” the idea of the accountant as a scientist 
dominated the profession’s early pursuit of professionalism. 
McMillan [1999, pp. 25-26] uses the term “community of the 
competent” to describe the efforts of the institute of Accounts 
(iA) to obtain a level of professionalism for accountants. As 
furner [1975, p. 1] states in reference to the professionalization 
of American social science during the period from 1865 to 1905, 
“in an age that honored science above other sources of wisdom, 
it became clear that people who established their ability to study 
society scientifically would command attention and influence 
the course of events.” Before the professionalization of account-
ing and the passage of the CPA law, the U.s. discipline had its in-
digenous leaders. Accounting members involved in the “science 
of accounts” and working toward the goal of professionalization 
included such prominent accounting educators and writers as 
sprague, selden R. Hopkins, e. t. Cockey, Kittredge, s.s. Pack-
ard, and Haskins [Romeo and Kyj, 1998, p. 37], as well as Hard-
castle, the subject of this study. 
Hardcastle’s contribution as a writer and scholar predomi-
nantly involved designing and improving bookkeeping systems 
and focusing on the principles upon which accounting was 
based. this is in agreement with McMillan’s [1998a, p. 121] 
suggestion that the late 19th century bookkeeper was more 
“interested in designing and monitoring new and efficient book-
keeping systems, than in developing and refining the idea of an 
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independent professional audit.” Hardcastle was instrumental 
in differentiating the body of knowledge necessary to study ac-
counting scientifically. As one of the leading theorists in the iA, 
his articles commanded attention and influenced the course 
of events for the emerging profession. in the next section, the 
functionalist approach will be used to explain the evolution of 
professions in general and the development of the professional 
ideology of accountants in particular. 
Use of tHe fUNCtioNAlist APPRoACH
sociological perspectives used in explaining accounting 
professionalism include the interactionist, the critical, and the 
functionalist approaches. the interactionist approach views pro-
fessions as interest groups that strive to convince others of the 
legitimacy of their claim to professional recognition, including 
status and power [Haug and sussman, 1969, p. 153]. Although 
professions possess the characteristics of autonomy, esoteric 
knowledge, and service orientation, they must deal with the 
 client and the environment since their services and positions 
may not be accepted without criticism by others. By co-opting 
these interest groups, professions try to preserve their positions 
[Haug and sussman, 1969, p. 153; Roth, 1974].
the critical perspective, which goes one step further, is 
based on weber’s writings on the theory of bureaucratic admin-
istration and Marx’s critique of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion [willmott, 1986]. this approach analyzes the traits of the 
group within an economic and political context. Professional 
groups are seen as a means of achieving collective financial and 
social mobility by creating exclusive market shelters that set 
each occupation apart from the other [Parkin, 1979, p. 54]. By 
legitimate “friendly licensing” or “titles,” professional groups 
secure control over a specific market for intangible skills, a 
monopoly over their lines of work, and control over admission 
into the monopoly [Cairnes, 1887, pp. 66-67; friedman, 1962, p. 
147; larson, 1977, p. 10]. Professions are seen as one of many 
interest groups competing for status and power within a larger 
social, economic, and political context [willmott, 1986; Richard-
son, 1988; Chua and Polullaos, 1998]. 
Both of these approaches could very easily be applicable to 
numerous events and organizations in accounting during the 
19th century. However, the authors feel that the interactionist 
and critical approaches, which differ from the functional ap-
proach in that specific knowledge and technical skills are not the 
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rationale for the group, are not as applicable in a discussion on 
an individual level.1 
the functionalist approach, the earliest sociological per-
spective used in explaining professions, views professionals as 
honored servants of the public who meet the needs of society 
because of the skills and attributes they possess. this view pur-
ports that organized professions undertake highly skilled tasks 
that are necessary for the assimilation and smooth operation of 
society. organized professions can do so because of the defining 
characteristics and skills they possess [Carr-saunders and wil-
son, 1933, p. 397; Greenwood, 1972, p. 4]. these characteristics 
and skills include esoteric knowledge, independence, altruism, 
and self-discipline [Ritzer, 1972, p. 54]. the skills are supported 
by knowledge that has been “organized into an internally consis-
tent system, called a body of theory” [Greenwood, 1972, p. 5], or 
what the accountants in the iA have referred to during the 1880s 
and 1890s as the “science of accounts.” Possession of skills re-
quires mastery of the theory underlying those skills. therefore, 
the acquisition of skills is a practical as well as an intellectual 
experience. Greenwood emphasized that on-the-job training is 
not enough; a formal education in an academic setting is neces-
sary.
As corporations grew in the latter half of the 19th century, 
the need for consistent, independent, and better financial report-
ing increased concomitantly. the separation of the supply of 
capital and its management created a new and different market 
for the public accountant’s services. leavitt [1896, p. 744], in 
his exposé on the professional accountant which appeared in 
several business magazines, stressed the difference between the 
“ordinary bookkeeper” and the “professional accountant.” He 
emphasized the investigative nature in the detection of fraud in 
the accountant’s work:
the professional accountant is an investigator, an in-
quisitor, a dissector, a detective, in the highest sense in 
which these terms can be used. it is his business to ver-
ify that which is right and to ferret out and expose that 
which is wrong; to discover and state facts as they are, 
whether plainly expressed by clear and distinct record, 
or skillfully concealed by distorted or falsified entries, or 
1 even though the authors elected to adopt the functionalist approach to ex-
plain the contributions of Hardcastle, this does not mean that this method has 
not been criticized in the accounting literature. for example, Robson and Cooper 
[1990], west [1996], and willmott [1986] are among those who have been critical 
of the functionalist approach.
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hidden under plausibly arranged figures, or, as in cases 
not a few, omitted from record entirely. this is his busi-
ness to read the record, ‘the hieroglyphics of accounts,’ 
whether plainly or blindly written; to read, too ‘between 
the lines’; and to interpret, rearrange, and produce in 
simple but distinct form, self-explanatory and free from 
mysteries of bookkeeping, the narrative of facts as they 
are, their relation to each other and results. 
the smooth running of society, which is the goal of the 
functionalist approach, is subject to social and economic condi-
tions. the separation of the functions of ownership, which is 
risk bearing, and the control function of management can result 
in situations that may be detrimental to the owners of capital 
if there is no goal congruence or control. Highly skilled tasks 
of professional accountants thus become necessary to ensure 
 proper stewardship and control. this became especially im-
portant as the great merger movement in the U.s. began in the 
1890s. in addition, innovative entrepreneurs like Andrew Car-
negie began using advanced methods of accounting developed 
during the 19th century to secure an edge in running and buying 
businesses [lamoreaux, 1985, p. 38]. 
these advanced methods of accounting called for conscien-
tious, skilled, and experienced personnel in matters of accounts, 
corporate law, and auditing (fraud detection) far above the 
capacity of a counting-house bookkeeper of that time whose 
daily work was a repetition of the preceding day’s work. thus, a 
marked distinction was made between the function of a profes-
sional public accountant and that of a bookkeeper, creating a 
demand for professional public accountants. in the major cities 
of New york, Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, corporations, 
banks, and receivers were employing public accountants. execu-
tors were also beginning to understand the advantages of em-
ploying experienced experts [“Advantage of expert Accountants 
to investors,” 1894, p. 457]. But there was a major distinction 
between the professional accountant in the U.s. and his British 
counterpart; the U.s. was an unregulated environment. there 
were few regulations governing commerce and no federal or 
state laws requiring independent audits. in Britain, companies 
were legally required to go through an annual audit by the spe-
cific act of Parliament granting their charter or by acts regulat-
ing their particular industry. on the other hand, the phenomenal 
growth of the country and the different industries in the U.s. 
created an environment that called for efficient accounting 
systems. Modern, efficient, scientific accounting was the topic 
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of lectures at accounting meetings and the topic of articles in 
business magazines [McMillan, 1998a]. the emphasis was on 
the development of accounting systems for the different lines of 
business. what might be a good method of bookkeeping for one 
line might not be good for another. 
By employing the functionalist perspective, which is charac-
terized by the competencies and skills necessary for the emerg-
ing profession, the authors hope to demonstrate Hardcastle’s 
importance in the establishment of the accounting profession in 
the U.s. 
BACKGRoUND iNfoRMAtioN
After Hardcastle graduated from the york and Ripon Di-
ocesan training school in 1847, his initial vocation, which 
continued for 17 years, was in education (see Appendix 1 for a 
short summary and timeline of his life). He taught at various 
schools and was also superintendent of schools in Belize, British 
Honduras for three years before immigrating to the U.s. His first 
position in the U.s. was as first assistant principal of Grammar 
school No. 38 in New york for six years [Committee on History, 
1951, p. 127]. His background in education, as well as his con-
siderable ability in mathematics [“Joseph Hardcastle, C.P.A.,” 
1899, p. 572], not only helped him in preparing his articles, 
which were written clearly, succinctly, and thoroughly, but also 
provided him with the impetus to become an accountant. 
His accounting career started in 1864, when his first cli-
ent was Peter Gilsey, who was involved in real estate. one of 
Gilsey’s sons, a student of Hardcastle’s, recommended that 
his father consult Hardcastle about a difficult mathematical 
income-tax problem requiring knowledge of sinking funds. the 
state income-tax commissioners accepted Hardcastle’s recom-
mendations, and, as a result, he remained Gilsey’s accountant 
for approximately 42 years [Rice, 1951]. thus, all of Hardcastle’s 
experience in accounting occurred in the U.s., different from 
many of the U.K. accountants who emigrated to the U.s. in the 
latter half of the 19th century as already experienced account-
ing professionals, frequently Chartered Accountants. it is fairly 
apparent that Hardcastle was an employee of Gilsey rather than 
Gilsey a client of Hardcastle. Aside from Gilsey, the authors 
could not find any evidence of other clients of Hardcastle.
Hardcastle did not advertise his services as a public ac-
countant in the accounting journals. He was not listed as a 
public accountant by littleton [1942, p. 31] until 1898, after 
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he passed the CPA exam, nor was he listed as one of 122 public 
account ants published in the journal Business in 1896 [“the 
Public Accountants of New york City,” 1896, p. 383]. even 
though the first examining board was normally strict in denying 
prospective CPAs who did not meet the public accounting expe-
rience requirement, the New york state Board of examiners was 
willing to recommend him for a waiver based on this experience 
to become a CPA [Committee on History, 1951, p. 125]. since 
two of the members of the Board of examiners, sprague and 
Haskins, were members of the iA and were quite familiar with 
Hardcastle’s work, the examining board doubtlessly held Hard-
castle in high esteem. 
the question then becomes, why did Hardcastle elect to 
sit for the exam if he probably could have applied for a waiver? 
the reason becomes more evident when one considers Hard-
castle’s background. Considered a scholar throughout his whole 
life, he was probably very confident not only of his accounting 
 knowledge but also of his testing abilities. for example, as a 
young man, he won the grand prize of a three-year education 
scholarship for the york and Ripon Diocesan training school 
for teaching. He also won the position of principal of the head 
school in Belize, British Honduras by a competitive examina-
tion and subsequently rose to the position of superintendent of 
the whole colony. when he first came to New york, he obtained 
a principal’s certificate by examination [“Joseph Hardcastle, 
C.P.A.,” 1899, p. 572]. one can only speculate, but his back-
ground in writing technical articles, his experience at taking 
exams, his mathematics skills, and the positions he held in the 
iA may have created sufficient confidence for him to decline the 
waiver and opt to sit for the first CPA exam. 
Hardcastle joined the iA, in which he was a charter mem-
ber, in 1882; the New york state society of Certified Public 
Accountants in 1897; and the American Association of Public 
Accountants in 1905. As a member of the iA, he made the first 
solo presentation in the history of the institute, “the origin of 
Calculations as Deduced from languages,” and made at least 
seven other presentations [Romeo and Kyj, 1998, pp. 51-55]. He 
was for many years chairman of the institute’s Committee on 
lectures and also one of its first chief examiners. in this posi-
tion, he was elected as a fellow in the plan to introduce member-
ship grades within the iA [“institute of Accounts of New york,” 
1887, p. 68]. thus, he examined for admission some of the best 
accountants in New york City and helped establish standards 
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of entry into the profession [Romeo and Kyj, 1996, p. 12].2 
through the positions he held, the lectures he gave, and the es-
says he wrote, he became one of the key players in providing the 
intellectual and scientific movement in which the iA flourished. 
in addition, he was a lecturer at the Koehler’s New york 
school of Accounts, and, in 1901, he was appointed to the fac-
ulty of the New york University (NyU) school of Commerce, Ac-
counts, and finance as professor of the principles and practice 
of accounts [Committee on History, 1951, p. 127].
Arguably, Hardcastle’s greatest contribution to accounting 
lies in his extensive authorship of numerous theoretical articles 
and presentations published in the earliest U.s. accounting 
periodicals. Hardcastle helped develop the body of knowledge 
necessary for an emerging profession by identifying accounting, 
auditing, actuarial, and mathematics of finance issues affecting 
the professional accountant. through an environment in which 
accounting was examined from a scientific approach, Hard-
castle, as well as many other American accountants, was able to 
help expand the accounting knowledge to make it more effective 
and contribute to the growth of industry and commerce. 
the first accounting journal in the U.s., The Book-Keeper, 
was started on July 20, 1880, and Hardcastle began contributing 
articles to this journal in 1882. By the late 1880s, he became a 
regular contributor to the journal Business and wrote monthly 
articles, probably for compensation, in that journal for many 
years. He became one of the leading advocates dedicated to pro-
moting the “science of accounts” and elevating accounting to the 
rank of a profession. 
His reputation was not confined to the U.s., for some of his 
articles were reprinted in london’s accountant papers. He also 
received a very flattering notice in the Ragionaria of Milan, italy, 
concerning his articles published in Business [“Notes on the Bi-
ography of Joseph Hardcastle, 1951”]. 
ACCoUNtiNG tHeoRies of HARDCAstle
As mentioned previously, the establishment of the “com-
munity of the competent” dominated accounting during the late 
19th century in the U.s. [McMillan, 1999]. one way Hardcastle 
2 the duty of the examining Committee was to report to the Board of the 
institute whether applicants met various qualifications – good moral character, 
proper experience requirement, and sufficient knowledge of accounting. the ap-
plicants were tested orally before the examining Committee [Romeo and Kyj, 
1996, p. 12].
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became a primary proponent of the “science of accounts” is 
through his writing more than 65 articles published in various 
journals between 1880 and 1905 [Committee on History, 1951, 
pp. 128-132]. the functionalist perspective is characterized by 
the competencies and skills that become necessary in a rapidly 
changing economy. A discussion will follow on a survey of the 
accounting techniques written by Hardcastle, including actu-
arial concepts, depreciation, cost accounting, and other topics. 
since many of these techniques are still applicable today, this 
section will help historians in discerning the origin of account-
ing theories developed in the U.s. thus, one of the reasons for 
the study is to determine whether “it will be of assistance in de-
ciding whether present practices have been adopted after a long 
period of trial and a careful evaluation of alternatives, or were 
the result of an unhappy string of accidents” [wells, 1978, p. 36]. 
However, in many cases, it will be difficult to ascertain whether 
Hardcastle developed some of the theories himself or borrowed 
them from other accountants. 
Actuarial Concepts: Hardcastle’s [1883a, pp. 17-20, 35-37] second 
published article, a lecture delivered before the iA and pub-
lished in The Book-Keeper, was evidence of his advanced grasp 
of  theories on actuarial concepts and interest on money. His 
numerous years of experience working as an accountant in real 
estate helped him to apply many of these interest concepts to 
accounting articles throughout his lifetime. for example, Hard-
castle [1883b, p. 89] displays how to calculate the present value 
of a bond: 
the present value of a bond = the yearly return from 
bond times the present value of an annuity for the num-
ber of years the bond has to run at the rate per cent. the 
investment is yielding us plus the present value of $100, 
payable when the bond matures at the same rate per 
cent. 
in the same article, Hardcastle [1883b, p. 89] then calcu-
lates the current value of the bond assuming that the coupons 
are cashed semi-annually:
…thus a 7% bond due in twenty years, interest pay-
able half-yearly, will be treated as a 3 ½% bond running 
forty years, interest payable yearly. in our solution we 
require two sets of tables: the one, giving the present 
value of an annuity of $1 for a number of years, at dif-
ferent rates per cent.; and the other, the present value 
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of $1, due at the end of a number of years, at different 
rates per cent. 
A few years later, Hardcastle [1892, pp. 26-27] wrote an 
article in which he discussed and analyzed the use of a present 
value of an annuity and the computation of a sinking fund by 
using a comprehensive example. Because of his mathematical 
and accounting background in real estate, many of his articles 
on time value, bonds, etc. could, with minimal modification, be 
used in modern treatments of the subject. However, when he 
discusses the bookkeeping of bonds, there are some differences 
from today’s accounting. Rather than debit or credit a discount 
or premium in a bonds account (he used both in his examples), 
he extends the total amount into a profit-or-loss account, charg-
ing the premium and discount to the income statement for the 
year the bonds were sold. He also, logically, considered the sink-
ing fund as a contra-bonds payable account rather than as an 
investment [Hardcastle, 1892, p. 26]:
the sinking fund is a bookkeeping contrivance, by 
means of which we can easily tell how much has been 
provided toward payment of the debt, and it is an off-
set to the debt, so as to show by taking the difference 
between the debt and the sinking fund account the 
amount of the debt unprovided for. 
in this article, he mentions depreciation for probably the first 
time. He states that if the money raised by bonds were used for 
a plant or other asset subject to depreciation, then an amount 
would be debited to the income statement:
Debit profit and loss with sinking fund, $1366.66, and 
credit depreciation account with the same. if there 
is any objection, from the circumstances of the case, 
credit reserve account with $1366.66, instead of depre-
ciation. 
later, Hardcastle [1901b, p. 470] recognized that premiums on 
bonds do have to be amortized, although he continued to use 
the term depreciation: 
Practically or theoretically, there is an equal periodical 
income coming in, part of which goes to the payment of 
interest on the investment, and part to the depreciation 
of the bond or of the lease – in the case of the bond to 
wiping out the premium of the bond, and in the case of 
the lease to wiping out the whole of the lease. 
the issue of accounting for bond discounts and premiums was 
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debated for many years. Accountants either immediately wrote 
off the premium or discount, or, if not, they treated them as a 
deferred charge or credit. Accountants’ theoretical attacks on 
these methods continued into the 1960s [Vangermeersch, 1996b, 
p. 380]. in the Accountants’ Index [1921], articles concerning the 
amortization of discounts and premiums do not appear until ap-
proximately 1910, even though sprague [1904, pp. 38-40] used 
the term in his text of lectures at NyU. in sprague’s text, which 
is a clear elucidation of nominal and effective rates of bonds, he 
acknowledges Hardcastle in the preface for valuable suggestions 
and assistance. 
in the first of his 1887 articles, Hardcastle [1887a, p. 4] pre-
sented a table showing the equivalent effective rates of various 
nominal interest rates when calculated yearly, semi-annually, 
quarterly, monthly, daily, and every moment. Compound inter-
est, as applied to loans and their calculations, is also discussed 
in later articles the same year [Hardcastle, 1887b, pp. 43-44, 
66-67]. 
in January 1896, Hardcastle began another series in Busi-
ness called “sparks from an Accountant’s Anvil.” He emphasized 
the importance of completing the sales cycle before recogniz-
ing any gains or losses and the necessity of having knowledge 
of present value computations. He suggested “all transactions 
in bookkeeping should represent present values, except when 
they are in condition of transition” [Hardcastle, 1896, p. 36]. He 
continued in this series with examples of present value tables (p. 
90), uses of perpetuities in accounting (p. 140), valuing leases, 
deferred annuities (p. 185), and the illustration of sinking funds 
(p. 229). 
in 1898, Hardcastle [1898, pp. 753-756] discussed the ef-
fective rate of interest as used in an installment sale in which 
the payments are made over a ten-year period. Hardcastle de-
termined the present value using tables and allocated the yearly 
payments between interest and reduction of the principal. 
Depreciation: Hardcastle wrote five short articles in a series that 
relates to one of the earliest expositions on depreciation in the 
U.s. in the first article, in November 1896, Hardcastle [1896, p. 
477] separated assets subject to depreciation into three catego-
ries:
the class from which there comes a regular income, 1. 
which is assumed to be fixed, but at the end of some 
fixed time ceases, and yields a certain rate per cent., 
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either leaving a residuum (as a bond) or not (as a 
lease)… 
the class of goods used in business, such as ma-2. 
chinery, boilers, and furniture. they are subject to 
natural depreciation from wear and tear, and some 
of them depreciate from new inventions taking their 
place, or special improvement made in their line …
the class which consists of intangible goods, but 3. 
which retain or lose their values according as the 
business with which they are connected is prosper-
ous or otherwise, such as good-will, franchises, 
preliminary expenses (i.e., cost of organizing the 
business), etc. 
it is interesting to note that it was not until the 1936 revision 
of “Uniform Accounting” published by the iA, that the term 
intangible asset appeared on the sample balance sheet [Vanger-
meersch, 1996a, p. 337]. in the same article, Vangermeersch 
also suggested that the first noted U.s. reference to intangible 
assets was in an editorial, “intangible Values in Balance sheets,” 
published in the Journal of Accountancy in 1916. Dicksee and 
tillyard never did use the term intangible in their 1906 text. 
Hardcastle [1897a, p. 49] wrote that he did agree with Dicksee 
that no harm could come by allowing goodwill to remain on the 
books of the business. thus, it is not necessary for the goodwill 
account to be written down. 
Hardcastle [1896, p. 477] was also aware of the risk associ-
ated with three categories of intangibles:
… the goods under these three classes all have a life 
more or less definite. those under the first class have 
a definite life, and may or may not have a residuum; 
those under the second class have a life indefinitely 
 definite, much like the life of man, i.e., have an aver-
age existence, but may be cut short in that existence, 
or with care and by circumstances may be extended 
beyond the average period, and the goods of this class 
have a residuum. the last is distinguished from the first 
and second classes by the goods under it having a very 
uncertain existence, which may be very short and is 
very long, but they have no residuum. 
in terms of estimating depreciation, with the exception of 
certain intangible assets, Hardcastle [1896, p. 477] recommend-
ed an accelerated method of depreciation: 
experts have observed the normal life of various goods, 
and these have been given us: it has been assumed that 
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the depreciation is greatest in the earliest and least in 
the latter part of the life; it has likewise been assumed 
that the law of decrease in value is similar, except oppo-
site to the law of compound interest. this law is called 
the law of diminishing balances. 
His example and method of calculation is similar to the ac-
celerated methods explained in modern textbooks. the deprecia-
tion for the first year on an asset that cost $10,000 and using 5% 
would be $500, the second year $475, the third year $451.25, etc. 
in the next article in the series, he presented tables with various 
rates to make the calculations easier [Hardcastle, 1896, p. 510].
Hardcastle’s [1897a, p. 15] entry for depreciation at the end 
of the first year was: 
Profit and loss $1,500
 To depreciation fund account  $1,500
And the presentation in the balance sheet was:
Cost of $10,000 
Written off for wear     1,500 $8,500
the depreciation-fund account is the same as modern-day ac-
cumulated depreciation and would increase each year by the 
amount of depreciation charged to profit and loss. Approximate-
ly a year later in 1897, frederick w. Child, also a member of the 
iA, presented a paper to the institute on the use of an account 
to accumulate and report depreciation reserves [Previts and Me-
rino, 1998, p. 157]. since Hardcastle and Child were members 
of the iA, there must have been interactions and discussions on 
this topic. 
what makes these articles especially interesting is the 
thoroughness and clarity of the topic covered at a time when 
there was a lack of a clear definition of depreciation. Referring 
to court cases in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, wood-
ward [1956, p.73] suggested that “it was not established whether 
depreciation was an expense, or a distribution of income.” Not 
until 1909 was there acceptance of the idea of depreciation as 
a cost of doing business; in fact, it was only accepted due to the 
U.s. supreme Court’s handing down its decision on the matter 
in Knoxville v. Knoxville water Company [woodward, 1956, p. 
73]. saliers [1939, p. 23], referring to the first income tax law of 
March 1, 1913, wrote:
…No uniformity of procedure existed, there was little 
known concerning the life characteristics of physical 
167
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2008, Vol. 35, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2008
159Romeo and McKinney, Contributions of Hardcastle
property, and standard rates of depreciation were a 
thing of the future. Many distinctions now clearly un-
derstood were then but vaguely recognized. Depletion, 
obsolescence, and inadequacy had then received but 
scant consideration; since then volumes have been writ-
ten to clarify and apply these terms. Although deprecia-
tion was recognized as expense, its part in the cost of 
manufacture and in the cost of producing services gen-
erally was not well understood. 
Hardcastle [1899, p. 115] also suggested using depreciation 
and doubtful-account reserves before a division of profits is de-
clared on partnerships: 
Before a division of profits be declared the profit and 
loss account shall be debited with say 10 per cent. on 
diminishing balances on the fixed capital subject to 
depreciation and depreciation account credited with 
the same. the depreciation account shall in the balance 
sheet be always treated as an offset to the fixed capital 
subject to depreciation. there shall also be two reserve 
accounts – one the reserve account for doubtful debts, 
and the other the general reserve account. the former 
shall be credited with…percent of the debts owing the 
firm remaining unpaid arising during the term of which 
the balance is the closing up, as a contingent fund to 
meet bad debts; and the latter or general reserve ac-
count shall be credited with...per cent of balance re-
maining in the profit and loss and the profit and loss 
account debited. 
Hardcastle treated the account on the balance sheet as an 
offset to the fixed capital subject to depreciation. in addition, 
Hardcastle [1899, p. 180] suggested allocating depreciation to 
a manufacturing company’s cost of goods produced and to a 
trading company’s expenses: “the depreciation of fixed capi-
tal in a manufacturing business is merged into the cost of the 
goods produced. in a trading business it becomes an offset to 
the profits.” two key concepts were developed in the texts and 
journals during the early 20th century. first, it was determined 
that a yearly deduction from the original cost of an asset should 
be made to allow for deterioration. Next, the modern-day com-
ponents of depreciation – wear and tear, the passage of time, 
obsolescence – began to be recognized [Downey, 1996, p. 199]. 
Hardcastle [1896, p. 476] also discusses these concepts in his 
article:
But wear and tear are not the only things with which 
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we are here concerned. there is the danger of our goods 
becoming worthless for the purpose for which the 
goods are used, by reason of some new invention which 
puts the owner of it in such an advantageous position 
that the one without the new invention cannot compete 
in the world of trade with the one using the invention. 
Appendix 2 displays a sample of U.s. books written in the 
19th and early 20th centuries, and whether their authors men-
tion anything about depreciation. Most omit the topic altogether 
except where it is mentioned as a term to reduce asset values. 
the exceptions are Kittredge and sprague, both active members 
of the iA who would have had contact with Hardcastle. 
Kittredge and Brown [1897, pp. 27, 61, 83] mention reserves 
for depreciation in their classification of accounts; however, they 
include it under the liability accounts. they do illustrate an ac-
count “reserve for fixtures depreciation” in which the debits and 
credits to the account are carried to a loss-and-gain account. 
Kittredge and Brown mention depreciation again, but are still 
not clear about the type of account since it is debited only at the 
end of the year when the books are closed. they also mention 
that in some factories “the percentage to be charged to orders 
is determined somewhat after the fashion above described, and 
then the amount is allowed to accumulate on the credit side of 
depreciation account.” this is the closest Kittredge and Brown 
come to a modern version of accounting for depreciation.
sprague [1908, p. 58] has only one page on depreciation 
and calls the allowance account an “offset or an adjunct to the 
principal account.” it is used to present two different valuations 
when computing depreciation. He is not clear whether it is a 
depreciation expense, but sprague does state that depreciation 
is not a liability. 
even though Hardcastle made no references to previous 
works on depreciation, there were numerous articles and texts 
written about the subject in both the U.K. and the U.s. dur-
ing the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As indicated by the 
sample of books in Appendix 2, there was no accepted theory of 
depreciation. there were still discussions in the literature as to 
whether depreciation was a valuation of assets or an allocation 
problem [Brief, 1967, p. 37]. in addition, the “reserve account” 
was sometimes considered a liability account or a contra asset. 
for example, accounting authors such as wilkinson [1901, p. 
953], teichmann [1906, p. 104], and Knight [1908, p. 192] all 
wrote after Hardcastle and still considered the “replacement 
reserve account” a liability, leaving the assets intact. 
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Hardcastle’s theories on depreciation are not original, for 
apparently they build on an article in The Accountant written 
by ladelle, published six years previously.3 ladelle [1890, pp. 
5-10] considered depreciation an allocation problem, disregard-
ing market fluctuations. He also utilized a reserve account that 
would be increased each year by the amount of depreciation. 
this is an excellent example of where Hardcastle may not have 
developed any new procedures, but his articles were clearly a 
modern and comprehensive presentation of the topic. Hard-
castle not only wrote on what he probably considered the most 
scientific approach concerning depreciation, but also expanded 
the discussion to include much more theory and examples.
Cost Accounting: Hardcastle, through the publication and pre-
sentation of his articles, was one of the leading cost accounting 
educators in the U.s. of his time. some theories and concepts 
on cost accounting were obviously discussed in iA meetings 
because a few authors, such as Kittredge and Hardcastle, wrote 
about cost theories within a year or two of each other. Metcalfe, 
who wrote the classic text, The Cost of Manufactures, made at 
least one presentation to the iA and one to the American society 
of Mechanical engineers as early as 1886, titled “the shop-
order system of Accounts,” which was published in The Office 
in five segments [Metcalfe, 1886, pp. 10-11, 19-20, 30-32, 48-50, 
64-66].
Many cost historians have neglected to reference 19th cen-
tury American periodicals because they were probably not aware 
that these journals existed [Romeo and Kyj, 2000]. for example, 
Garner [1954, p. 341], unaware of American writers like Hard-
castle and Kittredge, wrote nine propositions about cost history. 
three of those propositions are presented below: 
english cost accountants contributed a large propo-1. 
sition of the original ideas and procedures before 
1900. After that date the American theorists and 
practitioners forged ahead of their British contem-
poraries, the latter never regaining their relative 
standing. 
the third element of cost (factory overhead) was 2. 
comparatively neglected in the period before 1900, 
3 Brief [1967, p. ix] considers ladell’s article as one of three “classic articles 
on the depreciation of a single machine.” the other two articles were published 
later by Hotelling, “A General Mathematical theory of Depreciation” (1925) and 
Anton, “Depreciation, Cost Allocation and investment Decision” (1956).
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but after that date more attention was devoted to it 
than to the other two elements of costs combined.
industrial engineers, rather than cost or general 3. 
accountants, took a more active interest in costing 
problems in the early development of the subject in 
this country. 
A summary of Hardcastle’s theories published in Business 
would indicate that American cost accountants also took an ac-
tive interest in costing theory, along with the industrial engineers 
of the late 1890s. if Garner had been aware of the accountants 
operating in the environment of the “community of the compe-
tent” in the iA, he may have modified his propositions. 
in the January 1898 issue of Business, Hardcastle started a 
series of comprehensive articles on cost accounting. Although he 
may not have originated many of the concepts, he refined and 
wrote of them in a lucid and comprehensible manner. in the first 
article in the series, he recognized that the cost of a manufac-
tured item consisted of the following [Hardcastle, 1898, p. 28]:
Generally speaking, the cost price of an object to the 
manufacturer will be: Cost of the raw material entering 
into the object, plus the cost of the labor expended on 
it, plus all other direct expenses furnished for it, plus 
its proportionate share of the general expenses, the 
proposition being fixed in accordance with reason and 
experience. 
He later defined general expenses as “all the expenditures 
rendered necessary by the wants of trading or a manufactur-
ing business, which can not be directly imputed to any special 
operation of the business, and consequently must be equitably 
distributed over the total operations of a business house as the 
operations arise, or over the goods manufactured in a workshop 
or factory” (p. 221). He also classified general costs into two cat-
egories – those which concern the production and those which 
concern their sale (pp. 221-222) – as well as into fixed and vari-
able, just as Metcalf had done 12 years earlier (p. 29):
those which cannot be modified during a business 1. 
term, i.e., between the making of two consecutive 
balance sheets, and which are considered fixed.
the variable general expenses, which may be at any 2. 
time modified to the advantages of the business. 
fixed general expenses would include rents, taxes, insurance, 
management’s salaries, depreciation, and subscriptions to 
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technical periodicals. Variable general expenses would include 
maintenance of fixed capital, commissions, gifts and presents, 
advertising, stationery, utilities, oils and lubricants, steel for 
tools, and wood for models. even though he was considering a 
manufacturing company, his variable general expenses did not 
distinguish manufacturing and selling components. 
Hardcastle then stated that the proportionate share of the 
general expenses must be estimated. He recommended the cost 
of the labor as preferable, since it is less fluctuating, for deter-
mining the base: 
Also if the total general expenses for the month are di-
vided by the total cost of the labor for the month, the 
quotient will give the amount of the general expenses 
for that month to go to each dollar of value of labor 
during that month. 
the problem of using actual costs in determining the quo-
tient, or the co-efficient as Hardcastle called it, was recognized 
in his article: 
it implies that we should have to wait till the end of 1. 
the month before we could obtain this quotient or 
co-efficient.
the irregularities in production will cause great 2. 
variations in the co-efficient and consequently in 
cost price.
the cost price of an article when business was slack 3. 
would be placed too high to allow a sale to be made, 
and our warehouse would be filled with like articles 
of different cost prices. 
Hardcastle used a general expense account that was credited for 
the amount applied to the jobs as calculated by the co-efficient 
used. this account would also be debited for all of the sundry 
and other overhead accounts, including depreciation. At the end 
of the month, the two sides would be compared to determine the 
differences (pp. 293-294):
this is carried on for the whole of the business term, 
and the difference of the two sides will give the excess 
or deficiency of the estimation of the general expenses 
for the year, which excess or deficiency at the end of the 
term is carried into the profit and loss account. 
the merchandise account was used as an account to represent 
finished goods and was debited with the direct materials, direct 
labor, and general expenses (p. 294). However, in an article 
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written three years earlier, Hardcastle (1895, p. 330, emphasis 
added] was more explicit in explaining finished goods and work-
in-process: 
we will assume that the finished goods are kept stored 
(Store Account), that semifinished goods are in the fac-
tory (Factory Account) and the raw materials in the 
warehouse (Warehouse Account). 
Hardcastle gave examples of cost procedures similar to 
those used today. for example, cost of materials would be trans-
ferred from the warehouse account to the factory account (work-
in-process) along with labor and other manufacturing costs, and 
cost of goods would be transferred to the store account (finished 
goods). His sales account would include both components of the 
selling price of the goods sold and the cost of goods sold trans-
ferred from the store account.
Hardcastle [1898, p. 222] was also ahead of his time in 
recognizing the importance of cost-volume-profit analysis. He 
showed great insight concerning the use of accounting informa-
tion, especially the impact of fixed and variable costs on profits: 
the great art of the manufacturer consists in increas-
ing his output without increasing his fixed and variable 
general expenses, in order to lower the co-efficient for 
the general expenses and to keep down the cost price of 
the goods he sells. this art is tributary to accounting, 
which favors or trammels its proprietor according as it 
is well or badly ordered. 
He was aware of the challenges a company faced in under-
standing overhead in order to compete effectively in the market-
place (p. 221): 
the volume of the general expenses forms no small part 
of the cost of merchandise, and they are the part more 
likely to escape the notice of the manufacturer than 
the prime costs. for this reason it is necessary to place 
them, in a classified form, constantly before the manu-
facturer, the classifications being made according to the 
requirements of the business, so as to guide the mer-
chant in the regulation of them, in order that he may 
produce at the least cost, and not be one to fall by the 
wayside in the competitive struggle for existence.…the 
general expense account, or, rather, its subaccounts, re-
quire the closest attention, because of their complexity. 
Hardcastle presented a comprehensive discussion with 
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examples of a manufacturer using process costing in the same 
series. He called it “continuous manufacturing of objects or of 
merchandise of the same nature.” the materials, expenditures 
for labor, and general expenses, by means of a coefficient, are 
entered into the journal, with the total of the three equaling the 
cost-price of the merchandise or objects produced (p. 434). He 
was also familiar with the problem of beginning and ending in-
ventory for a work-in-process problem:
in these kinds of work, it is necessary to keep an ac-
count of the materials remaining on hand when the 
work is brought to a rest, for the material remaining 
will, in the next term of operations, be utilized, hence 
the necessity of an adjustment, to show the quantity of 
material used and the quantity remaining. 
in addition, he discussed in elaborate detail the accounting for 
materials as they pass through various stages and steps. 
Garner was not alone in ignoring a great source of cost 
theory by not knowing about the articles published in The Of-
fice and later Business by some of the great accountants of the 
19th century. wells [1996, pp. 228-229] suggested that allocation 
procedures were common in all branches of engineering in the 
period from 1880 to 1910, but rare in accounting journals, and 
that the pioneers of cost accounting were not accountants but 
engineers in the U.s. He also stated that it was a common belief 
that many of the problems of allocating overhead costs were 
discussed in the literature from the early 20th century and that 
most of the participants were American engineers. Again, Hard-
castle most likely did not invent the theories and concepts he 
proposed. fleischman et al. [1991] also disproved that possibil-
ity by demonstrating the existence of effective cost accounting 
systems in practice during the early part of the industrial Revo-
lution. However, Hardcastle’s series of articles in Business on 
cost accounting, even though written much later, may be one of 
the more comprehensive and clear discussions on cost theories 
written in the 19th century U.s. 
Miscellaneous Topics: Hardcastle’s expertise included a strong 
history of accounting, a skill that is evident in his writings when 
he, on many occasions, mentions the origins of accounting 
terms and concepts [e.g., Hardcastle, 1882, pp. 336-338]. He also 
wrote a series of articles about the history of bookkeeping from 
the Roman age until the 19th century [Hardcastle, 1890] and 
gave a summary of the history of the iA [“institute of Accounts,” 
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1889, p. 74]. Hardcastle [1899, p. 299] segmented bookkeep-
ing into three periods: “the first, the period giving rise to single 
entry; the second, the period which gave rise to double entry; 
and the third, the modern period.” the last period also featured 
double-entry accounting, but it included all the new theory de-
veloped within Hardcastle’s lifetime. 
in a discussion at the iA’s meeting in 1883, the subject for 
discussion for the evening was the necessity of the daybook and 
journal as the only proper connecting links between a transac-
tion and the ledger entry. Hardcastle presented arguments in 
favor of “the voucher system. the only principal book here is 
the ledger. this is really an older system than the italian, but it 
had its birth before the world could use it, or before the world 
wanted it” [“the Day-Book and Journal,” 1883, p. 90].
in correspondence to the editor in The Office, Hardcastle 
[1886, p. 46] discussed the calculation of purchase discounts. 
in a subsequent letter to the editor, he displays his background 
as a teacher by simplifying the calculation in the following rule: 
“write the discounts as decimals, and subtract each one from 
unity. the product of the several remainders take from unity; 
then the result will give the compound discount expressed deci-
mally.” 
Hardcastle [1888, p. 15] wrote two parts of an article on 
prices and profits. After explaining the problems with estimating 
the value of stock too high or low, he suggests two rules for esti-
mating the value of stock on hand:
for merchandise for which there is a ready sale, and 
which is in good condition, the estimate may be taken 
as that price which it would cost us to replace it. Mer-
chandise here is placed as a representative of any cir-
culating capital – but if the account represents fixed 
capital, the values should be the value to the firm, as a 
running concern, such as plant fixtures.
for merchandise not in a good condition, out of fash-
ion, the value should be a break-down value, for this 
merchandise should be sold off at any price rather than 
be kept on hand, becoming less and less valuable, so as 
to deceive us in our financial showing. 
these two rules combined were a rudimentary predecessor of 
the lower-of-cost-or-market method developed in the 20th centu-
ry and incorporated into GAAP by Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 29, issued in 1947.
in 1895, Hardcastle [1895, p. 155] called attention to the 
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problems of misclassifying capital accounts, or economic ac-
counts as he called them:
some persons go so far as to call the balance of the 
positive economic accounts liabilities, but the more 
enlightened accountants are beginning to see the ab-
surdity of doing so, and make capital accounts distinct 
from the liability accounts. 
subsequently, after a discussion of the differences between 
english and American accounting, he listed various examples of 
“motions”; that is, rules reflecting why there are changes in ac-
counts (p. 196): 
the principal results of these motions may be stated thus:
we can increase assets at the expense of other as-1. 
sets.
we can increase assets by increasing our liabilities.2. 
we can increase assets and increase our economic 3. 
condition.
we can decrease assets by decreasing our liabilities.4. 
we can decrease assets by decreasing our economic 5. 
condition.
we can provide insurance to meet losses in assets. 6. 
this system of classifying accounts differs from the traditional 
one used by many American authors who still classified accounts 
as real, personal, and fictitious [Hatfield, 1908, pp. 67-69]. 
Hardcastle’s approach and analysis is similar to the proprietary 
theory developed and presented by sprague [1880, 1889] and 
developed more fully in sprague’s 1908 text [Previts and Merino, 
1998, p. 154]. An amusing aside note about “the Algebra of Ac-
counts” [sprague, 1880] is a letter from Hardcastle to sprague, 
published in The Office, correcting the phrase “by analogy” used 
for the terms debtor and creditor. in response to Hardcastle’s let-
ter, sprague pleaded amnesia to the use of the phrase [“institute 
of Accounts,” 1889, p. 74].
in 1895, Hardcastle [1895, p. 330] suggested two accounts – 
a merchandise account which is debited with the original cost of 
goods and credited with the “cost of goods sold on the basis of 
the cost contained on the debit side of the account” and a trad-
ing account containing elements of selling prices, cost of goods 
sold, and expenses. it was not until the early part of the 20th 
century that the literature suggested separating merchandise, 
sales, and cost of goods sold into individual accounts. Many 
texts and articles combined all three of these accounts into one, 
thereby mixing sales with costs. 
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some of the other topics in this series included the follow-
ing: classification of accounts (p. 34), marginal utility (p. 233), 
misleading balance sheets, and revenue statements (p. 441).
in May 1897, Hardcastle started a series on “logismor-
graphy” in the journal Business, a series which is based on an 
early theory of agency developed by Joseph Cerboni, the author 
of Theory and Practice of Accounts [Hardcastle, 1897b, p. 141, 
1897c, p. 203]: 
According to this theory, the persons concerned with a 
business form two general classes, those having to do 
with its management, and those outside the manage-
ment, but having business relations with the owner of 
the business.
the first class comprehends those in the management 
of the business. these are subdivided into three func-
tional classes, the proprietor class, simply called the 
proprietor, the administrator class, simply called the 
administrator, and the custodian class, simply called 
the custodian.
…all accounts can be contained in two collective ac-
counts, the one giving the equity of the proprietor from 
the proprietor’s point of view, and which is called the 
Proprietor’s Account; the other giving the Agencies’ Ac-
count, from the agencies’ point of view and that both 
these accounts are concerned with the whole of the 
subject matter – i.e., the substance of the business, and 
nothing besides. 
the basic premise of logismorgraphy involves dividing the vari-
ous accounts into groups, then sub-dividing them even more as 
needed. Hardcastle’s command of languages, in this case italian, 
is evident when he made a rebuttal to a logismorgraphy review 
in the Accountants’ Magazine (a scottish journal) in the Decem-
ber 1897 issue of Business. the Accountants’ Magazine called 
them “Mr. Hardcastle’s theories.” Hardcastle replied, “they are 
not my theories; they are Cerboni’s theories, a man who has 
done more than any other man of the age for accounting” [Hard-
castle, 1897d, p. 361]. He continued his rebuttal as follows:
logismorgraphy is not a mere variation of Double en-
try, but it is an extension of the ideas of accounting, and 
Cerboni, as another luca Da Borgo, is the presenter of 
it to the accounting world. i am afraid that our scottish 
friend knows nothing of the modern italians and their 
accounting works, otherwise he would bow with re-
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spect before them, and be ready to sit at the feet of their 
learned professor. 
shortly after these articles appeared, sprague also wrote a few 
articles on logismorgraphy in Accountics. He was not as optimis-
tic as Hardcastle; he felt that the logismorgraphic journals did 
not display the entries simply and clearly. However, he did pro-
pose that constructing the proprietor’s account differentially and 
the agency account integrally were the two most indispensable 
developments of the theory [sprague, 1898, pp. 73-75, 117-121]. 
this new italian method was an example of how much Hard-
castle and sprague advocated the development of accounting as 
a science. As McMillan [1998, p. 28] mentions, “the ideal of the 
science of accounts had become a sufficiently profound reality 
to these men that they looked for new methods which could re-
veal new principles that had previously remained hidden.”
Hardcastle’s theory on treasury stock was many years ahead 
of its implementation in practice. Vangermeersch [1996c, p. 586] 
suggests that both Bentley in 1911 and Montgomery favored the 
asset approach in treasury-stock accounting, while w.t. sunley, 
Jr. made a classic argument for the contra-equity viewpoint in 
1915. Hardcastle [1899, p. 242] had argued that treasury stock 
should be a negative to the capital account in 1899, years before 
sunley’s contra-equity argument: 
there is an account called treasury stock, which is often 
improperly considered as an asset, instead of a negative 
to the share capital account. it represents stock of the 
company, which the company either has not yet dis-
posed of, or which, for some reason, after having once 
been issued by the company, has again come into its 
hands. 
During the late 1890s, there was some disagreement about 
how organizational costs should be treated in the financial state-
ments, either as an asset or expensed in the period incurred. 
Hardcastle (p. 243) suggested that organization expenses (he 
called them preliminary expenses) be gradually written off. He 
did theorize that they did not belong with the assets and should 
be a contra (negative) capital account. 
Another topic of modern interest is Hardcastle’s determina-
tion of extraordinary profits and how they should be handled for 
partnerships. His treatment of extraordinary profits and losses 
was to separate them from ordinary profit-and-loss items and 
utilize a general reserve account (p. 111):
extraordinary profits and losses, i.e., such as do not 
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usually occur but are accidental in nature, shall as they 
arise be carried to the general reserve account. the re-
maining profit and loss should now be duly divided and 
carried into each partner’s profit and loss account. 
in the same article, Hardcastle determines that the book-
keeping of a partnership is the same as that of a sole proprietor, 
with the exception of the mutual relations of the partners at the 
beginning of the partnership, the balancing of the books at the 
end of the period, and the dissolution of the partnership. Hard-
castle [1901a, pp. 346-348, 386-388, 1901b, pp. 470-472] contin-
ued to write about partnership liquidation and depreciation in 
future articles.
Hardcastle wrote two Journal of Accountancy articles in 
1905, and others for Accountics and the New York Accountants 
and Bookkeepers’ Journal late in life. He was a prolific writer 
until his death in 1906. in addition to the numerous journal ar-
ticles, Hardcastle [1903] authored a book which was a compila-
tion of lectures presented for the aid of the students at NyU. the 
first chapter of the book integrates the personalistic theory-to-
trustee accounting [Hardcastle, 1903, pp. 6-9]. leon Hay [1961, 
p. 104] acknowledges Hardcastle, as do Gottsberger, loomis, 
and sprague, as setting “the pattern used by most authors down 
to the present time” in his discussion of executorship reporting. 
A book on “accountics” was purportedly in preparation at the 
time of his death. He died June 16, 1906, as a result of an ac-
cident when he was thrown to the ground by a horse and wagon 
in New york City [“obituary,” 1906, p. 232]. 
CoNClUsioN
Drawing from the functionalist perspective, Hardcastle 
enhanced the profession by developing and disseminating the 
accounting competencies and skills necessary for the emerging 
profession. As one of the leading proponents of the scientific ba-
sis for the development of accounting theory, he helped provide 
the intellectual and theoretical skills necessary. His codification 
of topics such as actuarial concepts, depreciation, and cost ac-
counting helped expand the accounting knowledge to the practi-
tioner and, thus, made accounting more efficient and effective. 
Hardcastle began his professional career in education, 
teaching for approximately 18 years in grammar and private 
schools. His second career, in accounting, lasted more than 40 
years. Hardcastle’s last six years combined both careers when 
he came back to education as a lecturer at theodore Koehler’s 
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school of Accounts and as professor of principles and practice of 
accounts at NyU. His writings demonstrate that his early career 
as a teacher and his background in mathematics enhanced his 
status as an accountant and educator. Many of his early articles 
were on building associations and time value matters related 
to real estate. Many, if not most, of the topics Hardcastle wrote 
about were practiced, discussed, or written about previously. 
However, few accountants had Hardcastle’s gift of disseminat-
ing accounting information to the emerging profession in such 
a succinct, clear, and logical manner. He may have begun his 
career in teaching, but the teaching never left his career.
Because Hardcastle was aware of the accounting theory be-
ing developed in Britain, he could utilize and expand on theories 
developed there without deferring to the Company Acts to preju-
dice his writings based on the law. He also had an advantage 
over British accountants by being a prominent member of the 
iA and basing his theories on scientific reasoning in an unregu-
lated environment. During the 1880s and 1890s, at the end of 
each lecture given to the iA, a discussion of the subject followed 
with accountants like Hardcastle, sprague, Harney, Kittredge, 
and Packard participating, allowing the presenter to answer the 
questions. 
in using the functionalist approach to explain professional-
ism and the contributions of Hardcastle, accounting profession-
als are viewed as honored servants of the public. Professionals 
meet the needs of society because of the skills and attributes 
they contribute to the assimilation and smooth operation of so-
ciety. it was in this environment, the “community of the compe-
tent,” that the accounting profession in the U.s. worked toward 
jurisdictional legitimacy by developing accounting as a science. 
Because fields of professionalization constantly change over 
time [larson, 1977; Abbott, 1988], skills solidly supported by 
knowledge became necessary in the rapidly changing economy 
of the late 19th century. the accounting profession continued to 
define and delineate its area of expertise into a body of theory 
with the help of Hardcastle. He continued to develop this “sci-
ence of accounts” through his later years as he wrote monthly 
articles for Business, and later Business World, on a wide variety 
of accounting topics. 
even though Hardcastle wrote prolifically in accounting for 
almost a quarter of a century, he is relatively unknown today.4 
4 this statement is probably true for most 19th century accountants in the 
U.s. with the exception of sprague and Haskins.
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if it were not for his having the highest score on the first CPA 
exam, he would rarely be acknowledged in the literature. there 
are a few reasons for this. first, many early accounting authors 
took great liberties in borrowing ideas from each other. Many 
articles written in the 19th and early 20th centuries did not cite 
any sources, even though different authors such as Hardcastle 
may have covered the topic previously. second, Hardcastle was 
not as politically involved as were many of his more well-known 
peers. other than serving as chief examiner of the institute 
and chairman of the institute’s Committee on lectures, his 
political involvement in accounting was minimal. However, it 
is interesting that, recently, accounting historians have started 
to recognize the contributions of 19th century accountants who 
were members of the iA and who flourished in the environment 
that McMillan [1999, pp. 25-26] called the “community of the 
competent.” their contributions to the “science of accounts” 
are well documented [see Miranti, 1990; McMillan, 1998a, b, 
1999;  Romeo and Kyj, 1998]. Many of the journals in which 
Hardcastle wrote had a life of only a few years or are not read-
ily accessible to accounting historians. Until recently, many of 
these journals have been almost totally ignored by those writing 
the history of U.s. accounting. Most of the articles in these early 
journals are not even listed in the first Accountants’ Index, pub-
lished in 1921. 
However, Hardcastle did not go without recognition from 
his peers during his lifetime. A year before he died, NyU con-
ferred upon him the honorary degree of Master of letters and 
made him an honorary alumnus [“Joseph Hardcastle,” 1906, p. 
53]. the citation used to confer upon Hardcastle this degree in 
1905 reads as follows [Jones, 1941]:
for the degree of Master of letters:
JosePH HARDCAstle, of the city of New york, Pro-
fessor of the Principles and Practice of Accounts in the 
school of Commerce, Accounts and finance of New 
york University.
Born and educated in england. Removing to America, 
he served as Assistant Principal in Grammar school 38. 
for forty years an honored expert accountant in this 
city, at the age of seventy, he was the first to receive the 
degree of  Certified Public Accountant from the Regents 
of the state of New york. He has taken a prominent part 
in the elevation of accountancy to the rank of a profes-
sion. for many years a contributor to the periodcals of 
his profession and writer of text books recognized as 
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authoritative in their field. teacher, author, and leader 
in his profession, he is recommended for the honorary 
degree of Master of letters. 
Hardcastle, a regular contributor to various early account-
ing journals in the U.s., became one of the foremost and re-
spected authorities on subjects connected with the mathematics 
of finance and other general topics in accounting. some of his 
writings on leases, bonds, depreciation, and cost accounting 
are very similar to today’s theory with little modification. As a 
teacher, author, and leader, he figured prominently in the eleva-
tion of accountancy to the rank of a profession. He and sprague 
may have been America’s premiere 19th century theorists who 
developed and disseminated accounting practice and procedures 
to the practitioners to help the profession meet the demands of 
emerging markets. 
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appendiX 1
timeline of Joseph hardcastle’s life
1827  Born April 22, in skipton in Craven, yorkshire, england
1840-1844 Attended free Grammar school 
1844-1847 Attended york and Ripon Diocesan training school on scholar-
ship
1847-1850 Appointed instructor at york and Ripon Diocesan training 
school
1850-1854  opened a private school at Peterhead, scotland
1854-1855  Moved to leith in scotland
1855-1858 Principal and superintendent of schools at Belize, British Hon-
duras
1858-1864 Moved to Ny and within one month’s time received a principal’s 
certificate. taught as the first assistant in Grammar school No. 
38 for six years. Had under his charge two sons of Peter Gilsey.
1864-1906 Accountant for Gilsey estate and family
1882 Charter member of the institute of Accounts
1896 Passed all four sections of the first CPA exam
1900-1901  lecturer at theodore Koehler’s Ny school of Accounts 
1901-1906 Professor at NyU school of Commerce, Accounts and finance
1905 Received honorary degree of Master of letters, NyU
1906 Died June 16 as a result of an accident with a wagon on June 8, 
1906.
source: Committee on History [1951]
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appendiX 2
sample of texts Written in the 19th and early part of the 
20th Century and their Comments on depreciation
Date   title   Author(s) Comments
1909 Modern Illustrative  Neal, e. Virgil and no mention of
 Bookkeeping Cragin, C.t.  depreciation
1908 the Philosophy of Accounts sprague, Charles e.  see text
1899 Bookkeeping: Large  Hoffmann, John V. no mention of
 Business Houses  depreciation
1899 Commercial and Industrial Rowe, H.M. no mention of 
 Bookkeeping  depreciation
1898 The Cleveland Accountant Crawford, J.M.  no mention of
   depreciation
1897 The Self-Proving Accounting Kittredge, A.o. and  see text
 System Brown, J.f.
1897 Teacher’s Guide to the  wells, Charles, R. no mention of
 Practice System of Business  depreciation
 Training and Bookkeeping
1897 Office Routine and  schwartz, George w. no mention of 
 Bookkeeping: A Method of   depreciation
 Teaching the Science of 
 Accounts 
1890 Exercises in Book-Keeping Peirce, thomas no mention of
   depreciation
1888 Theoretical and Practical williams, louis l. no mention of
 Book-Keeping and Rogers,  depreciation
  fernando e.
1887 Smithdeal Practical Business  smithdeal, G.M.  no mention of
 Colleges  depreciation
1885 Nelson’s New Bookkeeping Nelson, Richard no mention of
   depreciation
1885 Allen’s Forty Lessons in Allen, George no mention of 
 Practical Double Entry   depreciation
 Book Keeping 
1884  The Eclectic Complete Mayhew, ira no mention of
 Book-Keeping  depreciation
1884 Manual of the Elements Royall, John P. no mention of
 Book-Keeping  depreciation
1882 Meservey’s Book-Keeping Meservey, A.B. no mention of
   depreciation
1878 The New Bryant & Stratton Packard, s.s. and uses the terms
 Counting-House Book- Bryant, H.B. depreciation 
 Keeping  to represent a 
   reduction of
   value.
1868 Theoretical Training in  Packard, s.s.  no mention of
 the Science of Accounts  depreciation
188
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/9
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2008180
189
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2008, Vol. 35, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2008
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 35, No. 2
December 2008
pp. 181-208
Alisdair Dobie
UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF SCOTLAND
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BURSARS’ 
ACCOUNTS AT DURHAM CATHEDRAL 
PRIORY, 1278-1398
Abstract: This paper is based upon an examination of a selection of 
the bursars’ accounts from Durham Cathedral Priory covering the 
period from the first extant account (1278-9) to the end of the 14th 
century. The accounts selected have been transcribed from the origi-
nal documents and translated from Latin into English. A traditional 
focus of accounting historians in the medieval period has been on 
manorial accounting and the system of charge and discharge. This 
paper examines a series of non-manorial accounts and a variety of 
supporting accounting materials, analyzing them for evidence of the 
development and refinement of controls. After an introduction which 
reviews the background of the accounts and the extent to which 
they have been utilized for historical research, this paper describes 
the various sources of receipts and types of expenditure which are 
revealed. The format of the accounts is traced, and a review of total 
receipts and expenditure is conducted to gain an understanding of the 
overall financial position of the bursar’s office. Next, the accounts are 
considered within the context of other accounting records to explore 
the financial controls in place. Finally, areas for further investigation 
and analysis are identified. The accounts selected reveal that actual 
receipts and actual expenditure were kept closely in tandem, and that 
an extensive network of other accounting material and documents 
allowing a system of cross-checks enabled auditors to ascertain the 
veracity and accuracy of the accounts.
INTRODUCTION
The bursars’ accounts at Durham Cathedral Priory surviv-
ing from the period 1278 (the earliest surviving complete roll)1 
to 1400 number in excess of 250 separate items, including some 
items which exist in duplicate and others that might be called
subsidiary accounts and schedules. The bursars’ formal accounts 
1 Fragments dating back to c. 1240 have been found [Piper, 1992, pp. 36-39].
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to the Chapter of Durham Ca-
thedral for access to Durham Cathedral Muniments, and wishes to thank Dr. B. 
Dodds, Mr. A. Piper, and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable com-
ments and suggestions.
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of the receipts and expenses of their office for this period cover 
some 85 years. These accounts and schedules vary enormously 
in size. Among the smaller items is an indenture issued in the 
year 1351-1352 witnessing the receipt of £10.5s. by the bursar 
from the proctor of Norham (Illustration 1) that measures 
barely four inches by six inches. The account-roll of 1379-1380 
would count among the larger items, being 11.5 inches wide 
and over 21 feet in length. Extracts from these rolls, edited by 
Fowler, were published between 1898 and 1901. However his se-
lection was influenced by his interest in building work, and the 
extracts have been criticized as unreliable in detail [Lomas and 
Piper, 1989, p. 7], of little use for economic or statistical pur-
poses [Knowles, 1955, p. 315], and confusing rather than clarify-
ing Durham Cathedral Priory’s financial organization [Dobson, 
1973, p. 251].
The accounts are written on parchment with legibility and 
completeness varying extensively between accounts. Legibility 
may be affected by the faintness of the ink or by damage due 
to damp and other causes. Even by the 1430s, it was noted that 
many of the records “consumpti sunt, partim per pluviam, partim 
per ratones et mures” (have been destroyed, partly by rain, partly 
by rats and mice) [Dobson, 1973, p. 3]. These factors have had 
an impact on the selection of records for review and transcrip-
tion. The accounts for 13 individual years have been examined 
along with supporting schedules. This sample cannot claim to 
be scientifically selected; the incidence of survival prevented the 
selection of an account on a regular basis every ten years. In-
complete rolls or those whose legibility were more problematic 
were passed over in favor of those more immediately decipher-
able. The objective was to examine an account-roll not too far 
removed from each of the decade ends between 1280 and 1400. 
Although at the start of this period the selection is not so evenly 
spaced, from 1310 onwards the accounts selected are approxi-
mately ten years apart. A list of the accounts selected may be 
seen in Table 1. Additionally, a number of further accounts for 
consecutive years were examined in the expectation of gaining 
information on the treatment of balances carried forward from 
one period to the next. 
The accounts are written in Latin and all monetary amounts 
are expressed in pounds, shillings, and pence (abbreviated as £., 
s., and d.). The Latin terms for these are libri, solidi, and denarii, 
and for halfpenny and farthing (one quarter of a penny) obolus 
and quarterius. One pound comprised 20 shillings and one shil-
ling comprised 12 pence. 
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The bursar of Durham Cathedral Priory was one of a num-
ber of officials and obedientiaries of the house to whom was 
entrusted the overseeing or administration of a particular sec-
tion of the priory’s activities. Thus, the chamberlain was respon-
sible for clothing the monks, and the sacristan for caring for 
ILLUSTRATION 1
An Indenture from 1351-52
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the altar vessels and supervising matters such as lighting within 
the church. Customarily in Benedictine houses, the officials or 
obedientiaries controlled certain streams of income sufficient 
to enable them to perform their role [Knowles, 1969, p. 109]. 
The details of such allocations are still available for a number of 
houses such as Abingdon Abbey [Moorman, 1945, p. 281] and 
Bury St. Edmunds [Snape, 1926, pp. 24-26]. At the conclusion of 
each period in office, each obedientiary was required to provide 
a written account or compotus detailing all monies received and 
expenses incurred. At Durham, accounting material survives 
from the offices of the bursar, terrar, cellarer, almoner, chamber-
lain, communar, feretrar, hostillar, infirmarer, and sacrist, as well 
as accounts from the manors owned by the priory; accounts for 
livestock and mines; accounts from proctors responsible for the 
administration of the priory’s possessions lying further away in 
Scotland, Northumberland, and Yorkshire; and, finally, accounts 
from the cells or dependencies of Durham Cathedral Priory, 
such as the priories of Coldingham and Finchale.2 
The bursar is described in the Rites of Durham, written in 
1593, as controlling all the receipts and expenses of the house 
[Fowler, 1903, p. 99]. However, based on a review of the finan-
cial records, Dobson [1973, pp. 257-260] disputes this, although 
agreeing that the bursar did control over two-thirds of the total 
throughout the period between 1300 and the Dissolution. He 
also quotes the practice of the priors, when required to produce 
the overall accounts of the house, in delivering the bursar’s 
roll alone. A more precise ratio will require future analysis of 
the other remaining accounting records of Durham Cathedral 
Priory.
The account-rolls of Durham Cathedral Priory provide a 
rich source of information for the 13th through the 16th centu-
ries, and have provided an important foundation for a number 
of studies. The majority of these studies either concerned single 
issues or related to the period after 1400. Halcrow [1949] con-
centrated on the administration and agrarian policy of the man-
ors of Durham Cathedral Priory. Dobson [1973] concentrated on 
the priorate of John Wessington (1416-1446) and the first half of 
the 15th century. More recently, Cambridge [1992] has focused 
on the building works of Durham Cathedral Priory between 
2 I am indebted to Mr Alan Piper for the use of the handlist which he has 
compiled listing the medieval accounting material found in the muniments of the 
Chapter of Durham Cathedral. Most of the information contained in this handlist 
is available at http://flambard.dur.ac:6336/dynaweb/handlist/ddc/dcdmaccs/.
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1339 and 1539; Dodds [2002] has focused on tithe and agrarian 
output between 1350 and 1450; and Threlfall-Holmes [2005] has 
used the accounts for an analysis of the purchasing strategies of 
the priory between 1460 and 1520. Elsewhere, detailed studies 
which draw upon surviving accounts to investigate monastic 
economy and administration include those on Bolton Priory 
[Kershaw, 1973], Canterbury Cathedral Priory [Smith, 1943], 
Norwich Cathedral Priory [Saunders, 1930], Westminster Abbey 
[Harvey, 1977, 2002], and St. Swithun’s Priory at Winchester 
[Kitchin, 1892]. Additionally, accounts have been transcribed 
and published from Worcester Priory [Wilson and Gordon, 1908; 
Hamilton, 1910]. A more general survey of English monastic 
finance was undertaken by Snape in 1926, and, more recently, 
Knowles [1940, 1948, 1955] included an analysis of monastic 
administration, management, and finance in his histories of the 
monastic and religious orders in England.
From accounting historians, the output has been less 
prolific. As Jack [1966, p. 137] observed, medieval accounting 
has tended to be overlooked except in so far as the origins and 
early development of the double-entry system may be traced. 
Chatfield [1977, pp. 19-31], in his chapter on medieval account 
keeping, described both government and manorial accounting 
and the importance of the agency relationship. Harvey [1999] 
has analyzed the forms of written manorial accounts and identi-
fied three broad phases in the development of written manorial 
accounts (see below). Concepts of profit have been explored by 
Stone [1962] and Postles [1994], and arrears and the excessus 
balance have been examined by Postles [1981] and Noke [1994]. 
These studies have been overwhelmingly concerned with mano-
rial accounts. This paper, in contrast, is based upon a series of 
bursars’ accounts and related documentation.
SOURCES OF RECEIPTS AND TYPES OF EXPENDITURE
The various sources of receipts and types of expenditure are 
described to demonstrate the number and variety of transactions 
which required monitoring and recording. The major sources of 
receipts can be seen in Table 1. They may be classified into four 
types: rents, labor, and customary dues from tenants living on 
lands owned by the priory; tithes due from appropriated par-
ishes; various other receipts; and, finally, borrowings.
The rents from lands, mills, and fisheries due to the priory 
from its estates appear to have fallen due twice a year at Pente-
cost and Martinmas, although a rent was not considered over-
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due until the subsequent due date had arrived [Lomas and Piper, 
1989, p. 11]. Pentecost is a moveable feast which falls seven 
weeks after Easter. Martinmas falls on November 11. Other re-
ceipts, such as wodladpennies, due at Pentecost and presumed 
to be in lieu of labor in the woods or loading or providing wood, 
arose on only one of the due dates [Fowler, 1900, p. 988; Lomas 
and Piper, 1989, p. 221]. With the exception of the years 1278-
1279 and 1329-1330, the total due at Pentecost and Martinmas 
seems to have remained within a consistent band of £300 to 
£350.
However, tithe income, as might be expected, was more vol-
atile. In each parish a tithe or tenth of all production was pay-
able to the parish priest.3 Durham Cathedral Priory controlled a 
number of parishes and was entitled to their tithes, which were 
payable in kind, and the bursars’ accounts reflect either the sale 
of the produce received or the sale of the right to receive the 
produce. Tithes infra aquas arose from the area between the 
Tyne and the Tees; those from further away were labeled extra 
aquas. The volatility of tithe income in the accounts reflects not 
only the fluctuations in harvests, but also decisions as to how 
much to sell and how much to consume.
Varie recepte (various receipts) included receipts from more 
distant lands administered by a proctor, such as those in Scot-
land and Norham; profits from the halmote and free courts; 
and sales of wool, corn, livestock, and wood. Again, varie recepte 
comprised a volatile source of receipts, a volatility which reflect-
ed decisions such as whether stock should be held or sold and 
the prevailing market prices. Operaciones and bondagia made 
their appearance in the accounts under their own headings as 
customary labor dues commuted for money payments.
Mutuaciones (borrowings) appear regularly throughout the 
accounts, again showing great volatility from year to year, as do 
premanibus (payments received in advance). Both on occasion 
form a significant proportion of receipts for the year. The ac-
counts identify the source of the loan by the name or position of 
the lender but provide little other information as to the term and 
conditions of the loan. Some loans were raised internally from 
the prior and other officials of the house; others came from ex-
ternal sources such as those from the dean of York in 1292-1293 
or from the wool merchant Thomas del Holme in 1329-1330.
3 Moorman [1945, pp.115-116] provides an outline of the origins of the system 
of tithing and of its rigorous enforcement.
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The types of expenditure incurred by the bursar’s office 
are summarized in Table 2. Garderoba (wardrobe) included 
expenditure on clothing for the monks’ retainers and servants, 
and spices and delicacies for the refectory table. Purchases of 
livestock were listed by category: horses, cattle, pigs, lambs, and 
sheep. Purchases of grain included wheat, malt, ale, oats, peas, 
and beans. Marescalia comprised horse-related expenditure. Ex-
pense necessarie (necessary expenses) could include parchment, 
slippers, boots, locks, barrels, and serving vessels among other 
items; and minute expense (small expenses) included smaller 
amounts for items such as the carrying of letters. Contribuciones 
(contributions) reflected the demands of royal and papal taxa-
tion. Tithe expenses recorded the costs of collecting, transport-
ing, and storing tithes. Condonaciones represented the waiving 
of amounts due to the priory from its tenants. Tallies typically 
comprised payments to the cellarer for the purchase of provi-
sions for the sustenance of the brethren, and to the servientes 
(officers who supervised the manors on behalf of the priory) for 
the payments necessary in the day to day administration of the 
manors.
The categories of receipts and expense outlined above nei-
ther constitute an exhaustive list nor do they appear in every 
account-roll. On occasion, the headings change, but the variety 
illustrates the complexity and number of cash transactions en-
tailed in the administration of Durham Cathedral Priory.
THE FORMAT OF THE ACCOUNTS
Harvey [1999, pp. 25-40] has analyzed the forms of written 
manorial accounts and identified three broad phases in the de-
velopment of written manorial accounts: an early phase (c.1200 
-c.1270) with diverse forms; a second period (c.1270-c.1380) 
that featured great standardization and detail; and a final phase 
(c.1380-c.1530) in which the accounts are less detailed. This 
next section analyzes the form of the bursars’ accounts at Dur-
ham Cathedral Priory, examining the titles given at the head of 
the accounts, the order of items within, and the use of headings 
and totals.
The title of an account could be written in a plain hand or 
elaborately on occasion. Illustrations 2 and 3 provide examples 
from the rolls of 1278-1279 and 1390-1391. The first existing 
account of 1278-1279 is headed “Compotus W. de Norton a die 
Sancti Wilfridi in Hyeme anno gracie mcclxx octavi usque in 
diem Sanctorum Processi et Martiniani” (The account of Walter 
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ILLUSTRATION 2
The Head of the Account-Roll of 1278-79
of Norton from St Wilfred’s day in winter in the year of grace 
1278 to the day of Saints Processus and Martinianus).4 The next 
extant account lacks the start date of the account: “Compotus 
fratris R. de Mordon Bursarii Dunelmensis die lune proxima post 
festum beati michaelis archangeli anno gracie mcc nonagesimo 
tercio” (The account of Ralph of Mordon on the Monday next 
after the feast of the blessed Archangel Michael in the year of 
grace 1293), but it does specify that the person in whose name 
the account is prepared holds the office of bursar of Durham. 
This indicates a desire to aid those reviewing accounts to be 
certain as to what they were seeing, and to enable them to find 
the correct account more quickly. In later years, it is usual for 
both the start and end dates of the account to be given. The roll 
of 1310-1311 is entitled “Compotus domini Thome de Hesswell 
bursarii a domenica proxima post festum sancti michelis anno 
domini millesimo cccx usque ad festum santi martini anno 
domini millesimo cccxi pro annum integrum et vi septimanas” 
4 The Latin of the accounts is often in abbreviated form. In quotations from 
the account-rolls, apart from cash items where li, s, d, ob, and q have been re-
tained, the Latin has been extended.
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(The account of Dominus Thomas of Haswell, bursar, from the 
Sunday next after the feast of St. Michael in the year of our lord 
1310 until the feast of St. Martin in the year of our lord 1311, for 
a full year and six weeks). Thus, it is clearly explained that this 
ILLUSTRATION 3
The Head of the Account-Roll of 1390-91
account runs from October 4, 1310 to November 11, 1311 for a 
period in excess of a year.
The period covered by each account is typically for a full 
year, but if the office–holder changed during the year, an ac-
count was prepared up to the date of departure. This illustrates 
the personal nature of the office and of the associated account-
ability, in keeping with traditional charge and discharge state-
ments. The office itself was not required to prepare accounts 
for a certain period on a certain date. For example, it seems 
that on January 9, 1317, only nine weeks after an account 
was rendered for the year to November 11, 1316, Alexander of 
Lamesley submitted another set of accounts for the nine weeks, 
having been replaced in office by John of Harmby who then 
presented a set of accounts covering the period January 9, 1317 
to January 8, 1318. Account-rolls with a year-end of Martinmas 
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(November 11) are found regularly until 1360. Thereafter, Pente-
cost was common until 1374, Michaelamas (September 29) until 
1388, and Pentecost again until 1398. The period covered by an 
account-roll often tends to reflect the date on which a bursar as-
sumed office rather than a consistently imposed date.
Within the accounts can be discerned a gradual formaliza-
tion. The first account of 1278-1279 commences with a list of 
individual expenses not grouped by category and not arranged 
in any apparent order. Foodstuffs, clothing materials, cash pay-
ments, travel expenses, livestock purchases are all itemized in a 
seemingly random order with an occasional sub-total. However, 
after approximately 130 entries, a heading expense prioris extra 
(expenses of the prior outwith the priory) does appear. Beneath 
this heading are listed the expenses incurred as he visited the 
priory manors, followed by a sub-total labeled summa coquina 
extra (total of external kitchen expenses). The account-roll con-
tinues with purchases of wine and fuel; some payments pro pace 
facta (for making peace, or settling a dispute); single entries for 
the payments of pensions and stipends at Martinmas and at 
Pentecost; and ends with expense per tallias de maneriis et aliis 
(expenses by tally to the manors and others). The expenses sec-
tion concludes with summa totalis expense (sum of all expense). 
Receipts are then considered in a section which is much shorter 
than the expenses section and comprises only some 34 lines. 
This starts with In bursa (in the purse, i.e., cash left over from 
the account of the previous year), followed by a list of receipts 
some of which are evidently summarized totals and others in-
dividual amounts. The first receipt, recepte per magnum cirogra-
phum (receipts from the great chirograph5), relates to receipts 
of arrears. Unfortunately, the great chirograph has not survived, 
but it appears to have been a document upon which were re-
corded all arrears due to the priory. This is followed by recepte 
de rotulo sancti martini and recepte de rotulo Pentecosti (receipts 
from the rent-rolls of Martinmas and Pentecost). From the proc-
tors of the estates in Northumberland and Scotland are received 
amounts with and amounts without a supporting chirograph. 
Then a total of receipts is given, followed by et sic remanent in 
bursa (and so there remains in the purse). Within the account, 
expenses have been totaled, cash held at the start of the account 
has been added to receipts for the period, and from this the total 
expenses have been subtracted to arrive at a cash total carried 
forward. These references to amounts held in the purse are not 
5 A chirograph is a formal handwritten document. 
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present in subsequent accounts.
The second extant account is from 1292-1293, has a grander 
and more florid title, and is more clearly ordered and makes 
much greater use of headings. The account deals first with 
receipts and then with expenses, a pattern repeated in all the 
subsequent accounts surveyed.
The roll begins by listing all the arrears and debts due to 
the house at the start of the period for which the bursar has re-
sponsibility for collecting. That these sums refer to all amounts 
due rather than to cash sums actually received is indicated by 
two factors. First the phrase, “Idem reddit compotum de dccxlvi 
li iiiis viid ob de omnibus contentibus in cyrograffo usque in 
diem Sancti Martini anno domini mcc nonagesimo secundo” 
(The same person, i.e., the bursar Ralph of Mordon, renders ac-
count for £746.4s.7½d. for all the contents of the chirograph 
up to Martinmas in the year of the lord 1292), relates not just to 
amounts received but for everything owed to the bursar’s office. 
Second, at the close of the account when total expenses have 
been deducted from total receipts, which in the absence of other 
adjustments would leave a cash balance to be displayed and 
counted at the audit, a series of deductions are made including 
“£1,577.9s.3d. remaining on the great chirograph.” This indi-
cates that this amount was outstanding in the form of arrears 
at the end of the account, probably including some or all of the 
arrears due at the start of the account augmented by further ar-
rears which had occurred during the year just past. The amount 
of arrears actually received is not shown directly as a receipt 
within the account. In fact, it is not possible to determine what 
proportion of the receipts relates to current year dues and how 
much to arrears. An indication as to whether the bursar’s office 
was experiencing improvements or deteriorations in its credit 
control can be calculated by comparing the opening arrears 
balance due shown at the start of the account with the closing 
amount. An increasing balance showed a deterioration and a 
decreasing balance the converse. In the year 1292-1293, the net 
increase in arrears was some £811 which represented 34% of 
total new receipts due to be received in that year.
After arrears come the rents due at Martinmas and at Pente-
cost, tithes, receipts from the sale of wool and from the various 
courts held by the priory, and a number of loans. The receipts 
section ends with a grand total of all receipts. 
Expenses at first sight appear less well ordered and labeled; 
only one heading Tallie is given. However, many of the entries 
appear as account headings in later rolls and, in fact, what is 
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shown here is an abbreviated set of expenses showing only the 
sub-totals of particular expense categories. Thus, we have en-
tries for garderoba, horses, cattle, and traveling expenses, all of 
which appear regularly as subheadings in later accounts. There 
follow two sections disclosed and sub-totaled separately – the 
payments by tally to the cellarer, granator, and manor officials 
and the payment of debts of the preceding account.
The concluding section again subtracts total expenses 
from total receipts to state: “Et sic excedunt recepte expensas 
in mdiiiixxxvi li xis xid” (and so receipts exceed expenses by 
£1,596.11s.11d.). In the absence of further adjustments, this 
figure would have been the increase in cash which the bursar 
ought to have been able to demonstrate at the audit. However, 
the following phrase is found: “De quibus se exonerat de” (from 
which he, the bursar, excuses himself from). Typically, he ex-
cuses himself “de mdlvii li ixs iiid remanent in magno cyrograffo” 
(from £1,557.9s.3d. remaining on the great chirograph, the roll 
on which all arrears were recorded). Once all exoneraciones 
have been deducted (these totaled £1,587.8s.3½d.), the bur-
sar is said to owe £9.3s.7½d., of which he could produce only 
4s.10d. remaining in his purse, so he debet de claro (owes clear) 
£8.18s.9½d., which amount was condonantur (forgiven).
The accounts that followed tended to conform to the overall 
layout described above, with the occasional addition or removal 
of new or defunct categories of receipt or expense. The use of 
tighter definitions in the title – the name of the office-bearer, 
his office, and the period of account including the start and end 
dates and the length of the period – all illustrate a concern for 
greater precision. The use of standardized headings, in a con-
sistent order, for specific categories of receipts and expenditure 
combined with the provision of sub-totals for each heading, and 
the adoption of a consistent form of balancing off at the end of 
the account, rendered the accounts more readily comparable 
from year to year. It also enabled a reviewer to identify more 
quickly unusual fluctuations and to appreciate more readily the 
net surplus or deficit position for the year. In this respect, the 
bursars’ accounts of Durham Cathedral Priory mirror some of 
the changes observed by Harvey in manorial accounts in that di-
verse forms were superseded by a standardized format, a change 
also reported by Saunders [1930, p. 152] at Norwich  Cathedral 
Priory. A detailed comparison of accounting at Durham with 
that done at other houses would shed light on the extent to 
which monastic houses adopted similar forms or alternatively 
pursued their own individual standardized models.
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THE FINANCIAL POSITION
Table 1 gives an indication of the amount of receipts which 
the bursar was charged with receiving. That amount was always 
in excess of £1,000 and at its highest in 1310-1311 reached 
£6,160. Total expenses (Table 2) were somewhat less volatile, 
ranging from just under £1,000 in 1349-1350 to £2,610 in 1310-
1311. A simple comparison of the two amounts gives a surplus 
for each year as illustrated in Table 3 (line 3). The surplus aver-
ages £1,302, 45% of average receipts of £2,879, which would 
appear to show an extremely healthy financial position with a 
steady accumulation of cash.
However, if the arrears which the bursar did not receive in 
the year of the account are subtracted from total receipts due, a 
much lower level of actual receipts is indicated (Table 3, line 5). 
After expenditure is deducted from actual receipts, the revised 
surplus (Table 3, line 7) is well nigh eradicated, falling to an 
average of £23 or 1% of the revised receipts figure. Indeed, in 
six of the 13 years examined, receipts and expenditure are so 
finely matched that the surplus is £4 or less (0.25% of average 
receipts). The need to adjust for arrears has not always been ap-
preciated. For example McKisack [1959, p. 305] quotes annual 
receipts of over £3,000 in the Durham bursar’s rolls for 1293, 
1295, and 1297, without deducting the large sums of arrears due 
from debtors which were carried forward from year to year and 
included each year within the total receipts figure.
One year (1389-1390) actually reveals a deficit, which also 
raises the question of how the bursar expended money which he 
had not received. Goods bought on credit were often reflected 
within receipts as mutuaciones as well as in the relevant expense 
category. This deficit may reflect an error in the accounts or a 
source of cash undisclosed in the accounts. The account itself 
notes “Et sic superexpendit” (and so he, the bursar, overspent), 
but no explanation is offered of how this has occurred. It must 
be assumed that the accounts contain an error or omission, or 
that the bursar had access to another source of funds, or that 
some items listed as expenses had not actually been paid, an oc-
currence noted elsewhere in manorial accounts [Postles, 1981; 
Noke, 1994].
Why do actual receipts and expenditure appear to be so 
closely matched? Alternative possible explanations for this are 
that either receipts were tailored to expenditure and adjusted 
to match expenditure needs or that expenditure was tailored to 
the receipts available to be spent. To advance this question, the 
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fixed and variable elements of receipts and expenditure need to 
be considered. Receipts comprised many fixed elements – cus-
tomary dues and rents, although increments were possible in 
the latter, and labor dues that could be commuted for a money 
payment. Tithes depended upon the quantity and quality of 
the harvest, although again the rights to tithes for a defined 
period could be sold for a fixed sum. Variable elements, which 
the bursar could control to a certain extent, included the raising 
of loans and the sale of the produce of the lands of the priory. 
The sale of tithes and the produce of the priory estates could 
also be sold premanibus (in advance) should cash be needed ur-
gently. On the expenditure side, a certain minimum sum would 
be needed for the running of the house and the sustenance 
of its members, although this could perhaps be reduced by a 
concerted effort by the priory to live off its own produce. Invest-
ment in land improvement, new stock, and building work could 
be halted or deferred if necessary. The repayment of debts would 
reflect the terms of the agreement with the lender.
Over the period 1278-1398, there is considerable volatility 
around the average revised receipts (£1,600) and expenditure 
(£1,577) levels seen in the accounts selected. The range varies 
from £1,002 (1349-1359) to £2,614 (1310-1311) for receipts and 
from £927 to £2,610 for expenses with the low and high points 
occurring in the same years as those for receipts. The raising 
of debt and its repayment may throw some light on whether re-
ceipts or expenditure were the predominant force in any one ac-
count, the assumption being that increased borrowings and the 
receipt of income in advance might be necessitated by higher 
levels of expenditure. Alternatively, higher levels of unassigned 
receipts might enable the repayment of debt. For example, in 
1329-1330, the borrowing of £351 and the receipt in advance 
of £342 might suggest that the raising of finance was necessary 
to meet expenditure commitments. Alternatively, the accounts 
of 1310-1311, which show a net debt repayment of £536, might 
indicate that surplus receipts were being used to free the house 
from debt. It may well be that the alternative scenarios sug-
gested occurred in different years as the fortunes of the priory 
fluctuated.
Loans appear to have been used for short-term as well 
as longer-term funding. In the accounts of 1330-1331, for ex-
ample, can be seen within a single year, both borrowings from 
and repayments to individual lenders such as John de Vescy 
and William of Hilton, suggesting these sources were used to 
cover short-term liquidity needs. The “Recepte fratris Willelmi de 
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Hexham” of 1330-1331 may be a chronological listing of items 
with periodic sub-totals which could have been an attempt to 
monitor cash flows during the year. An examination of a longer 
consecutive series of account-rolls, such as those covering the 
period from 1328-1340, and an analysis of receipts, expenditure, 
borrowings, and repayments therein may offer further insight 
into financial planning and cash budgeting at Durham Cathedral 
Priory. A review of other non-accounting material, such as the 
priory registers, may also provide background information on 
the financial state of the priory and the factors which may have 
led to changes in accounting practices. What can certainly be 
asserted at this stage, however, is that the finances reflected in 
the bursars’ accounts were finely tuned to ensure that receipts 
and expenses were on the whole in equilibrium with a small 
surplus being generated. This fine tuning highlights the impor-
tance of adequate financial controls to ensure that income was 
maximized and that the necessary funds were available to meet 
expenditure needs.
CONTROLS
Controls within and around the account-rolls include the 
separate disclosure of different categories of items, the increas-
ing precision in narrative description, the explanations offered 
for perceived variations from expected outcomes, balancing off, 
arithmetic accuracy, auditing, cross referencing to supporting 
schedules, and the monitoring of debtors and creditors.
The compotus rolls themselves constituted a financial con-
trol. The increasingly consistent format of the accounts, the 
regular order in which items were disclosed, and the use of sub-
headings and sub-totals for each category of receipts and expen-
diture made the identification of missing categories easier and 
facilitated the comparison of amounts between years. Many of 
the account-rolls were many feet in length, and so it would not 
have been easy to gain an overall picture of a year’s receipts and 
expenses at a glance. However, there survives a small indenture, 
some four and a half inches wide (Illustration 4), which com-
prises a list of all the sub-totals for an account. It has no title, 
but it evidently relates to the year 1313-1314 because its totals 
agree with the detailed account-roll for that year. It reduces the 
account for the year to 45 lines and would have enabled a re-
viewer to scan all the categories of receipts and expenditure and 
to form readily an impression of the inflows and outflows.
For a number of years, more than one copy of the account 
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exists. The importance of retaining duplicate copies in differ-
ent places was realized at an early date. The statutes of Prior 
Thomas of Melsonby of 1235 dictate that two copies of rent-rolls 
should be made so that if one be lost, the other might still be 
ILLUSTRATION 4
The Summary for 1313-14
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consulted [Raine, 1839, pp. xxxix-xl]. It seems likely that at least 
two copies of an account would have been prepared, one to be 
kept by the officer rendering the account and one to be kept cen-
trally. Where two accounts from the same year survive, they are 
not always identical. One may contain alterations perhaps made 
by the bursar, his scribe, or the auditors. Further detailed work 
may reveal the order in which different versions of the accounts 
were prepared, and which changes were made by the accountant 
and which imposed by the auditor.
Within the compotus rolls, it was felt necessary to highlight 
and disclose separately different categories of receipts and ex-
pense. In the 1292-1293 roll, loans to the bursar are included 
under varie recepte, whereas in later rolls, they are headed mutu-
aciones. Likewise payments received in advance are given their 
own heading of premanibus in later accounts rather than being 
included within the relevant receipts category as happened in 
some of the earlier accounts. Both of these disclosures were im-
portant as they represented prior claims on the future income of 
the house.
Within individual account categories, there is a trend to-
wards increasing detail and more precise description. The 1310-
1311 account discloses “45 quarters of oats bought, £7.17s.6d.,” 
whereas an account of 1333-1334 provides not only the total 
price, £18.15s., of the 60 quarters of malt bought, but also the 
price per quarter of 6s.3d. This enabled auditors to recalculate 
the total and to assess more readily whether the unit price was 
reasonable.6
For items where there was an apparent shortfall, an expla-
nation is often given on the face of the account. The phrase “et 
non plus quia” (and not more because) is frequently encoun-
tered. Thus, the 1310-1311 account states “£54.6s.8d. received 
from the tithes of the parish of Hesleden and not more because 
the tithe of Hesleden itself was sold for malt.” 
The balancing off at the foot of the account-rolls was done 
very much with the auditors in mind. Illustration 5 provides 
an example from the account-roll of 1292-1293. A total for pay-
ments was subtracted from a total for receipts, and the bursar 
was expected to be able to produce any surplus remaining or to 
explain its absence. These exoneraciones (explanations) in the 
6 The formulary of Beaulieu Abbey, which served as a guide for auditors, pro-
vides a table of standard costs for foodstuffs and clothing which could be com-
pared to actual prices paid and received [Hockey, 1975, pp. 52-55; Harvey, 1999, 
pp. 26-27].
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ILLUSTRATION 5
The Balancing-Off Section at the Foot of  
the Account-Roll of 1292-93
main took the form of arrears of income not actually received. 
Once all exoneraciones had been offered and the bursar 
had acknowledged that he owed a certain amount, any portion 
of this amount which he could not deliver in cash tended to be 
condoned. In the 1292-1293 account, this condonacio is for al-
most £9, a significant sum, and probably not a level with which 
rigorous auditors would have been satisfied. It is the largest con-
donacio found in the accounts surveyed. Later condonaciones 
are for much smaller amounts – 26s. in 1297-1298, 28s. in 
1310-1311, 4s. in 1318-1319, 7s. in 1329-1330, and 5s. in 1338-
1339. Subsequently, condonaciones disappear and any amount 
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remaining is carried forward and appears as an opening balance 
in the receipts section of the following year’s account. Thus, at 
the end of the 1349-1350 account, the bursar, John of Newton, 
“owes £74.18s.4¼d. for which he will give account in the next 
account-roll.” This is confirmed at the start of the account-roll 
for 1350-1351: “the same renders account for £74.18s.4¼d. re-
maining from the closing balance of the account of the preced-
ing year as appears at the foot of the same account.” This may 
be seen as evidence of a tightening-up by the auditors. Properly 
kept and complete accounts should not require the condonacio 
of lost revenue or unrecorded expenses.
Arithmetic accuracy was of vital importance in presenting 
meaningful accounts, and a recalculation of the arithmetic of 
the balancing-off sections has not revealed any significant er-
rors. However, other studies have revealed frequent arithmetical 
errors [Threlfall-Holmes, 2005, p. 31]. It could be that remaining 
accounts are not always the correct final version, or that errors 
have entered an account during careless copying from a correct 
version. The 1313-1314 roll includes the purchase of a computa-
torius for 6d. There is some doubt as to the precise definition of 
a computatorius, but it was likely to have been an item to assist 
in arithmetic calculations, perhaps a table or cloth marked with 
divisions for calculating totals.
That the accounts should have been audited is not in doubt. 
Innocent III (1198-1216) required the submission of annual ac-
counts by the superior and officials of a house, and Gregory IX 
(1227-1241) included the requirement for these to be audited 
in his statutes of 1235-1237 [Knowles, 1948, pp. 57-58]. The ef-
ficacy of the audit would have depended on the knowledge and 
experience of those auditing. It seems likely that at Durham 
as in other houses, the accounts were heard and reviewed by a 
body of senior and experienced monks. The presence or at least 
knowledge of the prior is indicated by an occasional reference to 
him at the foot of the account where the condonacio is said to be 
by his authority. Some priors are said to have had good financial 
skills. Prior Richard de Hoton (1290-1308), for example, claimed 
to have augmented the revenues of the priory [Fraser, 1957, pp. 
127-128].
The auditors’ task was aided by the frequent use of refer-
ences to subsidiary schedules and other accounts, directing their 
attention to the source of and breakdown for a figure as well as 
occasionally providing independent verification of the amount 
in an account prepared by a third party. In the 1310-1311 ac-
count, the phrase visis perticulis (according to the particulars) 
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appears some nine times in the expense section. Payments to 
and receipts from other priory officials could be checked with 
the amounts disclosed in their accounts. Thus, payments for 
expenses to the proctors of Norham and Scotland are described 
as “as shown in the account-roll of the proctor.” Payments to the 
manorial officials tended to be evidenced additionally by tally. 
The 1292-1293 roll includes “in payment to the manorial official 
of Pittington by two tallies £19.10s.”
References to other supporting schedules are illustrated in 
the account of 1278-1279 which provides very brief details of 
receipts but directs the reader to the source of the information. 
Thus, receipts of arrears can be checked to the magnum cirograf-
fum, the amounts due at Martinmas and Pentecost could be 
vouched to the rotulus sancti martini and the rotulus pentecost. 
Two such rolls survive from 1270 and 1273 [Lomas and Piper, 
1989, pp. 21-29]. Detailed schedules listing the receipts from the 
sale of tithes survive for many years, and the totals from these 
correspond to the summarized totals included in the account-
rolls.
Much of the emphasis within the accounts is on actual re-
ceipts and expenditure. However, the bursars also needed to be 
able to record and account for transactions which would be set-
tled in future periods. Procedures were developed for the moni-
toring of both debtors and creditors – the listing, review, and 
updating of arrears; the writing off of irrecoverable amounts; 
and the periodic listing of all loans contracted by the house.
In the consideration of the financial position (see above), 
it was noted that there was a significant difference between the 
receipts with which a bursar was charged and the amount which 
he in fact received (the difference arising from opening and clos-
ing arrears). The accounts reflect a growing awareness of this 
distinction in that until 1297-1298, a single sum total of receipts, 
including arrears brought forward, is given. However, in the ac-
count of 1310-1311 and thereafter, two totals are provided at the 
conclusion of the receipts section of the accounts, one relating 
to all the receipts except the arrears from prior years and the 
other including all receipts due including the arrears from prior 
years.
As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, the level of arrears ex-
ceeded £3,500 in 1310-1311. The monks as guardians of the 
assets of St. Cuthbert had a duty to gather and to protect his 
revenues, and thus, the monitoring of arrears was an important 
issue [Dobson, 1973, pp. 11-13]. Arrears were recorded on the 
magnum cirograffum. Between 1292 and 1318, this total appears 
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to have been included in the receipts due, which the then bursar 
was responsible for collecting. The total remaining on the mag-
num cirograffum at the end of the year was included in the exon-
eraciones at the end of the account. Such entries can be seen in 
the accounts of 1292-1293, 1297-1298, and 1310-1311.
The total amount of unreceived income for each compotus 
shows some striking features (Table 3, line 4) – a steady increase 
in arrears until 1318-1319, when a massive fall occurs; followed 
by an increase in 1329-1330, again with a subsequent drop in 
1338-1339, after which a more or less steady rise is sustained 
until the end of the period. These fluctuations reveal changes in 
accounting practice. Whereas in previous years the bursar was 
charged with “all the arrears and debts contained in the great 
chirograph,” in 1318-1319, he accounts only for “receipts from 
the great chirograph” rather than the total amount of arrears. 
Consequently, at the end of the account under exoneraciones, 
he includes only the arrears arising from the current year. The 
reason for the change in accounting practice is not known. Per-
haps it was felt that the inclusion of a large amount of old and 
perhaps irrecoverable debts was distorting the impression given 
by the accounts. As can be seen in Table 3, arrears dominated 
the receipts section of the accounts between 1292 and 1311.
However, after 1318-1319, there then seems to have oc-
curred a reversion to the old accounting practice. By the time 
of the start of the 1329-1330 account, arrears have built up to 
£1,309, and the reference is to “arreragiis contentis in cyrograffo” 
(arrears contained in the chirograph) which sounds as though 
a new record of debtors has been opened and that the bursars 
are once again being charged with the full amount of arrears 
contained therein. The operation of a new record appears to be 
confirmed by references in the account of 1335-1336 to receipts 
“from the old and the new chirographs.” From the year 1335-
1336, there also remains an indenture listing arrears received 
which shows that arrears as far back as 1315, presumably from 
the old chirograph, and also from more recent years between 
1329 and 1333 had been collected. This suggests that these chi-
rographs of arrears were maintained meticulously and regularly 
updated.
By the end of the period, the level of arrears has increased 
significantly. Total arrears are again being included rather than 
actual receipts. These arrears are identified with the name of the 
bursar during whose period of office they arose. Thus, the 1396-
1397 account includes arrears from the periods in office of the 
current bursar, Thomas Lythe, and of his predecessors – John of 
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Newburn, Robert of Claxton, Thomas of Corbridge, and “John 
of Berrington and the others before him.” Thus, the policy of 
whether to include total arrears due, or the more recent arrears, 
or the actual receipts seems to oscillate, and by the end of the 
period under review, all arrears which have not been written off 
appear to be included within receipts once again.
Although arrears appear to have been left on the chiro-
graphs for long periods, a new approach of writing off irrecov-
erable dues seems to emerge in the late 1340s. An indenture 
headed “Arreragia de quibus non est spes” (arrears for which 
there is no hope), has survived from 1348. In the 1350-1351 
account, new entries appeared in the exoneraciones section – de-
cayed rents and waste rents. These balances are not entered into 
the head of the next account. Waste and decay were evidently 
considered irrecoverable as soon as they were identified.
Lists of individually itemized arrears, including arrears or-
dered by township for halmote court and rental arrears, survive 
from several years as do schedules itemizing the arrears actually 
received. These can be agreed with the main account-rolls. Like-
wise subsidiary schedules detailing the decayed or waste rents 
for a year survive, which again provide a detailed breakdown of 
the single figures included within the main account-rolls.
If the monitoring of arrears was important to ensure that 
all revenues due to St. Cuthbert were collected as far a possible, 
the monitoring of creditors or of borrowings was equally im-
portant to ensure that the house did not become overburdened 
with debt which it would be unable to repay. It can be seen that 
given the small surpluses run in most years, borrowings were 
an important and necessary source of funds. New loans were 
recorded under mutuaciones within receipts, and repayments 
were recorded under soluciones debitorum within expenses, but 
the compotus roll itself did not give an indication of the full ex-
tent to which the house was indebted.
Contemporary sources reveal that the house struggled with 
its level of debt. Prior William of Tanfield (1308-1313) temporar-
ily withdrew assets from obedientiaries and used the proceeds 
to reduce debts [Cambridge, 1992, pp. 16-19]. An indenture of 
1391-1392, evidencing the monies borrowed by Thomas Lythe, 
bursar, reveals a receipt “from the lord bishop of Durham under 
the common seal for the payment of old debts, £200.” In 1405, it 
was commented: “The goods, rents and incomes...have been so 
notoriously wasted that they no longer suffice to pay the usual 
debts and support the convent in all its necessities” [Dobson, 
1973, pp. 250-251].
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Lists of creditors remain from 1330, 1331, 1333, and 1343. 
The 1330 schedule starts with debts incurred by the bursar or 
house, some 70 to 80 items. This is followed by amounts due 
to manorial officials for the superplusagia (the excess of their 
expenses over receipts) on their accounts. Finally, debts incurred 
by the cellarers are listed by cellarer and year from 1307 to 
1329, and a grand total of £1,277.4s.10½d. is given. This was a 
significant amount given that the receipts and expenses for the 
year 1329-1330 were £1,834 and £1,833 respectively.
Debts are not consolidated by creditor. For example, 
amounts due to the prior appear several times, indicating per-
haps that these amounts were taken from a chronological listing 
rather than from a listing of individual creditors. These debts 
were carefully monitored as can be illustrated by an amount due 
to Thomas del Holme for £314.10s. which is listed in this 1330 
account. Within soluciones debitorum of the 1330-1331 account, 
a sum of £156 is paid to del Holme, and in the list of debts com-
piled at the end of 1331, a new revised balance is shown. Further 
work on a greater number of accounts may allow a more reveal-
ing reconstruction of the net indebtedness of the house, clarify 
the need to raise debt finance, and identify attempts to control 
and repay the outstanding debt burden.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined a sample of 13 accounts from 
the bursar’s office covering the period 1278-1398. Sources of 
receipts, types of expenditure, and the format of the accounts 
have been described. An analysis of the accounts has allowed the 
calculation of the net surplus or deficit generated each year. This 
has revealed that once uncollected arrears have been excluded 
from receipts, the net surplus or deficit was of a very modest 
amount, and it appears that actual receipts and expenditure 
were very closely matched, indicating careful monitoring of the 
cash position. The accounts are largely concerned with receipts 
and expenditure, but an awareness of balance sheet issues is 
evidenced by the survival of schedules listing debtors and credi-
tors. These and other schedules, accounts, and records provided 
a system of cross-checks, which enabled auditors, if they chose, 
to verify and confirm the accounts presented to them.
The preparation of this paper has also identified a number 
of areas for further investigation, including an examination of 
other accounts from obedientiaries, proctors, and manorial offi-
cials to ascertain the proportion of the total receipts and expen-
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diture of the house accounted for by the bursar; more detailed 
comparisons of duplicate accounts to reconstruct their prepa-
ration and the audit process; an examination of consecutive 
accounts to draw out further information on the planning and 
cash management reflected in the bursars’ accounts; a review of 
other original source material for this period, such as the priory 
registers, to seek information on the impetus behind accounting 
changes; and a comparison of accounting procedures at Durham 
with those of other houses for which records remain, such as 
Canterbury, Norwich, Westminster, Winchester, and Worcester.
The comment of Dobson [1973, p. 259] that the financial or-
ganization at Durham and other houses cries out for a thorough 
reassessment is still valid. This paper is very much an initial step 
in an area which offers scope for much further investigation.
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